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ABSTRACT 
There is demand for police reform in the United States to reduce use of force and 
bias, and to improve police-citizen relationships. Many believe de-escalation should be a 
more central feature of police training and practice. It is suggested that improving 
officers’ communication and conflict resolution skills will temper police-citizen 
interactions and reduce police use of force, and that such a change will improve citizen 
trust in the police. To date, however, de-escalation training has not spread widely across 
agencies, and de-escalation as a strategy has not been studied. Without an evidence-based 
understanding of these concepts, de-escalation training will proceed blindly, if at all. 
Accordingly, this dissertation represents one of the first empirical studies of de-escalation 
in police work. The author completed this study as an embedded researcher in the 
Spokane (WA) Police Department, and it proceeds in two parts. Part 1 was exploratory 
and qualitative, consisting of in-depth interviews (N=8) and a focus group (N=1) with 
eight highly skilled police de-escalators. These officers were nominated by peers as the 
best among them at de-escalating difficult encounters with citizens. The results in Part 1 
explore officers’ perceptions of de-escalation and offer a definition of de-escalation as 
well as a description of de-escalation tactics. In Part 2, the author systematically observed 
the concepts developed in part 1 during 35 ride-alongs with 29 police officers, including 
the peer nominated officers (N=131 police-citizen encounters). This phase of the research 
investigated whether characteristics of officers, citizens, and situations are associated 
with de-escalation use, and de-escalation effectiveness. Implications from these findings 
are drawn for police practice, theory, and research methods. This dissertation is a 
launching point for empirical research on de-escalation in police work.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUTION 
“Although force is the core of the police role,  
the skill of policing consists of finding ways to avoid its use.”  
(Bittner, 1974, p. 40) 
 
Background 
American police have historically struggled to establish trust and legitimacy with 
the public, particularly in poor and minority communities. These problems have become 
pronounced recently, following several high profile deaths of unarmed black citizens by 
police. In particular, the two years following the fatal 2014 shooting of Michael Brown 
by a Ferguson, Missouri police officer have been called “the most widespread period of 
unrest since the 1960s” (Terrill, 2016, p. 491). A 2015 Gallup poll found that support for 
police fell as low as the rates seen in 1993 following the state trials of the officers who 
beat Rodney King. The poll found only 52% of American people have confidence in the 
police (Jones, 2015). Though by some measures these attitudes have improved, only 29% 
of black Americans currently report a great deal of confidence in the police (Newport, 
2016). According to James et al. (2016), “the police have gone from being the ‘good 
guys’ to being the ‘bad guys’… every use of deadly force (particularly against minority 
subjects) seems to be presumed unreasonable until proven otherwise” (pg. 49). There is a 
clear crisis of police-citizen relations in American society, and much of this problem is 
defined along racial lines. 
Michael Brown’s death had a uniquely poignant impact on the American public 
for several reasons (Pyrooz, Decker, Wolfe, & Shjarback, 2016). First, the event occurred 
in an era where the Internet and social media in particular permeate most areas of human 
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life. The circumstances surrounding Brown’s death spread like contagion online, causing 
the effects to be felt by people across the country instantaneously. Second, Brown’s death 
is a tangible representation of Americans’ natural aversion to heavy governmental 
intervention and control, especially in the use of coercive control (Walker, 1980).  
Finally, tension between police and minority citizens is not a new problem. 
According to Skolnick (2007), when one considers the historical context, the current 
atmosphere should come as little shock. The death of a black male at the hand of a white 
police officer is a proverbial “drop in the bucket” in racial tensions in American policing 
(Alexander, 2010; Dunham & Petersen, 2017; Skolnick, 2007; White & Fradella, 2016). 
Following the deaths of Trayvon Martin (by a white civilian) in 2012 and Michael Brown 
in 2014, riots began nation wide and #BlackLivesMatter grew into a national movement, 
mobilized by the belief that the police (and society in general) devalue black lives relative 
to white lives. Historically, similar riots have erupted following controversial cases of 
police force, notably across the country in the 1960s, in Los Angeles in the 1990s 
following the Rodney King incident, and in Miami (1980), St. Petersburg (1996), and 
Cincinnati (2001; White, 2014). Empirically, non-white citizens, especially African 
Americans, have reported more negative attitudes towards police than whites for as long 
as data are available (Decker, 1981; Newport, 2014, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2016; 
D. Smith, Graham, & Adams, 1991). Moreover, minority citizens’ attitudes are more 
adversely affected by instances of police brutality and for longer periods of time (Lasley, 
1994; Tuch & Weitzer, 1997). Current events are, therefore, a continuation in the pattern 
of public outrage over systemic racial problems in American policing and criminal 
justice. 
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Officers acknowledge that increased anti-police sentiment and negative publicity 
adversely affects their jobs (Morin, Parker, Stepler, & Mercer, 2017; T. Williams, 
2015b). Others have linked the events in Ferguson and aftermath to rise in crime 
(Christine, 2014; Mac Donald, 2016; Schmidt & Apuzzo, 2015; Rosenfeld, 2016). In 
extreme cases, the current climate has motivated executions of police officers. For 
example, in December 2014, two police officers in Brooklyn, New York were shot and 
killed “execution-style” as they sat in their patrol car (Mueller & Baker, 2014). Prior to 
the shooting, the assailant announced via social media that his anger over the deaths of 
Michael Brown and Eric Garner motivated him to kill police officers. In August 2015, a 
Houston police deputy was ambushed and fatally shot 15 times as he was pumping gas in 
his police uniform (The Associated Press, 2015). The only motive for the killing 
identified by investigators was that the deputy was wearing a law enforcement uniform. 
In July 2016, five Dallas officers were killed by a lone sniper immediately following the 
in-custody deaths of Philando Castile and Alton Sterling, both African Americans 
(Karimi, Shoichet, & Ellis, 2016). In the wake of these tragedies, police officers express 
concerns for their safety and many believe “it’s a different world” for law enforcement 
today (Morin et al., 2017; Rubin, Hennessy-Fiske, & Winton, 2015). 
The everyday operations of the police have also been transformed by a growing 
culture of recording the police. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU, 
2017) has a virtual Community Action Manual for combating police abuse of human 
rights. Similarly Cop Block (www.copblock.org) is dedicated to capturing and evaluating 
the actions of the police in the interest of uncovering misconduct. In combination with 
this culture of scrutiny, the pervasiveness of cell phone video cameras and police officer 
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body-worn cameras have placed U.S. police under a magnifying glass. As a result, 
findings from one simulation-based study suggests concerns about the aftermath of 
officer-involved shootings may be impacting officers’ in-the-moment decision-making, 
perhaps by causing officers to hesitate before shooting black suspects (James, James, & 
Vila, 2016). Another study found some officers are less motivated to work as a result of 
the increased scrutiny (i.e. depolicing; Nix & Wolfe, 2017). A third found that Missouri 
police officers in the “post-Ferguson” era are engaging in less proactive policing in 
predominantly African American municipalities (Shjarback, Pyrooz, Wolfe, & Decker, in 
press). 
Understanding the relationship between race and police use of force has been 
challenging. One major explanation is a lack of data. While homicides committed by 
civilians in the United States are well documented, as are police line of duty deaths 
(Borrego, 2011; Krieger, Chen, Waterman, Kiang, & Feldman, 2015), there is still no 
reliable data documenting how often U.S. police use force (Fyfe, 2002; Geller & Scott, 
1992; Klinger, Rosenfeld, Isom, & Deckard, 2016; White, 2016). White (2016) outlines 
several plausible reasons why this data is not collected: 1) the existence of other (albeit 
insufficient) efforts to collect this data, 2) the infrequency of police use of force, 3) the 
difficulty in compiling nationally representative data, 4) police culture’s adherence to 
secrecy and solidarity, 5) the “split second syndrome” (whereby the value of post hoc 
critiques of police actions is downplayed), and 6) the critical argument that efforts to 
document police use of force would threaten the dominant status of the racial and social 
majority and contradict the argument that criminal actions are perpetrated more often by 
minority groups. As such, we have no systematically collected data indicating how often 
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police use non-deadly force, how often citizens die at the hands of the police, how many 
of these deaths occurred for reasons other than police intervention (e.g. drug intoxication, 
suicide), and how many of these deaths were unnecessary or preventable. We do not 
know who is most often subjected to force. We do not even know if use of force is 
increasing or decreasing. 
Some efforts are underway to rectify this problem. In October 2016, the Justice 
Department announced a comprehensive plan to develop a national database on police 
use of force (U.S. Attorney General, 2016). Several recent media-driven efforts have also 
been undertaken to collect these data. For example, the Washington Post compiled a data 
set of individuals shot and killed by police in the United States annually (Kindy & Elliott, 
2015; Kindy, Fisher, Tate, & Jenkins, 2015). These data indicate that American police 
shot and killed 990 people in 2015, of whom 291 were black (Nix, Campbell, Byers, & 
Alpert, 2017). Similarly, The Guardian’s (2017) project “The Counted” aims to “count 
the number of people killed by police…monitor their demographics and…tell the stories 
of how they died.” These media based data are limited, however, to only citizens who are 
fatally shot by police (Klinger & Slocum, 2017). 
Another challenge hindering our understanding of the relationship between race 
and police force is methodological. It is exceedingly difficult to isolate the specific 
factors that influence officers’ in-the-moment decision making. Laboratory based 
experiments of police use of force shed light on this issue (James, James, et al., 2016; 
James, Klinger, & Vila, 2014), though are limited in their generalizability to the real 
world environment (Terrill, 2016). A third challenge relates to the precarious position 
held by police in American society (Bittner, 1970). Our society calls upon the police to 
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perform difficult, sometimes violent actions, and frequently on a moment’s notice with 
inadequate or inaccurate information. These circumstances can lead to the use of tactical 
methods that may appear crude to the outside observer, especially in the light of next day 
review with the benefit of more scrupulous and dissociated consideration. Officers are 
asked to enforce the law against those who break it – “given the choice, very few of the 
clients arrested or brought to book by the police would consent to this” (Fyfe, 1986, p. 
213).  Naturally, this role places the police in an opposing, confrontational position. Since 
disorder and crime are more concentrated in certain populations and social spaces, the 
nature of police enforcement and surveillance is inherently disproportionate and stirs 
animosity among those most targeted by police attention (Bittner, 1970). As a result, 
disentangling the relationships between criminal involvement, race, and the policing of 
minority citizens is challenging. 
Though research has highlighted the persisting damaged relationship between 
police and minorities for decades, it is possible the intense climate has finally brought us 
to a tipping point. For example, by December 2014, demands for law enforcement reform 
became so mainstream that President Barack Obama ordered a Presidential Task Force on 
21st Century Policing to conduct nationwide inquiries into American policing (The 
Executive Office of the President, 2014). The Task Force produced a final report in May 
2015 with more than 60 recommendations to the President for improving police-
community relations (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015). These 
recommendations focused on improving the quality of police-citizen interactions, 
increasing transparency and accountability, enhancing community involvement in crime 
control, identifying alternatives to arrest, increasing diversity in police personnel, and 
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improving use of force and decision making training. One suggestion in particular was to 
make de-escalation a core philosophy of police training and practice. Agencies, 
politicians, and researchers have jumped on a number of the report’s recommendations 
(for example, body-worn cameras). Others, like de-escalation, have not yet been 
examined in empirical research. The current study addresses this research gap. 
 
Research Problem 
The first problem addressed in the current dissertation is the lack of existing 
research on police de-escalation. The use of de-escalation has received nationwide 
attention and support from a number of sources, particularly among federal government 
and policing research organizations. Among the many recommendations put forth by 
President’s Task Force’s was that “law enforcement agency policies for training on use of 
force should emphasize de-escalation and alternatives to arrest or summons in situations 
where appropriate.” The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) has made similar 
recommendations over the past several years –  “We sometimes find that while the 
shooting may be legally justified, there were missed opportunities to ratchet down the 
encounter, to slow things down, to call in additional resources, in the minutes before the 
shooting occurred.” A recently issued National Consensus Policy on Use of Force (2017), 
developed in a collaboration between eleven national police organizations, also 
incorporated de-escalation: “An officer shall use de-escalation techniques and other 
alternatives to higher levels of force” whenever possible before resorting to physical 
force (pg. 3). Despite these recommendations, however, de-escalation has not generated 
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much empirical attention. In fact, research on the nature and effectiveness of de-
escalation tactics, training, and policies is virtually nonexistent (Terrill, 2016). 
It is generally argued that de-escalation will reduce the rate at which police use 
force by improving officers’ skills for resolving conflict without getting physical, 
particularly in highly combative or tense situations (Oliva, Morgan, & Compton, 2010). 
These skills are just as important as police training in physical force and defensive 
tactics, since the majority of police activity involves problem solving, helping, and order 
maintenance tasks rather than crime fighting (Walker & Katz, 2013). Further, since 
interacting with individuals who present special problems (such as mentally ill persons, 
juveniles, or groups who are especially hostile towards the police) are an engrained part 
of police work, developing skills and tactics for peacefully and effectively 
communicating with unique and difficult populations is crucial. These types of calls for 
service can be especially challenging and stressful for responding officers, and also tend 
to incite the most public outrage in the aftermath of a tragedy since such populations are 
viewed as vulnerable and needing protection (PERF, 2012, 2016).  
Even the concept of “de-escalation” itself (in reference to the policing strategy) is 
not well-defined or universally understood. Many police, for example, believe the 
strategy to be nothing more than “a rose by any other name” or a buzz word. For 
example, some claim it is another way of describing the “verbal judo” tactic espoused by 
Thompson in the 1980s (Dart, 2016). Flosi (2016) noted that most officers have for 
decades received some form of de-escalation training, including effective 
communications, verbal persuasion, using distance, cover, and time when appropriate, 
and Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training. Further, officers say they develop and hone 
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de-escalation skills themselves in the field, over thousands of public interactions that had 
the potential to become violent. More generally, many U.S. police have been vocal in 
their beliefs that recommendations put forth by the Task Force (2015) and others (PERF, 
2016) were based on misinformed realities of police work and de-escalation (Flosi, 2016; 
Force Science, 2016; Jackman, 2016; Martinelli, 2016; T. Williams, 2015a). They argue 
that “outsiders” tend to overestimate the potential for de-escalation to successfully 
resolve tense encounters, given the uncertainty and danger officers face on a daily basis. 
Most ardently, officers argue that increased pressure on police to de-escalate will put 
them in danger because they will attempt to use verbal tactics when it is unsafe to do so. 
PERF (2012) has characterized de-escalation as any alternative to use of force and 
lists a wide array of tactics for accomplishing this goal, including slowing situations 
down, CIT skills, and identifying and making considerations for special consumers of 
police services such as veterans and the mentally ill. The National Consensus Policy on 
Use of Force (2017) defined de-escalation as follows. 
“Taking an action or communicating verbally or non-verbally during a potential 
force encounter in an attempt to stabilize the situation and reduce the immediacy 
of the threat so that more time, options, and resources can be called upon to 
resolve the situation without the use of force or with a reduction in the force 
necessary. De-escalation may include the use of such techniques as command 
presence, advisements, warnings, verbal persuasion and tactical repositioning” 
(pg. 2).  
 
Generally, these organizations and others have argued that police use of force will 
decrease in frequency if police training more comprehensively covers and emphasizes de-
escalation tactics. Furthermore, in contrast with officers’ claims, they argue that de-
escalation skills will increase officer safety since it will provide officers with a more 
comprehensive skill set for addressing problematic situations and will decrease the 
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overall chances that violence will occur. However, as these examples demonstrate, 
exactly what these tactics or techniques are is not very clear. While there seems to be a 
consensus that de-escalation is “not force,” a specified definition of what de-escalation is 
and a standardized set of tactics do not exist.  
As a consequence of this conceptual ambiguity, an empirical analysis of de-
escalation is first needed to identify a concrete definition of its purpose, goals, and tactics 
to assist in the development of future research and ultimately so standardized policies and 
training can be created and properly evaluated. Such a conceptual analysis should collect 
data from officers, citizens, experts, and other relevant stakeholders. In particular, 
research on officer perceptions is needed to identify how the strategy is currently being 
used and to understand what types of calls officers typically respond to in which de-
escalation tactics are less effective or unsafe. Research should also investigate the extent 
to which officers believe training is lacking in teaching this strategy. Because many of 
the current controversies in policing stem from citizen disenchantment with current 
police practices, investigations into citizen perceptions of de-escalation are also 
imperative so de-escalation training can be developed and implemented with legitimacy 
in mind. Finally, an analysis of police-citizen encounters is needed, which examines how 
officer, citizen, and situational characteristics influence the effectiveness of these tactics. 
Ultimately, this form of conceptual and practical research analysis will be mutually 
beneficial to both police, who will be best equipped to safely neutralize potentially 
violent situations, and the public, who have the collective right to expect that police 
authority is used legitimately, competently, fairly, and in good faith (Reiman, 1985). 
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The second problem addressed in the current dissertation is a lack of research on 
good police work more generally (Fyfe, 1986, 1993; Klockars, 1996). Over the past half 
century or so, research has considerably advanced our knowledge of the causes and 
consequences of “police malpractice” in important ways (Kane & White, 2013, p. 165). 
Studies have extensively investigated officer misconduct (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 
1998), including career ending misconduct (Gaub, 2015; Kane & White, 2013), crimes 
(Stinson, 2015), corruption (Punch, 2009; Sherman, 1978), and excessive force (Geller & 
Toch, 1959). Studies have also examined “rotten” departments, organizational settings in 
which police deviance is tolerated or even encouraged, as well as the influence of the 
larger police culture on individual officer behavior (Punch, 2003; Skolnick & Fyfe, 
1993).  Generally speaking, we have a large body of literature on “bad” policing and the 
best practices for minimizing these behaviors and their consequences. These facts led 
Kane and White (2013) to argue policing research should transition to a discourse on 
“good policing,” a term coined by Fyfe (1993). Fyfe was noted for his approach to the 
study of police accountability not in terms of minimizing abuse as much as in producing 
good police work (Kane & White, 2013). He argued these two concepts are conceptually 
different and must be approached separately (see also White, 2010). In the context of 
police use of force, Fyfe (1986) argued there is a conceptual difference between 
extralegal (e.g. clearly excessive, brutal, abusive) forms of police violence, and legal yet 
unnecessary violence. It is easy for outsiders to conclude that a use of force is excessive, 
or motivated by the officer’s racial prejudice or emphatic aggressiveness. However, 
egregious forms of police violence occur far less frequently, and inflict less collective 
harm, than unnecessary police violence. Unnecessary violence occurs when well-
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meaning officers are incapable of handling a particular situation without hastily resorting 
to physical means of solving the problem. This form of violence occurs due to 
incompetence and inadequate training. Excessive force and other forms of misconduct 
that stem from officers’ unconscious or implicit biases may also contribute to 
unnecessary police violence (Fridell, 2013; James, Fridell, & Straub, 2016). Accordingly, 
Fyfe (1986) called for research examining how good policing is performed, not only to 
reduce extralegal forms of police abuse of force but also to minimize the use of 
unnecessary force, which is a more common problem. Research investigating the nature 
and impact of de-escalation strategies in policing would certainly take a step towards 
fulfilling these authors’ recommendations and move towards an empirical understanding 
of “good” policing. 
In summary, the preceding sections demonstrate there is a history of animosity 
and tension between the police and many segments of the population they serve, 
especially minority communities. According to the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing, “since the 1990s, policing has become more effective, better equipped, 
and better organized to tackle crime. Despite this… the public’s confidence in police 
work has remained flat, and among some populations of color, confidence has declined” 
(pg. 9). The tension has intensified considerably since the death of Michael Brown 
brought the police-citizen relationship to the very forefront of American dialogue. Use of 
force by police lies at the center of this controversy, as many people believe the police 
abuse their authority to use physical and deadly force. Unfortunately, our ability to fully 
understand this problem has been thus far obstructed by a lack of national data on one 
hand, and a near exclusive focus among policing researchers on “bad” policing on the 
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other. Progress towards repairing the relationship between the police and the American 
public will require policing scholars to initiate a dialogue on what constitutes “good” 
policing. Such a dialogue will range from inquiries into proper and fair use of force, to 
the intricacies of everyday verbal communications between officers and community 
residents.  
 
Dissertation Overview 
The current study is one of the first to investigate the topic of de-escalation since 
the strategy was cited as a critical mechanism for achieving police legitimacy by the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing in 2015, and was incorporated into the 
National Consensus Policy on Use of Force (2017). The study proceeds in two parts. The 
first part is a qualitative exploration of the concept of police de-escalation from the 
perspective of highly skilled police de-escalators. This part of the project asks: What are 
highly skilled officers’ perceptions of de-escalation?  The second part of the project 
employs a quantitative inquiry into the use of de-escalation by officers in the field, using 
the Systematic Social Observation method on police ride alongs, and answers the 
question: What characteristics of officers, situations, and citizens are associated with 
police use of de-escalation, and de-escalation effectiveness? 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Following this introductory chapter, 
Chapter 2 provides an empirical foundation for research on de-escalation in police work. 
This chapter begins with historical and contemporary knowledge concerning the role of 
race in police history, as well as the mission of the police, placing research on de-
escalation and violence reduction into historical and sociological context. Chapter 2 then 
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synthesizes current empirical knowledge on use of force, police-citizen transactions, and 
good police work. In Chapter 3, the methodology used in the current study is described, 
covering the methods for gaining access to the research setting, the sampling frame, data 
collection, the research purpose and questions, and analytic strategies. Chapter 4 presents 
the results from Part 1, the qualitative portion of this study. Chapter 5 presents Part 2, the 
quantitative results. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the findings for 
research, theory, and police practice. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Police-citizen relationships and racialized tension in American policing are some 
of the most pressing social problems of our time. A benefit of the recent crisis is it has 
generated momentum for reform. Many suggest de-escalation may be a solution to 
problems in policing because it trains officers to defuse conflict and handle potentially 
violent situations without using force. De-escalation has received a lot of attention but 
remains unstudied. The conceptual and theoretical foundations of de-escalation are 
consequently undefined and lack a clear direction moving forward. Accordingly, this 
chapter provides the historical, theoretical, and empirical foundations for research on 
police de-escalation. The chapter first reviews the historical evolution of American 
policing and de-escalation is discussed as a potential mechanism for addressing historical 
and contemporary problems. Next, this chapter considers the complex issue of the police 
role in society. Saving lives, enforcing the law, keeping the peace, and maintaining public 
trust have each been suggested as a fundamental role of the police. De-escalation is 
offered as a means for pursuing all of these roles. Finally, this chapter reviews evidence 
on use of force, police-citizen transactions, and good police work. In doing so, the review 
provides an empirical foundation for de-escalation research moving forward. 
 
Historical Context 
American Police Beginnings 
The origins of American policing, including its community-based patrol system 
and focus on crime prevention, stem from its English heritage (Uchida, 2015). In colonial 
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America, the design and intentions of police work were not specific. County sheriffs, 
constables, and various forms of night watchmen comprised the law enforcement system 
and were responsible for a wide range of tasks including enforcement of the law and 
maintaining community order, as well as tax collection and street lamp maintenance. 
Officers were responsible for maintaining their own neighborhoods and responded 
reactively to the diverse requests of local residents. American law enforcement was 
unique for this small and localized form of law enforcement. This model was desirable to 
Americans, according to Walker (1992b), because they were averse to big government 
authority – a response to the oppression experienced under previous British control. Most 
Americans felt police officers should have minimal control and a civilian orientation, in 
contrast to the militarized forces of Italy, Spain, and Germany, and the centrally 
controlled model of England (Fogelson, 1977). This form of policing was sufficient to 
handle crime and disorder in the small, homogeneous, and stable early American cities 
(Walker, 1980). 
As America expanded through immigration and over the course of the Industrial 
Revolution in the 1700s, large urban city centers developed and American society 
diversified (Dunham & Alpert, 2015; Fogelson, 1977; Uchida, 2015; Walker, 1980). 
With diversification came new viewpoints regarding acceptable moral values and formal 
laws. Crime and rioting became more common. Communities struggled to maintain 
stability and conformity through informal social control and the small, decentralized law 
enforcement system. With population growth it also became increasingly difficult for 
civilians and criminals to recognize police officers without official uniforms. As a result, 
the organization, strategies, and mission of the police necessarily evolved and grew more 
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complex. Larger, organized police forces were formed in many of the major American 
cities from the 1860s through the 1890s, based on the London Metropolitan Police model 
developed by Sir Robert Peel, Britain’s Home Secretary (Reisig, 2010; Uchida, 2015). 
The London model was established in 1829 and is considered the first modern police 
department, with its primary function to reduce crime and maintain public safety. Styling 
after this model, officers in America were given uniforms and weapons and received 
professional training, seeking to increase the legitimacy of the profession by replicating 
the appearances and practices of the military (Fogelson, 1977). They also built station 
houses to make officers more readily available in case of emergency. Many American 
citizens still held reservations about a large, uniformed police patrol force “occupying” 
their neighborhoods, as would an army. Nevertheless, once the largest U.S. cities such as 
New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Cincinnati created modern police forces, the new 
model diffused rapidly. 
American police agencies did not adopt Peel’s London model wholesale (Miller, 
1977). Both the London and American systems were grounded in a preventive patrol 
strategy according to the deterrence model, which believed a prominent, moving, well-
marked patrol force would deter criminal activity. However, England’s police system was 
highly centralized, while America’s was decentralized. Police forces in England were 
organized as extensions of the national government and were completely removed from 
the influence of public opinion (Uchida, 2015). American departments maintained their 
local affiliations and were effectively extensions of municipal political factions. Officers 
were selected for their positions by local politicians. For this reason, they were largely 
left to their own guises and primarily responded to specific requests from community 
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members (Fogelson, 1977). London’s “bobbies” (a name derived from their developer Sir 
Robert Peel) were heavily constrained by legal and institutional influence (Uchida, 2015). 
Fogelson (1977) identifies the close relationships between American police and the 
political machines in this era as the defining characteristic setting American police apart 
from all other European models. 
Peel’s London model remains the dominant organizing prototype of American 
law enforcement agencies today. However, within this model, the strategies used by 
police departments have evolved alongside societal shifts and technological advances. In 
one commonly cited framework, three eras of American policing are identified, each 
reflecting a distinct professional ethos of the police (Fogelson, 1977; Kelling & Moore, 
1988): the political era (1840s to early 1900s), the reform era (1920s to 1970s) and the 
community problem solving era (into the 21st century). Kelling and Moore’s model 
defines each era along seven organizational dimensions: legitimacy, function, 
organizational design, external relationships, demand management, strategies and 
technology, and outcomes. There are scholarly criticisms of this model, namely that it 
neglects the fundamental role of minority citizens in shaping American police history (H. 
Williams & Murphy, 1988). Below, a critical model is incorporated into Kelling and 
Moore’s framework to provide a more complete picture of American police history. 
White and Fradella’s (2016) identification of a new era of 21st century policing is also 
discussed. 
 
19 
Traditional and Critical Models of Police History 
Kelling and Moore (1988) define the political era of the police beginning in the 
1840s and ending in the early 1900s. As the name suggests, officers earned or bought 
their positions from local political leaders. They were held to no standards, selection 
criteria, or testing requirements, and officers received almost no training (see also 
Fogelson, 1977; White & Fradella, 2016). Police legitimacy was derived from political 
support. Officers served a variety of functions, including crime control and order 
maintenance, and also provided an array of services to their local communities including 
helping neighbors find work and volunteering at the soup kitchen (Kelling & Moore, 
1988). The primary law enforcement strategy was random foot patrol, and officers paid 
special attention to the requests of citizens, since their sponsoring politicians encouraged 
them to keep constituents happy. In addition to a decentralized organizational structure, 
limits in communication technology rendered officers largely independent from the 
demands of supervisors.  
This independence, close relationships between policing and politics, and 
inadequate selection and training standards bred rampant corruption in the political era. 
On one hand, officers tended to be well regarded by neighborhood residents because 
random foot patrol practices encouraged daily interactions and familiarity. On the other 
hand, a strong sense of community, a loose command structure, and encouragement from 
politicians also fostered strong distrust of outsiders, particularly immigrants. Fogelson 
(1977) described policing in the political era as law enforcement on an ethnic basis. 
Kelling and Moore (1988) acknowledge that discrimination and abuse were common – 
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“Ruling their beats with the ‘ends of their nightsticks,’ police regularly targeted outsiders 
and strangers for rousting and “curbstone justice” (pg. 4).  
In addition, though studies of police were rare until the 1950s, scholars have 
documented the persistent oppression of African Americans among police throughout this 
era. Blackmon (2009)’s analysis of historical documents from the American South since 
the end of the Civil War uncovered a pattern and practice of convict leasing, during 
which police selectively arrested African American freedmen for arbitrary offenses, who 
were subsequently traded by the courts to work camps to pay off fines, many until their 
death. In this way, official laws, police policies, and courtroom practices were used to 
maintain a steady source of free black slave labor even after slavery was outlawed. These 
practices persisted until World War II, when the “leader of the free world” grew 
increasingly embarrassed about inconsistencies between its condemnation of German 
concentrations camps and its own system of neoslavery (Alexander, 2010). Sociologists 
have also documented how actions of police in response to race riots during the political 
era through the Civil Rights era highlight an ideological disregard for the lives of black 
rioters. Grimshaw’s (1963) depiction of police response to the 1917 race riots in East St. 
Louis, Illinois shows officers allowing white mobs to take their weapons and use them 
against blacks. The commanding officer in charge was ultimately indicted for failing to 
quell the increasingly violent crowd and instead watching as mobs murdered minorities in 
the street. 
Critical scholars attribute these problems to the origin of American policing as a 
sanctioned institution for controlling the powerless and the “outsider,” with a particular 
emphasis on the subjugation of blacks. They point out that officers in the pre-Civil War 
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South conducted slave patrols to ensure slavery and segregation rules were enforced, 
limit resistance, authorize acts of discrimination against blacks, and generally keep “the 
Negro in his place” (Skolnick, 2007, p. 65; see also, Alexander, 2010; H. Williams & 
Murphy, 1988; Walker, 1977; The Center for Research on Criminal Justice, 1977). Many 
view the function of contemporary law enforcement as an extension of these racist 
institutions. In its report “The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove” the Center for Research on 
Criminal Justice (1977) defined the role of modern police as enforcing class, race, sex, 
and culture oppression, and protecting the power and property of the rich from the less 
fortunate. Rather than fundamental to the functioning and safety of a modern society, 
these authors perceived the police as a means to control and exploit minorities. 
Concerns about corruption, structural disorganization, and political interference 
prompted demands for police reform (Kelling and Moore, 1988), and the concept of 
professionalism took hold of American policing in the early 20th century (Walker, 1977, 
1984). Proponents of reform believed the criminal laws should be the sole source of 
police legitimacy, and that officers should not be expected to accommodate a citizen’s 
every request. O.W. Wilson emphasized the law enforcement mission of the police and 
the need for improved efficiency to achieve this mission. Professionalism was also 
famously touted by August Vollmer, a vocal police reformer and later Police Chief of 
Berkeley, California. Kelling and Moore (1988) propose that American policing entered a 
reform era beginning in the 1920s and extended through the 1970s. 
These changes in police management ideals reflected broader developments in 
organizational philosophy at the time. Classical organization theory dictates that 
organizations be rational, standardized, and efficient (Reisig, 2010; Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 
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2011). It calls for heavy centralized control, strict guidelines for employee behavior, 
specialization, and limited discretion. The model further emphasizes numeric indicators 
of performance. According to these bureaucratic principles, police departments in the 
reform era disassociated themselves from political influence, adopted a centralized 
internal command structure, and implemented a hierarchical promotion structure based 
on the military model (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Hiring standards were implemented and 
in more standardized and regimented training, new officers were taught they were 
professional crime fighters, to make decisions with strict adherence to criminal statutes, 
and to regard citizens only as sources of information (reflecting the rational and 
impersonal principles of classical theory). Departments also began to report arrest and 
crime rates as indicators that they were doing something to reduce crime. Finally, with 
the invention of the automobile, the telephone, and two-way radios, the 9-1-1 emergency 
system was implemented in 1968. Officers were encouraged to respond as quickly as 
possible to these calls to demonstrate efficiency and professionalism.  
There was great enthusiasm for efficiency and innovation in American policing 
during this time (H. Goldstein, 1990). In addition, the reforms of the era appeared to curb 
much of the corruption caused by political interference and lack of oversight. American 
citizens had also come to expect a higher quality of life, and considered it the duty of 
police to respond to their requests as quickly as possible (Walker, 1984). Because of 
these positive changes, Goldstein (1990) argued that the problems with the professional 
model went largely unnoticed or ignored for many decades. Police-citizen relationships 
had deteriorated. A strict adherence by police agencies to classical theory and 
bureaucratic principles partially explains these problems. Negative customer relationships 
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have been identified as an adverse consequence of bureaucracy generally (Angell, 1971). 
In the interest of efficiency, officer discretion was heavily constrained in the reform era 
(Kelling & Moore, 1988). Standardized solutions to problems were developed and 
officers were expected to employ these indiscriminately. Another problem was fast 
response times to calls for service were demanded above all other metrics of success. In 
an effort to handle all of their calls in a timely manner, officers rushed through the job, 
often failing to address actual problems and leaving citizens unsatisfied. As Angell 
(1971) argued, this method of law enforcement is not only ineffective, it can be 
inherently discriminatory against the disadvantaged. Additionally, random vehicle patrol 
replaced foot patrol as the primary strategy (though Walker (1984) observed that eastern 
U.S. cities still made heavy use of foot patrol during this time). While patrol vehicles 
made officers more efficient, they created an impersonal, reserved, and distant 
relationship with the public, which made citizens feel at best estranged from officers and 
at worst heavily surveilled (J. Q. Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Finally, the homogeneous 
makeup of police forces, which tended to be exclusively conservative, white, and middle 
class men increasingly alienated more and more of the American population as it 
diversified and expanded (Kappeler et al., 1998; Kerner Commission, 1968).  
Not until the unrest of the 1960s, and the civil rights and antiwar movements in 
particular, were the flaws of the professional police model confronted (H. Goldstein, 
1990). Despite efforts to improve police tactics, refine personnel selection processes, and 
reduce corruption, police legitimacy had taken a significant downturn, even among the 
majority population (H. Goldstein, 1990; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Reisig, 2010). 
Certainly, minority communities had come to view the police as bulwarks against society, 
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and they feared and hated police (Fogelson, 1977). In the broader context, crime rates 
doubled between 1960 and 1970 (Uchida, 2015) – and Martinson’s (1974) adage that 
“nothing works” became the predominant criminological thinking of the era. A 
presidential commission created to study the crime issue submitted a final report with a 
telling title: “The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society” (President’s Commission on 
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967). Some members of the public 
became increasingly aware of discrepancies between the treatment of white and minority 
citizens in the criminal justice system, and “the police became the symbol of a society 
that denied blacks equal justice under the law” (Uchida, 2015, p. 24). Others, as 
Alexander (2010) notes, reluctantly adjusted their rhetoric as “the rules of acceptable 
discourse changed” during the Civil Rights era and it became less socially acceptable to 
espouse white supremacist ideas (pg. 43). The issue of race and policing could not, 
however, be ignored. Most of the riots between the 1960s and 70s stemmed from a 
routine police incident, and especially a police shooting of a black citizen.  
Faced with widespread citizen disenchantment with police, President Lyndon B. 
Johnson appointed a National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders (Kerner 
Commission, 1968). Previous research had uncovered extreme or considerable prejudice 
against blacks among U.S. police officers (Skolnick, 1969). Westley’s (1951; 1953) 
classic observational studies of police documented a defining ritual of police culture was 
to ridicule blacks, and a pervasive belief that illegitimate violence against blacks was 
justified because “certain groups will respond only to fear and rough treatment” (1953, 
pg. 40). In its investigation, the Kerner Commission (1968) identified institutional racism 
as an underlying source of the tensions between the police and citizens. The report 
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highlighted the especially strained relationship between cops and people of color, 
harassment and abuse of minorities, and racial bias in law enforcement and use of force. 
One recommendation from the report was that police departments should hire more 
minorities, since agencies cannot be legitimate unless they represent and understand the 
communities they serve (Alex, 1969). A second recommendation was for the 
development of programs to promote police-community partnerships in crime control. 
Additionally, reflecting perceptions that police were ineffective at controlling crime and 
only served to increase fear of victimization, the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration (LEAA) was created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968 (Diegelman, 1982; The Center for Research on Criminal Justice, 1977). LEAA 
was the first significant effort in this country’s history to legitimize federal influence in 
local law enforcement. Its mission was to encourage state controlled structure, provide 
technical and financial assistance, conduct research, and develop and issue new crime 
control methods. The creation of LEAA highlights there was a high level of bipartisan 
support for increasing resources to the criminal justice system to increase its ability to 
affect crime. 
In response to public demands for police reform, heated and violent memories of 
the Civil Rights Movement, and the Kerner Commission’s (1968) recommendations, 
police departments strove to show that they were rededicating themselves to the 
community they had alienated. This shift was also prompted by a growing body of 
research on policing and the causes of crime, which resulted in an “enormous expansion 
of our knowledge about all aspects of policing” (Walker, 1984, p. 79). This growth in 
research encouraged departments to seek strategies that “worked” and to leave behind 
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those that did not. Kelling and Moore (1988) accordingly identify the years following the 
1970s as the community problem solving era.  
Efforts by police during this time were dedicated to improving public perceptions 
of police as public servants, rather than occupying armies. Kelling and Moore (1988) 
note that legitimacy during the community problem solving era was derived from both 
the law and the quality of an agency’s relationship with its community. Accordingly, foot 
patrol returned as a predominant strategy, based on the assumption that a visible police 
presence would reduce fear of crime and increase informal, positive police contacts with 
the community (Kelling & Moore, 1988). The community problem solving era was also 
characterized by numerous innovations in police strategies. Crime prevention became a 
new focus, in stark contrast to the exclusive emphasis on rapid response to calls and 
arrests rates of previous decades. Crime prevention was theorized as a product of strong 
community-police partnerships, localized problem solving (e.g. problem oriented 
policing; H. Goldstein, 1979), and order maintenance. A major influence was the 
publication of Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) broken windows theory, which fostered great 
enthusiasm for order maintenance policing (and in some cases, zero tolerance policing). 
The broken windows theory hypothesized that if police address minor disorder problems 
it would not only reduce fear of crime but would actually have a preventative effect on 
more serious crime, since orderly neighborhoods signal to criminals that the area is not a 
good environment for offending. A prominent order maintenance strategy was the “Terry 
stop,” or the “stop, question, and frisk.” The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the authority of 
police to conduct Terry stops (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 1968), ruling that police could 
temporarily detain a person “reasonably” suspected of a crime, and could conduct a 
27 
limited search of a person if they “reasonably” believed the person might have a weapon 
(White & Fradella, 2016).  
Place based policing also emerged as a dominant strategy, following evidence that 
random patrol did not affect crime (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & Brown, 1974). In one of 
the first empirical studies to make use of spatial crime data, Sherman, Gartin, and 
Buerger (1989) examined the spatial arrangement of 323,979 calls for service in the city 
of Minneapolis. The authors discovered that over half of calls for service to police in the 
city over one year originated from only 3.3% of the locations. Adopting a medical 
analogy, the authors termed these small locations “hot spots,” a reference to areas in 
which cancer mortality is high. In what would prove to be a classic finding, Sherman et 
al. (1989) concluded that location was the single most important factor in determining 
whether a crime would occur. As such, policing “hot spots,” in contrast to random 
assignment, became a widely used strategy that persists today (Weisburd, 2015). These 
innovations demonstrate increasing enthusiasm for evidence-based police strategies 
during this time. 
Noting that Kelling and Moore published their framework of police history in 
1988, White and Fradella (2016) extended their model into the 21st century policing era. 
These scholars argue that the police function today remains exceedingly broad. Various 
crime control, public safety, and order maintenance services are still provided, and 
strategies advanced in the community problem solving era, such as problem and 
community oriented policing, are still emphasized. There have also been major changes. 
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, most big city police departments 
have expanded to include specialized units dedicated to counter-terrorism. Crime control 
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in the 21st century is also much more data-driven, and evidence based practices have 
infiltrated department operations nationwide. Departments are also increasingly entering 
into collaborations with governing agencies, researchers, and evaluators, representing a 
shift from the notoriously closed off and secretive nature of police agencies (Braga, 
2013). Technology also plays a fundamental role in 21st century policing. GIS crime 
mapping software and other advanced crime analysis techniques, CompStat, DNA and 
forensics, digital license plate readers, pepper and OC spray, TASERs and other less 
lethal weapons, drug and alcohol field testing, body-worn cameras, and gunshot detection 
systems are some of the technologies used in 21st century policing (White & Fradella, 
2016). New technologies continue to be developed as well, such as the StarChase pursuit 
management prototype that allows police to “shoot” vehicles with a GPS tracker and then 
follow safely from a distance (www.starchase.com). 
American policing is more evidence based, innovative, and safe than ever before 
(White & Fradella, 2016). However, a defining problem still persists. There is 
overwhelming evidence that the issue of race continues to plague policing into the 21st 
century. Over the past fifty years, examples abound where police officers engaged in 
excessive force, or unnecessarily used deadly force against unarmed black citizens, and 
were subsequently cleared of wrongdoing, often by mostly white, suburbanite juries 
(Skolnick, 2007; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Still today, cases where police officers are 
arrested and charged for excessive force are extremely rare, in part due to a general belief 
that police work is dangerous and a police officer’s decisions in the heat of the moment 
are difficult to second guess. This belief extends to juries, who are hesitant to convict 
without conclusive evidence of the officer’s ill intentions, even in many cases when 
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provided with video footage of the incident (Ali & Sherman, 2016). The NYPD officer 
who choked Eric Garner to death on video in 2014 was recently cleared of a crime by a 
State Island grand jury, as was the Ferguson officer who fatally shot Michael Brown the 
same year. Similarly, University of Cincinnati officer Ray Tensing who shot Samuel 
Dubose in the head during a traffic stop, and North Charleston Officer Michael Slager 
who shot Walter Scott from behind as he fled, both captured on video in 2015, were both 
cleared at trials following jury deadlock. Most recently, the female Tulsa officer who shot 
and killed Terence Crutcher was cleared of all charges in 2017 after arguing that she 
feared for her life because Crutcher would not lie down on the ground on the side of the 
roadway. These cases demonstrate both increasing public demand for the criminal 
prosecution of police officers involved in highly publicized, controversial, and racially 
charged deadly force encounters, as well as the difficulty in securing a conviction (Ali & 
Sherman, 2016). 
 There are other examples of the persistent role of race in policing and criminal 
justice in the 21st century. Alexander (2010) described the War on Drugs as a sanctioned 
effort to regain the control over blacks lost during the Civil Rights Movement. She calls 
the decades long pattern of mass incarceration of black men for minor drug crimes “the 
New Jim Crow.” Other studies highlight how the pervasive use of stop, question, and 
frisk tactics disproportionately targets and negatively affects the lives of young, minority, 
men (Fradella, Morrow, & White, 2016; W. Morrow, 2015; W. J. Morrow, White, & 
Fradella, in press; White & Fradella, 2016). Because the tactic as used in practice 
disproportionately affected certain groups more than others and demonstrated very little 
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crime control benefits, a New York federal judge ruled that the New York Police 
Department’s use of stop, question, and frisk was unconstitutional.  
 
De-Escalation in Historical Context 
This history detailed the birth of American policing from a desire to maximize 
public safety and protections of individual civil liberties, particularly in a developing and 
diversifying society. In many ways, this history clarifies the goals of 21st century 
policing: to maximize professionalism while maintaining positive relationships between 
police and all members of the public, to reduce the use of unnecessary and extralegal 
force, as well as disproportionality in law enforcement, and to employ evidence-based 
and innovative strategies and technologies for effectively reducing or preventing crime. 
Moreover, the criminal justice system as a whole is faced with the goal of properly 
evaluating police behavior and rooting out misconduct in fair and just ways. One 
development in this area has been our increased understanding of unconscious biases, 
which psychological science suggests most adult Americans have, and the creation of 
police trainings designed to reduce the influence of unconscious bias on police behaviors 
(Fridell, 2016; James & James, 2016). 
However, police in the 21st century are also presented with old and new 
challenges, including the number of problematic and potentially violent encounters with 
members of the public who suffer from mental illness or substance addictions, as well as 
persons who are inherently distrusting of police. Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) further argued 
that there exist two Americas. “One is urban, cosmopolitan, and multicultural. It suffers 
disproportionately from crime, gang violence, poverty, and homelessness. The other is 
31 
suburban, relatively safe, relatively prosperous, and – most important – unicultural. 
Like…the [Rodney] King trial jury, it is predominantly white and middle class” (pg. xi). 
If a shift toward de-escalation in American police work is to help police achieve the goals 
of the 21st century and put an end to centuries-long racial tensions in sustainable ways, 
such a shift must be grounded in an evidence-based understanding of these two Americas, 
of problematic citizen encounters and their correlates, and of strategies that encourage 
mutual trust and respect between officers and members of the public who are not the 
intended targets of police attention but often get caught up in this net for reasons deeply 
seeded in America’s troubling social and political history. 
The following section demonstrates the police are also challenged by a second 
problem. They operate under the direction of an unclear mission and they pursue an 
“impossible mandate.” Different theories of the police mission and the complexities of 
this impossible mandate are presented below, and de-escalation is situated in this debate. 
The Role of the Police 
For decades, the role of police in American society has been debated (Bittner, 
1970; Fogelson, 1977; H. Goldstein, 1977; Skolnick, 1966; J. Q. Wilson, 1968). Are 
police crime fighters mindlessly enforcing laws, or should they be peacekeepers going 
‘above and beyond the call of duty’ to help citizens in any way they can? Should officers 
be focused only on neutralizing safety threats, or should they endeavor to save the lives 
of all people, including violent criminals? How should effective policing be measured? 
According to Rumbaut and Bittner (1979), “The problems of police…are problems of 
ends, of competing social values, interests and priorities, the resolution of which raise 
fundamental moral and political issues to be decided by an informed citizenry.” In other 
32 
words, the goals of police are not universally defined. In a heterogeneous society such as 
the United States the role of the police may be inevitably defined on an individual basis 
according to each person’s experiences, worldviews, and priorities. Many members of the 
public emphasize the service and order maintenance roles of police – they call on police 
for minor issues. Some residents of urban neighborhoods may wish police to be harder on 
violent criminals, while others view officers as the enemy oppressing their rights and 
freedoms. Officers, on the other hand, typically recognize their law enforcement 
mandate.  
These differences have numerous and significant consequences (Brown, 1988; 
Manning, 1978; Paoline, 2003; Rumbaut & Bittner, 1979; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; J. Q. 
Wilson, 1968). Manning (1977) said conflicting role expectations mean officers are 
tasked with the impossible mandate of controlling crime while at the same time using 
minimal force and maintaining positive relationships with the public, and they must 
publicly demonstrate all these achievements using observable metrics. Because they 
know they cannot achieve this mandate, the police have resorted to a “numbers game” 
relying heavily on quantitative measures of performance designed “to make it look as 
though they are doing well when they are not” (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 126). Manning 
(1978) also acknowledged that police retain a legal monopoly of violence in society. As a 
result, the ramifications for malpractice in the profession are incomparably high. 
Identifying a specific definition of the police role in society is imperative to resolve 
potential crises in police-citizen relations, particularly following a deadly force incident. 
Furthermore, an emphasis on their law enforcement mandate encourages officers to view 
perpetrators of crimes as their only clientele, and to write off crime victims and general 
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members of the public as the domain of other professions (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). From 
an administrative standpoint, this means that officer performance is measured based on 
arrests, and not on problem solving or persons helped. Just as problematic, the lack of a 
clear definition of the police mandate means we have little knowledge of when police are 
getting it right (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). The main tenants of this issue are outlined below 
and each is linked to the topic of de-escalation in police work. 
 
Law Enforcement as the Role of the Police 
Particularly during the “reform” era, when significant changes were made to 
professionalize and standardize the police institution, police “staked out the mandate that 
claims to include the efficient, apolitical, and professional enforcement of the law” 
(Manning, 1978, p. 8). Still today, police continue to assert their primary duty is to 
enforce laws and control crime. This cultural tenet developed as a mechanism to reduce 
internal conflict over contradictory duties (Paoline, 2003). However, Manning (1978) 
deemed crime fighting an “impossible mandate” for police, since crime is largely fostered 
and controlled through factors outside of their locus of control. At the same time, the 
police have fought a losing battle in staking out this claim with the public. While officers 
believe their primary duty is to enforce the law, and indeed have trained nearly 
exclusively in pursuit of this mission, the public continues to request their help in a wide 
range of non-legal matters (Bittner, 1967; Mastrofski, 1983; Reiss, 1971). Others, in 
contrast, are resentful to police when they pursue their crime control duties, perhaps 
particularly so when they are the subjects of the enforcement. Each of these creates role 
conflict for officers and negatively affects the relationships between cops and citizens. 
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Peace Keeping as the Role of the Police 
In practice, the police role is exceptionally broad and much of a police officer’s 
time is spent on non-enforcement activities (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1967; Cain, 1973; 
Manning, 1978; Mastrofski, 1983; Scott, 1981; White, 2010; J. Q. Wilson, 1969). 
Officers, unlike the courts and corrections branches of the criminal justice system, 
frequently come into contact with people who have committed no crimes at all (Fyfe, 
1986). About 50% of calls to police involve a request for officer support in handling an 
interpersonal problem (Cumming, Cumming, & Edell, 1965). Police are asked to 
intercede in disputes, calm emotions, provide help both formally and informally, provide 
information, give directions, give advice, serve as a comforting or helpful presence, 
return lost items, children, or pets, provide emergency aid, substitute as ambulance 
drivers, and the list goes on (Manning, 1978). As August Vollmer famously described, a 
police officer must: 
“…have the wisdom of Solomon, the courage of David, the patience of 
Job and leadership of Moses, the kindness of the Good Samaritan, the 
strategy of Alexander, the faith of Daniel, the diplomacy of Lincoln, the 
tolerance of the Carpenter of Nazareth, and finally, an intimate knowledge 
of every branch of the nature, biological and social sciences” (Quoted in 
Leonard & More, 1971, p. 128). 
Bittner (1974) similarly said “no human problem exists, or is imaginable, about 
which it could be said with finality that this certainly could not become the proper 
business of the police” (pg. 244). We, in effect, expect police to fix all our problems. For 
this reason, many experts acknowledge that “peacekeeping is a central and critical 
function of policing” (White, 2010, p. 884). Scholars have laid out several reasons for 
society’s boundless expectations of police. First, police retain the exclusive authority to 
use coercive force, and therefore citizens expect police to arrive at their request and 
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quickly put an end to their problems by forcing someone to do something (Bittner, 1970). 
Second, many citizens view police as interconnected members of their community and 
maintenance of established social norms as their responsibility (Banton, 1964). Wilson 
(1968), Cain (1973), and others have argued that citizens are more likely to expect this 
form of police service in homogenous and stable areas. 
The discrepancies between how officers view their role and the realities of their 
work present a few problems. The maintenance of public peace is not clearly defined by 
laws, and police training focuses primarily on use of force and law enforcement 
procedure, rather than on procedures for maintaining public order (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 
1967; Manning, 1978; J. Q. Wilson, 1969). Further, while many issues the police 
encounter qualify as law violations, officers often use their discretion to not invoke the 
legal process (Black, 1980; Fyfe, 1986; J. Goldstein, 1960; LaFave, 1965). As a result, 
most of an officer’s daily work is guided by nothing more than his or her own common 
sense and police culture (Bittner, 1967; Hunt, 1983). Such a high level of independence 
leaves much room for malpractice and disproportionality in police treatment. 
 
Force as the Role of the Police 
Bittner (1970) defined the role of police in terms of their official authority to use 
force. He argues, for three reasons, “it makes much more sense to say that the police are 
nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified force in 
society” (pg. 36). First, the demands placed on the police are most often requests for 
coercion. People call the police when they need them to use their authority to overpower 
resistance. Second, officers are deployed to areas based on the need to implement 
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forceful actions –that is, more officers are assigned to areas where more force is needed. 
On the other hand, only 1/3 of the police at any given time are attending to crime related 
matters. For this reason, Bittner argues that crime control cannot be the core function of 
the police (see also Manning, 1978). Finally, the use of force or the threat to use force 
unites all forms of police activity. Officers use force through physical presence, verbal 
direction, or by using physical strength and training (Terrill, 2001). For example, when a 
citizen calls on the police because the front door of her house is open, she is asking the 
police to check her house for intruders. This is asked not for the sake of information but 
because the police can, if they find an intruder, force them to leave. Likewise, officers are 
often asked to stand post in locations where citizens are frequently victimized, because 
they are able to force offenders to stop. 
Relatedly, some scholars believe the role of the police is to increase the overall 
safety of the American public through coercive force. There exists a social contract 
between police and citizens such that citizens give up a certain amount of civil freedoms 
to ensure a net increase in that freedom through police protection (Dunham & Alpert, 
2015; Reiman, 1985). Citizens surrender a large part of the right to use physical force, so 
they can devote more time to work and family activities. Without a police force, we 
would devote much more of this time and energy to protecting our personal safety and 
property. In turn, we give the police the right to protect us, and to use all means 
necessary, including deadly force, to do so. For its part, the police promise to use this 
authority fairly and in the interest of the greater good. Within this context we see the 
current crisis of police-citizen relations as a re-evaluation of the social contract. For the 
social contract to remain valid, the public must view the harm they are subjected to by 
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police as less than the harm that would be inflicted upon them by others if police did not 
exist (or no longer retained the authority to utilize coercive force). Members of the public 
become outraged when they view officer use of force as unfairly distributed or overly 
excessive (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Walker, 1980, 1984), which may be what we are 
seeing today with the high levels of citizen discontent with police. However, the public 
still appears to view the police as beneficial in terms of net benefit – much of the 
suggestions for police reform are focused on ways to improve officer use of force, while 
very few recommend an overall elimination of the institution.  
 
Defending Human Life as the Role of the Police 
In their study of excessive police force, Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) philosophized 
that the mission of police is to protect life. They argued that this definition provides 
police with a clear benchmark for evaluating actions (were the most lives saved?) and for 
developing best policies (will the most lives be saved?). As numerous scholars conveyed 
in a tribute to Dr. Fyfe (McCoy, 2010) much of his research was conducted in pursuit of 
this mission. The defense of life philosophy is also evident in a wave of recent changes to 
police policies and practices, including those limiting vehicle pursuits, narrowing use of 
nonlethal force, and clarifying officer response to crimes of domestic violence (Walker, 
2010). The creation of hostage negotiations specialty units is another example of a 
successful change in police practices with the goal of protecting human life (Skolnick & 
Fyfe, 1993). Prior to the 1970s, police approached hostage situations with the mindset 
that hostage lives were already lost; this typically meant police were quick to use force 
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and the events usually resulted in bloodshed. Nowadays, significant time and effort is 
expended to ensure hostages are saved, with great success. 
In another example, until Tennessee v. Garner (471 U.S. 1 1985) police in the 
United States retained the authority to shoot at fleeing, unarmed suspects on the theory 
that this prevented them from committing future crimes (Fyfe, 1979). Experimenting with 
a change in policy, the NYPD issued Temporary Order of Policy 237 – the “defense of 
life” policy – which removed an officer’s authority to shoot at certain fleeing felons who 
did not present an imminent threat to the public. The agency enlisted Fyfe’s services in 
evaluating whether constraining deadly force authority in this context carried any 
unforeseen consequences, such as increased crime rates or compromised officer safety. In 
an evaluation of the policy’s impact, Fyfe (1979) demonstrated that firearms discharges 
by NYPD officers declined by 30% per week, and this decline came at no cost to officer 
safety or crime control. This research was cited as a justification for the Supreme Court’s 
decision to remove the fleeing felon rule in Tennessee v. Garner.  
Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) talked about a case in which one of them was involved 
as an expert witness. A black doctor was stopped by police for driving 10 miles over the 
speed limit. After telling the officers that he could not be stopped because he was rushing 
to the emergency room to save a man’s life, the officers pulled the man from the car and 
choked him unconscious. On the witness stand, one of the authors argued for a defense of 
life philosophy in evaluating the case, which would dictate that the officers should have 
assisted the doctor in getting to the emergency room to save the patient (given the minor 
infraction that prompted the original stop). Consistent with this philosophy, the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommended a clearly stated “sanctity 
39 
of life” philosophy be on the forefront of every officer’s mind, and at the core of all 
departments’ missions (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015, p. 19). 
Likewise, a document offering “30 Guiding Principles on Use of Force” published by 
PERF (2016) incorporates tales from agencies across the United States of successful 
efforts to minimize harm to citizens while also protecting officer safety. The National 
Consensus Policy on Use of Force (2017) was the first of its kind to identify de-
escalation and force avoidance as a responsibility of the police. 
 
Legitimacy as the Role of the Police 
Police face immense and persistent problems in managing positive relations with 
the public. After decades of recurring waves of scandal and reform have deteriorated 
many citizen’s perceptions of the police, there is a growing body of research, practitioner, 
and government interest in police legitimacy as a core function of American law 
enforcement. In its final report, the Task Force highlighted as the top priority in 
American policing to “build trust and legitimacy” with the public (President’s Task Force 
on 21st Century Policing, 2015, p. 1). There are many indications that legitimacy can 
serve as a guiding role of the police without sacrificing other core missions. Most 
importantly, legitimacy is intimately connected with the ability of the police to protect 
and serve their assigned communities, and to reduce crime and disorder. Criminal justice 
agencies enjoy legitimacy when people feel the institution, agency, and individual actors 
deserve to be respected and obeyed. Police in particular have legitimacy when the public 
accepts and respects the authority of the police, regard the police positively, and feel that 
officers treat people fairly and with respect (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Research has 
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demonstrated perceptions of police legitimacy are strongly related to compliance with the 
law and cooperation with authority figures (Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996; Tyler, 
1990; Tyler & Fagan, 2008). Moreover, the most important factor influencing whether 
someone cooperates with police is their evaluation of the fairness of the processes used 
by police in the exercise of their authority – procedural justice (Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 
2007; Reisig, Tankebe, & Mesko, 2012; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; 
Tyler, 1990, 2003, 2004; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Procedural justice is based on a citizen’s 
evaluation of four criteria during an interaction with a police officer: fairness, respect, 
trustworthiness, and whether they were given a voice in the decision-making process 
(Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett, & Tyler, 2013; Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler 
& Huo, 2002). 
According to Walker (1992b), being treated fairly and respectfully by police is 
especially important for residents of poor, inner-city communities, who are more likely to 
perceive police are overly-aggressive in their tactics, but unresponsive to crime and 
deviance in their neighborhoods. Research suggests the value of procedural justice is 
equally important to individuals across racial, ethnic, gender, income, age, education, 
ideology, and political affiliation (Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Huo, 2002).  Nevertheless, there 
are established differences in baseline attitudes towards the police among members of 
different ethnic and racial groups, with nonwhite groups reporting significantly lower 
attitudes (Decker, 1981; Huang & Vaughn, 1996; Lasley, 1994; D. Smith et al., 1991; 
Tuch & Weitzer, 1997). Furthermore, whether individuals perceive they were treated 
fairly is an indicator of whether they believe they were racially profiled during an 
interaction with police (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004).  
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In a famous example, Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) argue that following the widely 
disseminated video taped beating of Rodney King, there was a palpable change in the 
attitudes of African American jurors who virtually wrote off the value of officer 
testimony as viable evidence.  
After all, who, especially in urban America, will believe a cop on the 
witness stand when cops have a reputation for beating people up, or 
ridiculing them, or taking bribes – and then covering up the misdeeds? 
The King videotape enhanced the plausibility of any allegation against 
police everywhere in America…the King videotape and the verdict will 
make it harder for cops everywhere to do their job, which is to be officers 
of the law…Any sensible and reflective police officer will understand that 
when a cop reaches above the law to use more force or coercion than is 
necessary to subdue a suspect, he or she undermines the very source of 
police authority (pg. xvi). 
 
When police authority is undermined by the actions of one or a few, officers as a whole 
lose their influence over law enforcement and criminal justice even when they are acting 
in good faith and within the boundaries of the law. As such, pursuing public trust and 
legitimacy as a core mission will assist the police in the pursuit of their other roles – 
crime control, peacekeeping, and defense of human life. 
 
De-Escalation and the Roles of Police 
Law enforcement, peace keeping, use of force, defense of life, and legitimacy 
have each been presented as a role of police. Scholars have debated for decades over 
which role is the police’s primary function. This dissertation cannot settle this debate. 
This is unfortunate, because as Manning (1978) argued a mistake in police work puts 
human life at risk, so identifiable benchmarks for successful policing are critical for 
preventing unnecessary deaths. Moreover, when citizens view police use of force as 
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unfair, excessive, or overly frequent, this stirs contention among citizens, and has 
historically prompted violent riots and demands for investigations (Crank & Langworthy, 
1992; Walker, 1980, 1984). As such, it is problematic if officers and citizens hold 
different views of what constitutes good policing. 
Potentially, more frequent and successful use of de-escalation tactics can 
potentially assist police in pursuing each of these roles. When officers adopt skills to 
interact more positively with citizens and de-escalate critical encounters, this is directly 
related to less use of force and greater citizen perceptions of the police, since citizens 
walk away from encounters with better evaluations of police interactions. Each of these 
outcomes leads to higher police legitimacy. In turn, police are more effective at law 
enforcement, since citizens are more apt to obey the law and the police when they 
perceive the police as legitimate. In addition, since most calls for police service involve 
interpersonal disputes, de-escalation is best suited to aid police in resolving these types of 
conflicts as its core premise is communication and conflict resolution. Theoretically, 
then, successful de-escalation should resolve the tension and conflict that exists between 
officers and citizens because it encourages mutual respect between these historically 
opposing social groups. Of course, without empirical research to back these claims, they 
remain only possibilities. The following section reviews existing research relevant to the 
topic of de-escalation and situates the police strategy within the most up to date 
knowledge about police use of force, police-citizen transactions, and good policing. 
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Foundations for Research on De-Escalation 
Police Use of Force 
Frequency. A volume of research has studied the frequency and predictors of 
police use of force. In terms of statistical frequency, research shows use of force is rare 
and most often low in severity (Alpert & Dunham, 2000; Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Eith 
& Durose, 2011; Garner & Maxwell, 2002; Garner, Maxwell, & Heraux, 2002; Garner, 
Schade, & Hepburn, 1996; Hickman, Piquero, & Garner, 2008; Terrill, 2005). Bayley and 
Garofalo (1989) found officers were involved in physical confrontations in only 8% of 
encounters. The authors calculated police use force about once in every eight and one-
third working days, and typically this behavior is on the lower end of the use of force 
continuum.1 Most often force observed in the study involved “hands on” tactics such as 
grabbing or restraining, and the authors never witnessed an officer use a firearm. 
However, given that approximately 40 million police-citizen encounters occur annually, 
approximately 560,000 use of force encounters occur each year (Shjarback and White, 
2016). As such, while force may be statistically rare, it occurs at a frequency of 1,500 
times per day in the United States. 
Hickman et al. (2008) showed that police use of force is also much more common 
in arrest situations. They argued that use of force rates are typically underestimated 
because most studies exclude prisoners, who are more likely to have been in 
confrontations with police. To address these limitations the authors drew on data from the 
                                                 
1 The use of force continuum is a training tool used by police departments to provide officers with guidance 
on incremental levels of suspect resistance and appropriate responses to these behaviors (Alpert & 
Dunham, 1997; Garner, Schade, Hepburn, & Buchanan, 1995; Terrill, 2003). The concept allows for an 
analysis of the interplay between suspect behavior and police use of force, as well as the appropriateness of 
officers’ responses in given situations (Terrill, 2005). 
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Police-Public Contact Survey and the Survey of Inmates in Local Jails. Similar to 
previous research, they confirmed that use of nonlethal force is rare – officers either 
threatened to use or used force in 1.7% of all contacts – and most uses of force were low 
on the force continuum. They also confirmed that police use of force was more common 
among the arrestee sample. One-fifth of encounters resulting in an arrest involved force. 
In terms of lethal force, scholars have similarly argued that since there exists no national 
database on police use of deadly force, the numbers typically reported may be 
underestimated by as much as 50% (Sherman & Langworthy, 1979). 
Individual level factors. Studies have tested the impact of officer, suspect, 
situational, organizational, and community-level factors on police use of nonlethal and 
deadly force. Many studies find that suspect behavior is a predictor of police use of force, 
and some further find that extralegal suspect characteristics are predictive as well. 
Findings from an analysis of 3,116 police-citizen encounters showed officers respond to 
legally-relevant factors when deciding to use force, especially the level of suspect 
resistance – “ the decision to use force has a great deal to do with what the suspect does” 
– and the level of threat posed (Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002, p. 243). Terrill and Mastrofski 
(2002) also found extralegal suspect characteristics predicted use of force. Young, poor, 
male, and minority suspects were subjected to more frequent and higher levels of 
physical force. They did not, however, find that suspects who were more disrespectful to 
the officer’s authority were subjected to more force, contrary to other available research 
evidence (e.g. Van Maanen, 1978). Similarly, Hickman et al. (2008) found force was 
most commonly used against young, male, and minority suspects, and those who were 
resisting police. On the other hand, James, James, and Vila (in press) found officers in 
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controlled laboratory experiments responded only to suspect demeanor, not demographics 
or attire, in their decisions to use force. These findings suggest officers rely on both 
legally-relevant characteristics and extralegal characteristics in making decisions to use 
force. 
Cohen and Chaiken (1972) theorized that more experienced officers should use 
force more reasonably and less frequently. Much research has supported this theory. 
McElvain and Kposowa (2008) found officers with the fewest years of experience were 
more likely to be investigated for use of force, and Paoline and Terrill (2007) found 
officers who had more experience used less verbal and physical force. Terrill and 
Mastrofski (2002) found youth and lack of experience were significantly related to more 
frequent use of force. Garner et al. (2002) found male and younger officers, and those 
who had been previously treated for an on-the-job injury tended to use more force. 
Testing the impact of other officer characteristics, Friedrich (1980) found officers who 
most strongly liked and those who most strongly disliked their jobs were more likely to 
use force. He surmised this was because officers who disliked their jobs took out their 
frustrations on citizens, while those who liked their jobs were more enthusiastic and 
active. Paoline and Terrill (2007) found more educated officers used less force. The 
impact of officer race appears more complex, as it tends to interact with suspect 
characteristics. Paoline, Gau, and Terrill (2016) found white officers tended to use more 
coercive force with black suspects, and female officers may be less likely to use force 
(Rabe-Hemp, 2008). Studies testing the impact of rigorous hiring standards are mixed, 
though Kane and White (2009) demonstrated that officers who were fired for misconduct 
most often had produced “red flags” to which the department was previously 
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unresponsive during the hiring process. Research testing the impact of department 
professionalism on use of force rates is similarly inconclusive, though Shjarback and 
White (2016) found departments more committed to educational standards – e.g. those 
that required an associates degree or higher for hiring – experienced less citizen 
complaints for use of force. 
Situation level factors. The nature of the situation largely influences whether 
force is used. Officers who fire their weapons are more likely to do so against citizens 
who present an imminent danger to officers (Fyfe, 1980; 1981; Klinger, 2004). Bayley 
and Garofalo (1989) observed that when overt conflict was in progress between citizens 
at the time police arrived on scene, officers were more likely to use force. Fridell and 
Binder (1992) compared deadly force encounters to incidents where a police-involved 
shooting had the potential to occur but did not. The authors found the deadly force 
incidents were more often characterized by “ambiguity and surprise,” where officers had 
inadequate information about the suspects they would be dealing with and did not 
preconceive the situation as a potential deadly force encounter. In his Metro-Dade 
Police/Citizen Violence Reduction study, Fyfe (1987) found that violence typically 
occurred in four contexts: routine traffic stops, high risk traffic stops, crimes in progress, 
and interpersonal disputes. A study of predictors of police use of force in six jurisdictions 
identified that force was more likely on multiple police response calls and during calls for 
service involving a violence offense (Garner et al., 1996). 
Agency level factors. Organizational factors also shape officer use of force. 
Agencies with more restrictive policies (Fyfe, 1979), and more administrative oversight 
following a use of force (Alpert & MacDonald, 2001), demonstrate lower overall force 
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rates. For example, more restrictive policies on officer use of firearms, if properly 
enforced, can reduce the number of officer involved shootings (Fyfe, 1979; Geller & 
Scott, 1992). Alternatively, more permissive shooting policies are significantly related to 
more shootings (White, 2001). Other studies show administrative policy is effective at 
reducing other forms of police coercion, including less lethal force, vehicle pursuits, and 
K9 deployments (Riksheim & Chermak, 1993; White, 2007). Training can effectively 
reduce officer use of force rates. Klinger (2010) analyzed the effects of receiving 
violence reduction training on officers handling of disputes, specifically in their use of 
force. Consistent with existing research, he found most (60%) disputes were handled 
without any force. Moreover, regression analyses demonstrated a statistically significant 
drop in the use and severity of force by treatment (trained) officers when handling 
disputes – officers used one-quarter of a level of less force than they did prior to 
receiving the training and compared to control officers who did not receive the trianing. 
He concluded that officers can be taught to use less force through training. Finally, 
research testing the impact of organizational size on police use of force is inconclusive 
(Mastrofski, 1981; Ostrom, Parks, & Whitaker, 1978). 
Ecological factors. Other research investigating the impact of community-level 
factors has found that the surrounding environment plays a significant role in shaping 
police use of force. For example, Jacobs and O’Brien (1998) tested the minority threat 
theory for explaining use of force. Threat explanations suggest that police employ violent 
tactics more often in minority communities or against minority citizens to maintain 
control over minority social groups. In an examination of police killings in 170 cities, 
racial inequality (i.e. current black population and recent increases in the black 
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population), as well as the rate of violence in the area predicted police killing rates. 
Similarly, Terrill and Reisig (2003) found officers were more likely to use force in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods and areas with higher homicide rates, controlling for 
situational and officer-based factors. The authors also observed the influence of suspect 
race was mediated by the context of the surrounding environment. Research testing the 
impact of state statutes and court rulings has not found that these are significant in 
predicting officer use of firearms (White, 2003). 
Professional factors. Researchers have theorized there are dynamics unique to 
policing that make violence more likely than in other professional or everyday social 
functions. Fyfe (1986) notes there is an ethos among police officers that every call 
(especially “hot” calls) is urgent. The public likewise expects officers to respond to and 
fix their various life problems as quickly as possible. Bittner (1974) says citizens expect 
officers to respond to “something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and- about-which-
someone-had-better-do-something-now!” (pg. 31). Police are therefore trained to deal 
with a range of social problems fast and then move on to the next call. There is also a 
worldview among police that police-citizen encounters are unpredictable. No two cases 
are alike and only those who have worked patrol can understand “what it’s really like” in 
the heat of the moment. The belief that all cases are unpredictable leads to a perception 
that the same training tactics or principles cannot be standardly applied across similar 
cases. The combined senses of urgency and unpredictability render many police tactics 
“quick and dirty,” misdiagnosis likely, and violence more probable (Fyfe, 1986). 
Skolnick (1966) also noted that officers are responsible for finding and arresting 
dangerous suspects. The officer adopts a perceptual shorthand for seeking out the 
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“symbolic assailant” in a crowd of innocent people. They use individual cues and 
characteristics that make a stranger stand out as more likely guilty of a crime– any 
“vague indication of danger suggested by appearance.” Over time the seasoned officer 
develops a practice of automatically separating worldly elements into those that are 
potentially dangerous and those that are not. As such, the officer is always on alert and 
prepared to defend against attack. The perceived need of officers to sense out danger 
before it strikes makes police use of force more likely than in other professional and 
social encounters. 
 
Citizen Violence against Police 
Frequency. Because police work involves responding to emergency situations, 
criminal activity, and violence, police officers have a higher risk for being intentionally 
injured compared to other professionals (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012; Caplan, 
Marotta, Piza, & Kennedy, 2014). Injury and mortality rates of police officers are five 
times higher than the general population (Kercher, Swedler, Pollack, & Webster, 2013). 
A homicide rate of 5.6/100,000 employees makes policing the second deadliest 
profession (behind taxi drivers and gas station/liquor store employees; Swedler, Kercher, 
Simmons, & Pollack, 2014). Police also have the highest rate of violent victimization of 
all occupations (Fridell, Faggiani, Taylor, Brito, & Kubu, 2009).  
In statistical terms, citizen violence against police is rare relative to the frequency 
of police-citizen encounters. In 2011, police made an estimated 12,408,899 arrests (FBI, 
2011). In the same year, the Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted Program 
(LEOKA, 2011) reported 54,774 officers were assaulted in the course of their duties, 
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indicating that officers are assaulted once in every 0.44% of arrests. Further, most 
assaults against officers produce minor or no injuries (Bierie, in press). 26.6% of officers 
assaulted in 2011 sustained injuries (LEOKA, 2011), which amounts to one injury in 
0.12% of arrests. Despite statistical rarity, however, the high volume of annual police-
citizen contacts translates to daily assaults on officers at a rate of 160 per day in the 
United States (LEOKA, 2011). According to Bierie (in press), this means about 10% of 
all police officers are assaulted every year, suggesting that in practical terms policing is 
still a high-risk career. 
In cases where officer are intentionally injured or killed on the job, firearms play 
a prominent role (L. A. Wilson & Meyer, 1991). Over 90% of citizen homicides of law 
enforcement officers are committed with a firearm, most (67%) with a short-barrel 
firearm, and 10% with their own service weapon (Swedler et al., 2014). Swedler et al. 
(2015) examined the relationship between state firearm ownership and killings of police 
officers. Offering further evidence of the profound role of guns in officer fatalities, the 
authors found line of duty homicides were three times more likely in states with high 
firearms ownership compared to states with low firearm ownership. Moreover, a 10% 
increase in firearms ownership was associated with 10 additional line-of-duty deaths 
between 1996 and 2010. 
Individual level factors. Researchers have studied correlates of citizen violence 
against police extensively. This literature highlights the impact of community, situational, 
and individual level factors on citizen assaults of police officers. Female citizens are 
more likely to resist police compared to male citizens (Covington, Huff-Corzine, & 
Corzine, 2014). While research has found a citizen’s race/ethnicity is unrelated to 
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whether he or she assaults a police officer, black citizens are overrepresented among 
those who kill police officers – LEOKA (2015) compiled a list of 37 assailants identified 
in connection with 2015 murders of police officers, of which at least 17 were black. 
Citizens who kill police are also more likely to be under the influence of a substance 
compared to those who commit less serious assaults on police officers (Covington et al., 
2014). Kachurik et al. (2013) found police officers with greater social bonds, such as 
those who were married and had children, were less likely to be killed on duty than single 
officers. This finding was replicated in a longitudinal analysis of Baltimore Police 
Department officer death rates (Gibbs, Ruiz, & Klepper-Lehman, 2014). Findings with 
regard to officer experience and the risk for being killed in the line of duty are 
inconsistent. While one study (Kachurik et al., 2013) found officers with more years on 
the job were more likely to be killed on duty, another produced opposite findings (Gibbs 
et al., 2014). 
Situation level factors. The type of call an officer responds to tends to influence 
his or her likelihood of being assaulted. Officers have a higher likelihood of being 
victimized when responding to domestic violence calls (Stanford & Mowry, 1990) and 
weapon crimes (Margarita, 1980). Caplan et al. (2014) found that elements of physical 
places put officers at greater risk for being assaulted. Problem buildings, bars, gang 
territories, liquor stores, and other locations all showed a higher likelihood of police 
victimization. Covington et al. (2014) further found one officer response calls are less 
likely than multiple officer response calls to end in an officer being assaulted.  
Agency level factors. At the agency level, there is some evidence that departments 
that send officers out on patrol in one-person vehicles have a higher risk of victimization 
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compared to those sending officers out in two-person vehicles (Fridell & Pate, 1997). 
Fridell and Pate (1997) showed that training hours are unrelated to officer assaults. In an 
analysis of the effects of soft body armor, the FBI (1994) concluded that police who are 
not equipped with body armor are 14 times more likely to be killed. Willits (2014) 
examined the effects of organization structure variables on officer assaults. Higher levels 
of organizational complexity, such as unit specialization and the presence of substations, 
were associated with lower rates of officer assaults. Agencies that exhibit a “culture of 
aggressiveness” through training and policy are also shown to “produce” higher levels of 
violence against police (Fridell et al., 2009, p. 550). 
Ecological factors. In addition to gun ownership rates, research has found officers 
are at a higher risk for victimization in southern regions of the country (Kaminski, 
Jefferis, & Chanhatasilpa, 2000). Officers who work in communities with higher rates of 
violent crime are more likely to be assaulted (Fridell & Pate, 1997). In fact, Fridell and 
Pate (1997) identified community violence rates as the most important predictor of 
officer assaults. Areas with larger populations of black citizens (Kaminski, Jefferis, & 
Gu, 2003; Kaminski & Stucky, 2009), and higher levels of social disorganization (Batton 
& Wilson, 2006) also represent an increased safety threat to officers. Kent (2010) found a 
significant relationship between the number of officer involved fatal shootings and 
homicides against police officers.  
Some have argued that following the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson (MO) 
in the summer of 2014, increased public scrutiny and criticism has fostered a “War on 
Cops” environment (Mac Donald, 2016). Former FBI Director James Comey (2105) has 
publicly claimed on numerous occasions that police officers in the “post-Ferguson” era 
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are in fear of being assaulted and killed on the job, and are engaging in less proactive 
policing and are less engaged with the community as a result. Mac Donald (2016) 
suggests this de-policing effect has produced massive increases in violent crime since 
criminals are less concerned about being apprehended and punished for misbehavior (aka, 
the “Ferguson effect”). Some researchers have tested these claims with mixed results. 
Maguire, Nix, and Campbell (2016) found no evidence that the events in Ferguson led to 
an increase in felonious killings of police officers. Similarly, Campbell and colleagues 
(2017) reported non-significant results with respect to the number of citizens shot by 
police. Pyrooz, Decker, Wolfe, and Shjarback (2016) found no evidence of a systematic 
Ferguson effect on violent crime, though homicide rates did increase “post-Ferguson” in 
cities with historically high violence rates, larger black populations, and higher levels of 
socioeconomic disadvantage. Towers and White (2017) found no evidence of a Ferguson 
effect on crime in Chicago, identifying the proliferation of firearms as a more likely 
explanation for rises in violence. Testing for a post-Ferguson “de-policing” effect in St. 
Louis (MO), Shjarback, Pyrooz, Wolfe, and Decker (in press) found that officers were 
engaging in less proactive policing only in municipalities with larger compositions of 
black residents.  
 
Police-Citizen Transactions  
The previous sections examined research on officer use of force and citizen force 
against police. A major limitation of these bodies of research is that the events are treated 
as separate phenomena (White, 2016). Toch (1969) proposed, rather, that violence is a 
“two person game”: 
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Even where the victim does no more than appear at the wrong time and 
place, his or her contribution is essential for the consummation of his or 
her destruction. And usually more than mere physical presence is 
involved. Common sense and law are attracted to the image of passive 
victims mauled by spontaneously malevolent aggressors…to understand 
violence it is necessary to focus on the chain of interactions between 
aggressor and victim, on the sequence that begins when two people 
encounter each other. (p. 7-8).  
 
While cautioning against blaming the victim, Toch (1969) encouraged scholars to 
consider the victim’s role in motivating the offender to better understand the crime itself. 
In the same way, our analyses of police use of force cannot focus solely on the actions of 
the citizen, or solely on the actions of the officer. Much like a chess match, to understand 
the actions of one you must understand the totality of the behaviors and the order in 
which they took place (White, 2016).  
Unfortunately, use of force in reality tends to be afflicted by a “split second 
syndrome” whereby the specific actions taken by the citizen which prompted the officer’s 
force in the final moments of the event are almost always used as a legal basis to support 
the officer’s decision (Fyfe, 1986). To illustrate, many officers involved in questionable 
shootings in the past year have claimed that, in the moment, they felt they had no choice 
but to use deadly force to protect themselves and others from the citizen’s violent 
behavior (Terrill, 2016). A prominent example of the split second syndrome is the current 
Supreme Court standard for evaluating use of force (argued in Graham v. Connor, 1989; 
490 U.S. 386 1989) which states that police tactics must be “objectively reasonable,” 
determined based on an evaluation of the situation as it would have been experienced by 
the officer in the moment they made the decision. “Objectively reasonable,” in this sense, 
dictates there must have been an imminent threat of danger or the perception of such to 
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the officer or others. Terrill (2016) notes that this definition “inherently requires a 
subjective interpretation” (pg. 491). Fyfe (1986) argued that the split second syndrome 
(with the assistance of existing legal standards) fosters a belief that all police-citizen 
encounters are unpredictable, provides after-the-fact justification for a majority of officer 
decisions, and inhibits proper diagnosis and improvement in police training, policies, and 
practices. “Instead of asking whether an officer ultimately had to fight or shoot his way 
out of perilous circumstances, we are better advised to ask whether it was not possible for 
him to have approached the situation in a way that reduced the risk of bloodshed and 
increased the chances of a successful and nonviolent conclusion” (Fyfe, 1989, p. 446). 
Bittner (1967) also notes that, more broadly, the philosophical foundations of police 
coercion also support a split second syndrome approach to evaluating police behavior. 
Police are granted the authority to use force only in situations involving imminent danger. 
They are not held responsible, nor are they offered directions for, using methods in 
preventing their own use of force, only in responding to the dangerous actions of others. 
Some scholars address these issues by taking an interactionist approach to 
studying police-citizen encounters. They recognize these events as transactional 
processes, rather than split second decision points (Bayley, 1986; Binder & Scharf, 1980; 
Reiss, 1980; Scharf & Binder, 1983; Terrill, 2005; Toch, 1969). The interplay between 
citizen actions and police reactions are highlighted, and it is recognized that actions 
taking place from the very beginning of the interaction carry consequences for the final 
outcome. From this perspective, violent police-citizen encounters, including police use of 
force, are the result of the totality of the circumstances, rather a final second decision 
necessarily taken by the officer in response to a citizen’s specific movement. 
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The death of Michael Brown provides a relevant recent example of these 
concepts. After the shooting, questions were immediately raised asking whether the 
officer could have taken steps to avoid the fatal ending. Policing expert Sam Walker 
(2014) called Brown’s death a “needless tragedy.” Officer Wilson approached Brown in 
his vehicle as Brown was traveling on foot down the middle of the street. According to 
Wilson’s testimony, Brown came at him aggressively, pinned him in his patrol car, 
punched him, and attempted to grab his firearm (Schwirtz & Oppel Jr., 2014). Officer 
Wilson says these aggressive actions caused him to fear for his life and he had no choice 
but to shoot Brown. Walker (2014) and others (Schwirtz & Oppel Jr., 2014) have argued 
that Wilson did have another choice – drive further down the street once he saw that the 
man was agitated or aggressive, regroup, wait for back-up, and develop a plan of 
approach. These experts argue this alternative decision taken by the officer at the onset of 
the encounter would have de-escalated the situation and avoided the death of Michael 
Brown.  
Goffman (1956) theorized interactions between persons as series of exchange 
rituals. It is generally expected that each person will be respectful to the other when 
interacting in social settings, and that each is treated as an equal player. Expanding 
Goffman to a policing context, Sykes and Clark’s (1975) theory of deference exchange 
hypothesized that the typical social expectations are suspended in police-citizen 
encounters because these events are tainted by a power differential – the citizen is 
expected to show a deference that is not expected to be returned by the officer. Returning 
to the chess match analogy, a police-citizen encounter is much like a game of chess, only 
one player is highly trained and knowledgable of the rules, while the other is not. The 
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latter player must honor the former’s skill and authority as the expert in the game, and in 
most cases must let the opponent with the game. The game, in other words, offers one 
player an unfair advantage. In police-citizen encounters, Sykes and Clarke (1975) argued 
that officers make deliberate efforts to maintain their unfair advantage in order to stay in 
control of the encounter.  
Consistent with this theory, numerous studies have found that a citizen’s 
demeanor is an important predictor of police actions, regardless of whether the citizen 
was involved in any rulebreaking behaviors (Black, 1971; Brown, 1988; James, James, & 
Vila, in press; Lundman, 1979; Mastrofski, Reisig, & McCluskey, 2002; Van Maanen, 
1978). Sykes and Brent (1980) found officers typically reassert their control using verbal 
force. Van Maanen (1978) theorized that officers ratchet up their response if someone is 
acting like “an asshole” by disrespecting the officer’s authority. Other scholars have 
taken Sykes and Clarke’s (1975) theory one step further (Alpert & Dunham, 2004; 
Terrill, 2001). In use of force encounters, Alpert and Dunham (2004) confirmed that 
officers make multiple efforts to reassert control of a spiraling situation. In response, the 
authors identified that citizens usually react negatively to these efforts by increasingly 
their levels of resistance to the police. Collectively, these studies highlight the importance 
of the interplay among behaviors in determining the outcome, rather than any single word 
or action. It does not make sense, then, to continue the study of police-citizen violence by 
separating police force and citizen assaults against police into two categories. 
In a classic transactional study, Binder and Scharf (1980) analyzed the relative 
importance of events occuring at the beginning, middle, and end of police-citizen 
transactions. They proposed a four phase model for evaluating and understanding 
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outcomes. The first is the phase of anticipation, or the moment when the officer becomes 
aware of the problem. This is typically initiated by either a dispatch from the radio, the 
officer’s own observation of a problem, or upon receiving information from any source. 
The authors note that the nature of the problem and indicators of its seriousness can 
heavily influence officers’ responses. The second is the phase of entry, during which the 
officer arrives on the scene and makes an initial assessment of the situation. The officer 
also uses the entry phase to establish police authority, establish the tone of the police 
response, and clarify expectations to citizens. The third is the phase of information 
exchange, where officers gather facts from suspects, victims, and witnesses. Binder and 
Scharf (1980) note this phase can last anywhere from one second (Police! Don’t move!) 
to hours or weeks of negotiation. Finally, the phase of final decision occurs when the 
officer diagnoses the problem and employs a solution. This phase includes the officer’s 
decision of whether or not to use force. Each of these phases, and especially the actions 
taken by all actors within each phase, is influential in producing the final outcome. In a 
separate analysis, Fridell and Binder (1992) found that the information exchange phase 
most significantly impacted whether a potentially violent situation ended in deadly force. 
The findings suggest the importance of communication between officers and citizens in 
producing the final outcome, and highlights that officers have the ability to take steps at 
the onset of an encounter to positively affect the outcome, and are not constrained to 
simply reacting in the final moment to a suspect’s threatening behavior. 
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Police De-Escalation and Good Policing 
Cultural and practical barriers. Many have recently argued that de-escalation 
should become a central philosophy in American policing (President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing, 2015). For reasons associated with police work and culture, this 
shift will be difficult to realize. Most importantly, police culture dictates above all else 
that the work is dangerous and can be deadly, and therefore it is the highest priority of the 
officer to make it home safely (Paoline, 2003; PERF, 2015; Wexler & Thomson, 2016). 
Stories like that of Ashley Guindon, a Prince William County police officer who was 
fatally shot in February 2016 on her first day on the job (Ellis, Karimi, & Sutton, 2016) 
are widely publicized by the media and reinforce the idea that the police officer is in 
constant mortal danger. Officers stay abreast of line of duty deaths and join together in 
solidarity to show support for families of fallen officers (Crank, 2004). As a result, police 
culture (and general wisdom) tends to overestimate the actual chances of being injured or 
killed on duty. “This sense of ever-present danger has shaped police training, tactics and 
culture in ways that can lead to responses that are neither proportional nor necessary in 
situations that don’t involve guns” (Wexler & Thomson, 2016). The desire to stay alive 
lends to a shared practice of staying one step ahead of an assailant’s behavior (action, not 
reaction). This is seen in the force standard established in Graham v. Connor (490 U.S. 
386 1989), which states that an officer’s actions must be considered in light of the 
circumstances, acknowledging that officers are sometimes faced with complex, dynamic, 
and rapidly evolving situations with little room to make well-processed decisions. This 
means that the proverbial tie goes to the officer; that officer safety is the top priority. 
They are trained to be one step ahead. Therefore, we should expect an officer’s actions to 
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be disproportionally more severe than the suspect’s. To the officer, then, de-escalation 
may seem antithetical to the job, and especially to officer safety, because it teaches 
officers to be patient, stand back, to take in the totality of the circumstances before taking 
any actions, and to use the least amount of force possible. 
Police culture has also historically supported noble-cause corruption (Caldero & 
Crank, 2004). Klockars (1980) called this the Dirty Harry problem, named for Clint 
Eastwood’s character in the 1971 movie. Officers face numerous ethical dilemmas 
stemming from their work and the larger bureacracy of the criminal justice system. 
Following the Rodney King beating, LAPD Assistant Chief Dotson attempted to explain 
the officers’ decisions – “we expect [patrol officers] to go out and aggressively identify 
people, and investigate them, and that puts these police officers in the middle between 
what we evaluate them on and what they are able to do legally” (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, 
p. 13). While the “right thing to do” may sometimes be clear, at times officers are tasked 
with deciding between protecting public safety and acting within their legal and 
organizational constraints. Sometimes, officers have opted for nobel cause corruption – 
corruption viewed as justified if the means achieve just ends. This can be planting 
evidence or lying to make a charge stick, roughing up a person who the officer believes 
escaped retribution (“street justice”), or threatening to harm a suspect who the officer 
thinks may commit a crime in the future. De-escalation is in some ways the exact 
opposite of noble cause corruption, because it dictates that an officer treat any person 
with dignity and respect regardless of their actions, intentions, or words in order to 
resolve a situation legitimately, peacefully, and without physical force. In sum, a shift 
towards de-escalation in police work may be challenging because 1) officers are taught 
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“officer safety first,” and 2) employing de-escalation with persons whom officers feel are 
unworthy of respect may feel unnatural or contrary to their mission. 
De-escalation training programs. Nationally, most agencies do not offer or 
require de-escalation training to their officers either because of budgetary or human 
resource constraints, or because the department perceives that the training is not 
necessary (Gilbert, 2017; PERF, 2015). Just twelve U.S. states require agencies to offer 
de-escalation training. Among the 34 states that do not require training, 24 have police 
training standards boards that could require the training to agencies but choose to not do 
so. Accordingly, the average police officer in 2015 received 58 hours of firearms 
instruction, 49 hours of defense tactics, and only 8 hours of de-escalation training (PERF, 
2015). At the national level, Attorney General Jeff Sessions has made clear that he does 
not support the efforts of the previous administration to promote police reform, including 
de-escalation (Zapotosky, 2017). If de-escalation training is to diffuse in the near future, 
it will need to do so in spite of an unsupportive political and professional atmosphere. 
Gilbert (2017) suggests that a lack of de-escalation training for officers could 
have dire consequences. Officers are traditionally trained to respond to problems in terms 
of force – how much force is adequate given the circumstances, and what is the best way 
to use that force? They are not trained in methods for avoiding force. As such, they 
cannot be expected to employ avoidance or conflict resolution tactics when they could be 
effective at solving a conflict, nor can they be held accountable in cases where they fail to 
de-escalate. Whether or not an officer could have avoided force does not matter, because 
using force is exactly what they are trained to do. Without de-escalation training, 
unnecessary uses of coercive and deadly force will continue, and it will continue to be 
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ruled that the officers were justified in their decisions. Aside from the impact on use of 
force rates, some believe that simply opting against de-escalation training can have direct 
negative consequences on a department’s legitimacy. To some citizens, departments that 
refuse to implement de-escalation training despite national recommendations and calls 
from citizens seem to send the message that citizens’ lives are secondary to officers’ 
lives. Departments that send these messages will see citizen trust in the police erode as a 
result.  
Some large cities in the United States have implemented forms of de-escalation 
training (Griffith, 2016). A few departments implemented training or policy changes 
following the death of Michael Brown and the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement, 
in efforts to demonstrate change. For example, the NYPD was among the first to begin 
training all its officers in various methods to slow down a potentially violent encounter. 
The Seattle Police Department altered its policy manual to include an officer’s 
responsibility to try to de-escalate “when safe.” Dallas Police Department has publicly 
reported a number of positive outcomes following the implementation of new de-
escalation training. Their training is largely based on reality scenarios. The department 
has since reported a 91% drop in citizen complaints between 2009 and 2015, although 
some have countered that these drops were also concordant with the agency’s deployment 
of body cameras. A few departments, such as Ferguson (MO), implemented the training 
in response to a consent decree order.  
There are some concerns about new de-escalation policies and trainings. For 
example, critics claim the Albuquerque Police Department altered its policies to 
incorporate de-escalation but did not offer new training with respect to these policy 
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changes. This caused many to question whether officers will start to employ these tactics 
in unsafe ways. A separate problem is, among agencies that do offer de-escalation 
training, the content of the curriculum and the number of required hours varies 
dramatically. There are no standards governing how to implement the training and no 
empirical research guiding development. Gilbert (2017) argued that the current lack of 
training and training standards fosters injustice in American policing. A vulnerable, 
mentally ill person who poses no immediate threat to officers could have a higher chance 
of being killed by police simply by crossing city lines. Without empirical research, the 
truth behind this suggestion is unknown. 
While de-escalation has not received specific empirical attention, similar 
strategies have been well studied. The best example is Crisis Intervention Training (CIT), 
which teams police with mental health professionals, advocates, and academics to 
develop comprehensive plans for addressing problems involving mentally ill community 
members (“CIT International,” 2016; Dupont, Cochran, & Pillsbury, 2007; PERF, 2012). 
Police frequently come into contact with mentally ill persons, who present special 
problems that can sometimes lead to confusion, conflict, and violent confrontation 
(Augustin & Fagan, 2011). CIT training teaches police officers communication and 
resolution skills to help them successfully interact with mentally ill individuals in ways 
that reduce tension, achieve mutual understanding, and reduce negative outcomes 
(Sanow, 2006). Research suggests this form of training is successful in reducing use of 
force (Compton et al., 2011), putting individuals with mental illness at ease, reducing risk 
of injury, and reducing unpredictability (Hanafi, Bahora, Demir, & Compton, 2008). CIT 
is also associated with decreased arrest rates and increased referrals (Steadman, Deane, & 
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Borum, 2000). Young and Brumley (2009) found officers who received CIT training 
were more satisfied with their perceived ability to manage crisis situations. Teller and 
colleagues (2006) found CIT training significantly increases the chances that a police-
involved person with mental illness will gain access to treatment. The training is also 
associated with an increase in the number of calls stating the citizen may have a mental 
illness and an increase in the number of transports of mentally ill persons to an 
emergency treatment facility. 
Good police behaviors. Like de-escalation, the research literature on good 
policing is scant. What is available generally describes the behaviors of good or effective 
police officers, often when dealing with those extralegal informal encounters that 
encompass a majority of an officer’s workday. Also like de-escalation, good or effective 
policing is not well defined. Furthermore, due to its infrequency, effective police 
responses during potentially violent situations are less well documented and the existing 
literature is largely theoretical (and dated). The remainder of this literature review aims to 
describe good policing in the eyes of classic policing scholars and to situate de-escalation 
within this body of work. A close reading of this scholarship offers some insight for our 
still developing understanding of violence de-escalation in police work. In addition, many 
scholars note that police have their own conceptions of what makes a good police officer, 
based on their perceptions of the police mission and self-imposed standards (as opposed 
to department policy definitions, academy training, legal standards, or citizen 
perceptions; Bittner, 1967; Hunt, 1985). To understand these concepts, scholars 
recommend we use a peer nomination sampling method to identify and study officers 
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whom others regard as the best among them. Research using peer nominations in policing 
research is also discussed below. 
 Researchers have long acknowledged that the majority of an officer’s daily 
activities involve extralegal peacekeeping tasks (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1967; Wilson, 
1968). White (2010) noted the peacekeeping responsibility of police stems from their 
amorphous mandate. As Bitter (1967) points out, citizens often request police service for 
a multitude of noncriminal matters, such as interpersonal disputes or disorderly persons. 
Peacekeeping may be better understood as a “craft” as described by Willis (2013), since 
these behaviors are largely developed through experience and constrained only by the 
officer’s own common sense and police cultural customs that dictate what behaviors are 
normal and appropriate (Bittner, 1967). Bittner (1967) studied skid row because he 
argued the setting provides an optimal and unique opportunity for officers practicing the 
peacekeeping craft. Because the inhabitants of skid row lead “abnormal” lives, law 
enforcement activities in this setting are largely guided by the officer’s professional 
knowledge of local customs and the goals of peacekeeping, rather than the teachings of 
the police academy or the rules of law. Therefore, patrol officers assigned to skid row 
endeavor to develop a rich local knowledge of the area, the persons, and the unique social 
norms that guide behaviors.  
To many officers assigned to skid row (an area of Los Angeles with one of the 
largest populations of homeless persons), their work is perceived as the policing of the 
inherently offensive persons (Bittner, 1967). The lifestyle and scrupulousness of skid row 
residents are regarded as a personal choice and they are viewed as responsible for their 
own victimization as a result. Officers on skid row are constantly aware that victimization 
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and violence can erupt at any moment. For these reasons, the mission of police on skid 
row is not to enforce the black letter of the law, but to prevent the worst occurrences from 
happening to its residents. Officers accordingly develop and hone the peacekeeping craft 
with a keen awareness to the ad hoc asocial nature of the setting.  
Bittner (1967) identifies the first task for effective peacekeeping on skid row as 
developing a rich understanding of the beat and its inhabitants. Making casual rounds 
officers get to know the places, ask questions of residents, and become aware of present 
and past events. Local knowledge of the area informs the officer of the potential for 
problems, aids in decision-making, and offers familiarity between officers and citizens, 
which can reduce conflict and hostility in future encounters. The second goal of 
peacekeeping is solving immediate problems, rather than systematically enforcing the 
law. Most commonly, officers employ extralegal alternative methods for problem 
solving, such as making suggestions, giving warnings, or issuing instructions. Familiarity 
between patrol officers and citizens increases the chances that residents will respond to 
these informal methods of control. Arrest is used only as a resource to solve an 
immediately pressing problem. “The problem patrolmen confront is not which drunks, 
beggars, or disturbers of the peace should be arrested…rather, the problem is whether, 
when someone ‘needs’ to be arrested, he should be charged with drunkenness, begging, 
or disturbing the peace” (p. 710). Finally, peacekeeping on skid row dictates that 
decisions to arrest are made for two reasons, both concerned with the reduction of risk: 1) 
to protect persons from harming themselves and 2) to prevent persons from being 
victimized. Otherwise, as one officer put it, “the best among us can usually keep the 
upper hand in such situations without making arrests” (p. 711). 
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Muir (1977) likened the police officer’s task to extortion – boiled down, the 
officer’s job is to induce compliance by threatening a person with the loss of property or 
freedom. Citizens, Muir (1977) notes, are agents in this game too. For example, when 
citizens are “truly dispossessed” they are less vulnerable to the extortion tactics of the 
officer, since they have very little to lose (p. 39). In these cases the citizens tend to have 
the upper hand. Similarly, persons who are emotionally detached from worldly 
belongings, social relationships, or their own mortality will not be affected by the threat 
of police presence, arrest, or deadly force. The officer is force to either muscle his or her 
way through the encounter or seek out alternative means. Furthermore, the irrationality of 
one’s opponent tends to skew the traditional rules of play, since someone who is 
irrational is unpredictable and might do quite literally anything. Officers faced with 
“irrational” citizens are aware that their usual tactics will be less effective and perhaps 
less safe. 
Acknowledging these challenges, Muir (1977) sought to understand how good 
police officers respond to them in ways that “level the playing field” and ultimately 
achieve compliance (Waddington, 2015, p. 682). Officers who do this well enjoy the 
confidence of their community, foster a sense of security among residents on their beat, 
and have higher levels of job satisfaction. Echoing Bittner (1967), Muir (1997) notes the 
most effective police officers talk to and get to know persons on their beat. They do not 
do this because they are friendly people, but because this practice gives them inside 
knowledge to regain the upper hand should they enter into an enforcement situation in 
which they need to “extort” compliance. Talking with residents helps the officer identify 
what matters to them, including those who are seemingly unattached, which can then be 
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used as leverage in moments of crisis. Effective officers also make use of other 
innovative methods for “extorting” persons who are not affected by the threat of police 
authority. When arrest did nothing to deter a man’s drunk and disorderly behavior, Muir 
(1997) describes how a police officer convinced local liquor store owners to refuse sale to 
the person. An additional trait of a good police officer is what Muir called “passion” – the 
reconciliation of one’s life saving responsibilities with the duty to use coercive force. 
Good officers do not resort to force unless necessary, but when the time requires they are 
not hesitant to take physical action. Good police officers also have empathy or 
“perspective” for the various forms of the human condition, including those who lead 
atypical lifestyles. 
In his classic study, Muir (1977) also documented the behaviors of unprofessional 
police officers. He noted that some officers adopt a cynical approach to the job and an 
“us vs. them” mentality regarding citizens. These “enforcers,” have high passion but low 
perspective and are quick to use force. They fail to recognize there are alternative, 
innovative methods for gaining compliance that do not involve physical means or arrest. 
As a consequence, enforcers tend to alienate themselves from their constituents and find 
that their interactions escalate more quickly and are more difficult to handle. Avoiders, 
on the other hand, lack both passion and perspective. These officers avoid problem 
situations and conflict at all costs, especially when it could potentially affect their job. 
These officers rarely use force and attempt to use all other means to solve problems. Muir 
(1977) notes the primary consequence of the avoider strategy is that criminals learn the 
area is ripe for offending activity, since the officer will likely do nothing in response. 
According to Bittner (1967) and Muir (1977), officers who have both passion and 
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perspective, who gain specific knowledge about their beat, and who see their job as 
problem solving rather than law enforcement tend to be most effective at policing skid 
row. 
Defining and measuring good police behaviors. Scholars lament that the police 
institution is designed in such a way that successful policing is hard to identify, credit, 
and measure (Bittner, 1967; Fyfe, 1993; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). For this reason, some 
officers may perceive little incentive to engage in effective policing, as described by 
Bittner (1967) and Muir (1977), because they get little to no recognition for their efforts. 
They may, in fact, be punished for some forms of good police behavior if they fail to 
produce hard evidence of their daily activities. For example, officers instructed to meet 
traffic ticket quotas are not rewarded for the number of accidents they prevent (perhaps 
through the use of warnings and “teachable moments”) but only for the number of drivers 
to whom they issue a ticket.  
Good police practices are difficult to identify for several reasons. First, there is no 
universally accepted definition of good or effective policing. As such, it is difficult for 
agencies to structure organizations in ways that give credit to or incentivize these 
behaviors. Second, traditional indicators of good police work – arrests, citations, 
investigative stops – tend to mask the efforts of more effective officers who take 
innovative steps to avoid official action or physical force. Some scholars have 
recommended alternative measures of effectiveness that promote good policing. Klockars 
(1996), as well as Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) have suggested that tactics which save the 
most lives, or which use the least amount of force possible to solve a problem, should be 
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considered as metrics for evaluating good work, because these promote the life saving 
mission of the police. 
Willis’ (2013) discussion of policing as a craft speaks to the importance of officer 
experience in developing an evidence base on good policing. It is a common assumption 
among scholars that good police officers are those who are aware of the evidence base 
and who put these ideas into practice. However, Willis (2013) regards this in some ways 
as backwards thinking. He suggests rather that successful ideas in evidence based 
policing are those that take into account the views of police practitioners, and particularly 
the views of officers who have significant work experience (Bayley & Bittner, 1984; 
Willis, 2013). The police craft is an accumulation of context specific skills for addressing 
individual problems. These skills include things not covered in the police academy, such 
as the ability to remain calm, to communicate in effective ways with different groups of 
people, to rationalize through sets of facts to come to the best decision, and even to avoid 
burnout and cynicism. These context specific skills are more important in more 
ambiguous situations – such as interpersonal disputes – where a specific approach 
forward is not clear. Furthermore, what works well for one officer with a particular skill 
set may not be as effective for another who has different skills. Officers tend to be aware 
of whom among them is best suited to respond to a particular problem, be it a group of 
rowdy teens or a suicidal male whose wife has recently left him. Willis (2013) argues that 
the skilled craftsman or woman makes decisions that both their fellow officers and 
citizens believe are “wise, compassionate, and fair” (pg. 4). Effective evidence based 
policing research should focus on understanding how and why these officers arrive at 
these decisions. 
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Traits of skilled police officers. In addition to good police behaviors, some 
researchers have looked at the personality traits of good officers. Lawrence and 
colleagues (2017) point out that agencies typically conduct psychological testing on 
potential candidates to screen certain persons out of law enforcement careers. Agencies 
have used the screen out method since the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice in 1967 recommended that police officers possess certain 
psychological traits – including coping skills and the ability to take direction. This 
practice became even more popular since the National Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals Report provided national standards for police psychological 
exams in 1972.  
Agencies do not, however, usually rely on personality traits to screen good 
candidates in. In the same fashion, most research has examined the impact of officer 
personality traits on negative outcomes such as use of force, complaints, suspensions, and 
terminations. Few studies examine the impact of positive personality effects on good 
policing outcomes (Lawrence et al., 2017). Over twenty years ago, Fyfe (1993) argued 
that researchers should begin to develop a body of research evidence regarding best 
practices for producing good police work. To achieve this goal it would be vitally 
important scholars to investigate the impact of officer personality traits on those daily 
police behaviors that are colloquially valued but less well understood – such as 
discretionary decision-making, information gathering, quality interactions with citizens, 
and verbal de-escalation.  
Lawrence and colleagues (2017) employed data from the National Police 
Research Platform’s recruit study, which surveyed new recruits on their first week at the 
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police academy on traditional and contemporary dimensions of policing, including 
communication style and personality traits. Once the officers graduated and were 
working in a patrol function, the recruit study contacted citizens with whom the officers 
had an encounter and interviewed them regarding the interaction. In particular, citizens 
were asked to rate their quality of treatment and quality of decision-making, components 
of procedural justice. The authors found that officers who scored higher in empathy and 
lower in neuroticism on the original survey were rated higher by citizens in procedural 
justice. Officers who had higher emotional control also rated significantly higher in 
quality of treatment. The study findings strongly suggest the potential for screening in 
methods for selecting candidates in ways the promote good policing as requested by Fyfe 
(1993). 
Applying these principles to violence de-escalation. In Bittner’s (1967) depiction 
of skid row policing, officers regarded skid row inhabitants as offensive, and largely 
responsible for their lifestyle and the victimization they experienced. Some officers, 
nevertheless, approached their work with the mindset of risk reduction – asking what 
actions can be taken in order to prevent all residents from being harmed or, importantly, 
from harming themselves? They did not seek to punish individuals who may have chosen 
to engage in binge drinking or to live on the streets without employment. They sought to 
work within these boundaries to make the lives of skid row residents marginally safer. 
Muir (1977) likewise described the professional officer as one with perspective – who 
treats everyone with dignity and respect, regardless of their lifestyle choices. It has been 
previously argued in this dissertation that a transition to an emphasis on de-escalation in 
policing today would seem unnatural to some police officers. When faced with a hostile, 
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threatening, violent, or offensive person, the response by many would be to seek justice 
for their crimes, to punish them for their distain of police authority or the law, to 
disregard their circumstances as products of their personal choices, or at the very least to 
quickly and physically restrain their violent actions. Alternatively, the ideals of de-
escalation would dictate that officers converse with citizens compassionately and 
empathetically, in spite of their antagonism, to make an effort to understand their 
perspective, and to stand back and consider the situation before taking any immediate 
physical actions. The underlying motive of these tactics is to exact the individual’s 
compliance in order to safely arrest them or prevent them from doing harm to officers, 
citizens, or themselves. Principles of d-escalation would further dictate that officers do so 
in ways that minimize the use of force involved. 
These studies also highlight the importance of local knowledge for an officer’s 
ability to achieve citizen compliance on their beat. Officers in Bittner and Muir’s field 
studies spent most of their time patrolling the town, talking to residents, soaking up 
current events, and largely gathering a background to inform their later decisions on the 
job. These officers also sought out innovative, alternative methods for solving problems 
that did not involve use of force or arrest making – efforts made easier if the officer knew 
the person’s background and attachments. Though more difficult to gain detailed local 
knowledge today, particularly in larger and more complex urban cities, de-escalation 
would certainly involve such concepts as procedural justice, quality treatment, citizen 
trust in law enforcement, and would be seemingly more effective if officers gathered 
knowledge on persons with heavy involvement in law enforcement. A police officer 
would be significantly less anxious and heavy handed when responding to a suspicious 
74 
persons call if they had previous contacts with the individual and knew he or she was 
noncombative. Background knowledge would also be particularly useful for officers 
assigned to special areas such as high traffic shopping strips, downtown corridors, or 
small university campuses. 
A key concept in Muir’s study was the identification of citizens who present 
special problems to police officers and who generally respond less well to traditional 
compliance-gaining tactics. Individuals who have little earthly belongings, or who are 
detached from society, have less to “lose” from a police encounter and may not be easily 
persuaded by threats to their freedom or use of force. Other special persons include those 
who are irrational in the moment and cannot hold a productive conversation or who may 
act out in unpredictable ways. These citizens and situations, which may include the 
homeless, the depressed or mentally ill, and those who are under the influence or who 
have serious addictions need to be better studied and understood so police officers can be 
guided in better methods for handling interactions safely. Alternatively, as suggested by 
Willis (2013) it may behoove scholars to explore officers’ perceptions and experiences in 
dealing with these persons in order to identify tactics that were effective at de-escalation 
the conflict. The following section offers one method for conducting this form of 
research. 
Peer nominations for studying good policing.2 Similar to Willis (2013), many 
scholars believe the answer to problems plaguing the police institution in America can be 
better understood by talking to highly skilled officers. Klockars (1996) believed the skills 
to improve police response to potentially violent encounters already exist and are 
                                                 
2 This topic is also covered in Chapter 3: Methods in a discussion of this study’s sampling frame. 
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currently being used. He asks how else would we find variance in the levels of force used 
by skilled and average police officers? His suggestion is to ask highly skilled police 
officers about how they would solve the problem, and to propose force-minimizing 
solutions that can used at the agency level.3 His article further sought to define excessive 
force according to a highly skilled officer standard – excessive force is that which a 
highly skilled officer would not have found necessary. Klockars criticized citizen review 
boards on the grounds that lay persons do not have the knowledge necessary to properly 
evaluate police work, including an understanding of the options and alternatives 
available, to know when more could have been done to avoid the use of force. 
In 1969, Toch, Grant, and Galvin asked Oakland Police Department supervisors 
to identify officers who were especially good at their jobs (Toch, 1980; Toch & Grant, 
1991; Toch, Grant, & Galvin, 1975). To gauge both sides, they also identified “problem” 
officers who had the highest rates of force in the department. They asked both groups 
officers to define the problem of police violence and identify solutions. The discussion 
led to the creation of a violence prevention specialized unit in OPD, whose task was to 
identify officers with propensities for violence and to nonpunitively investigate and 
remedy the issue. Also following participation in the study, the officers identified as 
violence prone reduced their use of force rates by half add citation 
The Metro-Dade Police/Citizen Violence Reduction Project was rooted in the 
research by Toch and colleagues. The project was a collaboration between the Police 
Foundation and the Metro-Dade Police Department (MDPD; Miami, FL; Fyfe, 1987). 
                                                 
3 However, Bayley and Garofalo (1989) found that those officers whom peers nominated as the best at 
handling potentially violent situations actually used more force and were generally more active. The 
authors said they could conclude these officers did something differently but could not say with certainty 
whether they were better police officers. 
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The goal was to help MDPD develop training for officers on de-escalating potentially 
violent encounters with citizens, with a premise that officers can take steps to avoid 
physical confrontation by structuring interactions in strategically inoffensive ways, most 
importantly by being sensitive and polite, but also by using strategy, reading body 
language, and listening. Fyfe (1987) argued that officers could reduce the chances of 
using force in several ways: Using down time to become familiar with residents, using 
the time on the drive to a call for service to consider the facts and prepare, and by 
structuring the initial contact and resolutions to avoid negative outcomes.  
Officers were recruited to a focus group to read official police reports and identify 
situations and behaviors that escalate or de-escalate confrontation. Collectively, the group 
found that violence typically occurred in four contexts: routine traffic stops, high risk 
traffic stops, crimes in progress, and interpersonal disputes. Ultimately, Fyfe worked with 
MDPD training instructors to construct an effective role play-based training course on de-
escalation tactics, based on the information generated during the focus group. This 
information was used to develop MDPD’s new de-escalation training. Klinger (2010), 
testing the effectiveness of this violence reduction training, found that officers who 
received the training indeed used less force. 
 
Summary of Literature Review 
The main takeaway from this section is that research on de-escalation is scant. 
However, this review also suggests that de-escalation could in theory address some of the 
long standing social issues plaguing the police profession. American policing has long 
faced serious challenges in developing trust and legitimacy with citizens and in particular 
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with minority and poor communities The current issues, stemming from high profile 
encounters involving the deaths of unarmed black men in custody, represent a 
continuation of these historical challenges and the outrage expressed by some members 
of the community for the perceived discrimination and abuse in police practices. This 
literature review, I argue, strongly suggests that the recommendations to increase the use 
and sophistication of de-escalation tactics in policing could make strides towards 
addressing these problems. 
Research on CIT training (Compton et al., 2011) and violence reduction training 
generally (Klinger, 2010) highlights that these can be effective at reducing adverse 
police-citizen outcomes, including use of force. De-escalation training could 
systematically teach officers to avoid or reduce conflict with citizens with whom they 
typically have greater challenges: the criminally violent, the mentally ill, intoxicated 
persons, and people who hold negative attitudes towards police and are hostile or disobey 
the police. Such training should be guided by classic (Bittner, 1967; Muir, 1977) 
discussions of effective, professional police work, as well as much needed future research 
seeking to identify pathways towards promoting good policing (Fyfe, 1993; Lawrence et 
al, 2017). 
Additionally, although there is no consensus on the primary role of police in 
American society, it is clear that de-escalation (if implemented as intended) could help 
the police to pursue each of their important roles. These include law enforcement, 
protecting public safety, keeping public peace, the legitimate use of coercive force, and 
maintaining their legitimacy. Most importantly, the enhanced use of de-escalation could 
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assist the police in saving more lives during potentially violent encounters and improving 
their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 
Finally, the fact that police force is exceedingly rare and low in severity indicates 
that the vast majority of encounters can be de-escalated. There are numerous 
opportunities for officers to actionably reduce the chances that a situation will escalate, 
particularly from the very beginning of a citizen contact. Police research and training will 
need to pursue a transactional approach to police-citizen encounters moving forward. 
 
CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
This dissertation uses a mixed methods approach to the study of de-escalation in 
police-citizen encounters. The project was conducted in collaboration with the Spokane 
Police Department in Spokane, Washington, and was carried out in two parts over the 
course of one year. Given the lack of conceptual clarity and research on this topic, Part 1 
was exploratory and qualitative, consisting of in-depth interviews (N=8 officers) and a 
focus group (N=1 focus group) with eight peer nominated officers. The purpose of 
studying this small group of officers was to better understand the concept of de-escalation 
by seeking the perspective of those who perform it well. Part 2 is a quantitative test of the 
concepts explored in Part 1, examining the use of de-escalation in actual police-citizen 
encounters. This phase of the study employed Systematic Social Observations on 35 ride-
alongs (N=131 police-citizen encounters). This section examines the situations in which 
officers tend to use de-escalation as well as situations in which these tactics are more 
effective at de-escalating conflict. 
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Research Setting 
This section provides a description of the setting of the research – the Spokane 
Police Department – as well as the ecological setting – Spokane, Washington. Two 
current issues in Spokane are worth mentioning in the context of this study. A sentinel 
event from 2006, which had a poignant impact on the relationship between the Spokane 
Police Department and the community, is examined. The Collaborative Reform Initiative 
that was underway at the time of data collection is also discussed. 
 
Spokane Police Department 
The research setting is the Spokane Police Department (SPD), a medium-sized 
agency in the Northwestern United States. As of October 2016, the department employed 
225 sworn patrol officers, including 171 Officers, 16 Corporals, and 38 Sergeants 
(approximately 1 sworn officer per 1,000 residents). The average age is 34.4 The 
departments is not exceedingly diverse. Diversity in the department is lower than the 
national averages for gender, race, and ethnicity. Twenty (8.9%) of the 225 patrol officers 
are female, 3 (1.3%) are Black, 9 (4%) are Hispanic; 1 (0.4%) is Asian, 2 (0.8%) are 
Native American, and 4 (1.7%) are Multi-Racial. The department’s jurisdiction spans 76 
square miles, and beats are divided into the “North side” and the “South side” of the 
Spokane River. There are four major patrol shifts: Day (6am-4:40pm), Swing (10am-
8:40pm), Power (4pm-2:40am), and Graveyard (8pm-6:40am). There are four teams 
                                                 
4 Demographics were provided via personal communications with agency staff. The average age was 
calculated for 2015 patrol officers, corporals, and sergeants. Remaining statistics reflect the 2016 profile of 
the agency. 
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assigned to each shift – two North side and two South side – for a total of 16 patrol 
teams. 
 
Spokane, Washington 
The city of Spokane, Washington is located on the far Eastern end of the state 
near the border of Idaho. The city is medium sized, with a population of 209,525, making 
it the second most populous city in the state of Washington and the largest city between 
Seattle and Minneapolis. Its median age is 35 years, median household income is 
$43,694, and unemployment in 2013 was reported at 7%.5 Much like the police 
department, the city of Spokane is predominantly white, with just under 87% white 
residents. Almost 6% of the population is Hispanic, and under 3% is black. Spokane is 
well known for its close proximity to hundreds of miles of coniferous forestry and lakes, 
attracting visitors and residents who enjoy outdoor activities such as hiking, camping, 
skiing, rafting, and fishing (SpokaneCity.org, 2015). It is a major hub for service 
industries. Further, the city ranks 4th among United States metropolitan areas in the health 
care industry, and its largest employer is Fairchild Air Force Base. 
 
In-Custody Death of Otto Zehm 
As I quickly learned while working in Spokane, one does not spend much time in 
the city before hearing the story of Otto Zehm. This death shapes much of the 
relationship between the police and the public in Spokane. On March 18, 2006, SPD was 
                                                 
5 City of Spokane census data were drawn from 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF 
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involved in an encounter with Zehm, a 36-year-old man who suffered from mental illness 
(“Otto Zehm: Summary,” 2012). The call originated when two women became concerned 
that Zehm used the ATM machine immediately after they did. The women called police 
claiming he might be robbing them. When officers responded, Zehm was inside the 
nearby Zip Trip convenience store shopping for soda. It is possible the information 
received from dispatch was inadequate and confusing, leading officers to suspect Zehm 
was robbing the store. A physical confrontation with Zehm ensued and officers deployed 
several force techniques, including a baton and a TASER, before hog-tying and spit-
guarding6 Zehm on the ground. Zehm died two days later. The medical examiner 
identified the cause of death as lack of oxygen to the brain, likely due to the spit guard.  
According to statements from responding officers, Zehm was aggressive and had 
threatened them with a 2-liter Pepsi bottle, which prompted their use of force. Witness 
accounts and video footage from store security cameras, however, disputed these claims, 
suggesting Zehm was holding the Pepsi and, because he suffered from mental illness, did 
not understand the officers’ commands and became confused. 
Spokane County prosecutors originally decided against prosecuting the case, 
clearing officers of wrongdoing (Hill, 2014). However, in May 2012 the city reached an 
excessive force settlement with the Zehm family for $1.67 million, after which a federal 
investigation was opened by the FBI. A subsequent civil rights trial resulted in a guilty 
verdict against one of the officers, who was sentenced to 51 months in prison on 
November 21, 2011.  
                                                 
6 A spit guard is a hood placed over a person’s head to prevent them from spitting or biting officers. 
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The death of Otto Zehm sparked outcry from the Spokane community – the public 
believed police had used excessive force and needlessly caused the death of an innocent 
and mentally ill man. Later in the investigation, residents believe the police failed to 
investigate the death and attempted to cover up details (Shors & Clouse, 2006). Public 
disapproval over the case prompted the creation of an Ombudsman’s civilian review 
office. In addition, the mayor established a use of force commission to audit use of force 
by the SPD. The commission issued a final report in February 2013 detailing 26 
recommendations for improving the police department. Six and 12 months later, SPD 
issued progress reports detailing its attempts to address the use of force commission’s 
recommendations. Eleven years later, however, many in the Spokane community remain 
upset by the incident. It is inevitably brought up in the context of reasons why the police 
department needs reform. An anniversary article is published in the local newspaper each 
year, while a statue commemorating Zehm’s life (and also serving as a physical 
monument of protest against police brutality) currently resides in one of Spokane’s public 
parks.  
 
Collaborative Reform 
Also in 2012, Frank Straub was named the police chief. One of Chief Straub’s 
first actions was to contact The Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance, 
established through the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), to 
comprehensively investigate SPD. The broad goal of Collaborative Reform is to work 
with law enforcement agencies to address specific issues involving the agency’s 
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relationship with its community. The specific goal is to identify and implement long term 
solutions. 
According to the official report, SPD was experiencing an increase in use of force 
and a fractured relationship with the community (King, Saloom, & McClelland, 2014). 
Specifically, the community was unhappy with the way the department had investigated 
Otto Zehm’s death. As such, the goals of the collaborative reform were to  
1) examine Spokane’s force policies, 
2) improve Spokane’s use of force investigations, 
3) examine the role of an ombudsman as a potential option for improvement, and  
4) improve the department’s culture, as it relates to force.  
For 11 months, the COPS office examined a wealth of data, including Spokane’s 
use of force policies, training, investigation and documentation practices, civilian 
oversight, and community outreach activities. Investigators interviewed police officers 
and citizens of Spokane, observed training and deadly force review meetings, participated 
in ride alongs, reviewed use of force files, policies, and national standards, and provided 
technical assistance.  
The final report concluded that, while the department fell within the spectrum of 
good policing, there were 42 areas where improvement could be made. Key concerns 
were deficiencies in Spokane’s use of force reporting documents, promotion processes, 
the flawed early intervention system, and inadequate documentation of training. They 
also found use of deadly force is rarely disciplined or corrected, and the Office of the 
Police Ombudsman lacked formal and clear responsibilities. Since the issuing of this 
report, department administration has focused considerable effort towards addressing the 
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42 areas of improvement and reporting these changes to the public. More recent data 
from 2015 and 2016 has found that use of force and citizen complaints are quite rare in 
SPD. A study found that, among 149 study officers, about one use of force report was 
generated per month per 1,000 calls for service, while citizen complaints arose even less 
frequently (White, Gaub, & Todak, in press). 
 
Access to the Research Setting 
Some of the first challenges encountered by a field worker are “getting in” and 
“getting along.” Getting in reflects how the researcher obtains access to conduct research 
in a setting. The difficulty of gaining access depends on the extent to which the setting is 
public or private (Lofland, 2005). Getting along reflects the researcher’s task, once 
granted access, of navigating a relationship with participants in the setting over an 
extended period of time (Lofland, 2005). The scope of potential problems faced by 
ethnographers in the field is infinite: “The researcher must gain access to the field, 
establish rapport with the research participants, understand hidden codes, and balance the 
roles of insider and outsider to get interesting data and be able to write about them” 
(Sandberg & Copes, 2012, p. 180). Success in “getting along” can ebb and flow without 
warning.  
I was initially granted access to conduct research in SPD in January 2015, when I 
was hired as a graduate student on a project studying body-worn cameras (BWCs).7 The 
                                                 
7 “Assessing the Impact and Consequences of Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras: A Multi-Site 
Randomized Controlled Trial.” Funded to the Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety, 
Arizona State University (Principal Investigator Dr. Michael D. White), by the Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation in the amount of $497,575. 
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Principal Investigator on the project, Dr. Michael White, had worked with the agency’s 
administrative staff to devise a two-year randomized controlled trial experiment. During 
the first eight months, I worked on this larger project. Between January and September 
2015, I traveled to the location four times, each for one week. My primary task was to 
attend roll call briefings to administer surveys to officers. These visits were also used to 
establish a rapport with the officers and become a familiar face. For this reason, I also did 
a number of ride alongs. By September 2015, I had done 14 of these preparatory ride 
alongs, totaling 85 hours in a Spokane police car, for the purpose of getting to know the 
officers, the agency, and the city of Spokane. I also attended two 8-hour BWC training 
classes in Fall 2015, during which I observed training and interacted with instructors and 
officers. 
By June 2015, I was a known presence at SPD and had developed a positive 
working relationship with many of its members. At this point, the idea to conduct my 
dissertation research in this setting was developed. Lofland (2005, pg. 9) calls this 
method of selecting a research setting “starting where you are.” He argued it is the easiest 
path for obtaining access to a setting and members that might otherwise be off limits. I 
would probably not have been able to conduct research with this police department had it 
not been for my initial appointment on the larger BWC project. Lofland also notes that 
“starting where you are” increases the chances a project will be taken to completion since 
the ethnographer has multiple reasons to be present in the location. 
In November 2015, I moved from Phoenix to Spokane to conduct my dissertation. 
This decision allowed me to develop a rapport with the participants and other members of 
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the setting, to develop a better familiarity with the agency, and to get a feel for the city as 
a member of the community. Moving also facilitated the extensive ride along portion of 
the data collection for the current project, which I would not have been able to do had I 
been traveling back and forth. Ultimately, moving to Spokane made much of this 
research possible.  
The decision to move, however, came with as many challenges as it did benefits. I 
no longer lived close to my academic department so I could not benefit from face-to-face 
interactions with my peers or dissertation committee members on a daily basis. Virtually 
all communications with my committee took place either by email or phone. I also gave 
up my access to the office infrastructure (e.g. desks, supplies, printers) and missed every 
single event (and therefore learning opportunity) held by my School during those years. I 
was disappointed that I did not get to attend the dissertation defenses of my colleagues. 
My decision to move was accompanied by a number of additional personal challenges, 
compromises, and sacrifices. These challenges are not unheard of in the academic field, 
particularly for those who conduct qualitative fieldwork. However, to other Ph.D. 
students I would advise to consider the impact of the move on one’s dissertation, 
productivity, academic socialization, personal well-being, and social/family life. 
In terms of gaining access to a research setting, the extent to which a setting is 
private or public also dictates the ease with which the researcher can gain access 
(Lofland, 2005). A police department is highly private and secured. The doors are always 
locked and the premises are off-limits to everyone except members. Members are granted 
access only after extensive background checks, fingerprinting, and interviews. Non-
members may be granted temporary access, but require escorts and are watched carefully 
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during their time on the premises. Police departments therefore fall on the extremely 
private end of the public-private spectrum. Accordingly, researchers must be granted 
special access, often from the higher echelons of administration and only after 
investigation into their background. Largely due to Dr. White’s credentials and renown as 
a policing scholar, I was ultimately granted full access to department facilities and given 
an ID pass, after completing an online security and information protection course, and 
providing fingerprints and physical descriptions of all my tattoos. 
By November 2015, I had also identified a number of “gatekeepers” or 
“informants” in SPD (Lofland, 2005, p. 40). Gatekeepers are members of the research 
setting that connect the researcher to other members and opportunities. A classic example 
of this practice in qualitative research can be found in Wright and Decker’s (1996, 1997) 
studies of active offenders (see also, Decker & Smith, 2015). ‘Street Daddy,’ a college 
student whom both professors had taught in their classes, agreed to help the authors 
recruit active offenders from his neighborhood. Ultimately, Street Daddy connected these 
scholars with a large number of active offenders in St. Louis, Missouri, due to his 
reputation in the streets of St. Louis and his past criminal history. By the time I began 
research on the current project, I had identified a handful of officers and staff members 
whom I could contact directly for information, advice, permissions, and introductions to 
other members of the organization. These connections, and my close proximity to the 
location, have helped both the current project and the larger BWC project. 
According to Lofland (2005, p. 67), the goal of “getting in” is to gain access to 
the population you are interested in, while the goal of “getting along” is to acquire the 
data. Fostering an identity in the setting is an important task involved in both processes. 
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My goal upon entering the police department was to be regarded by members of the 
setting as a professional researcher, since I had up to that point in my career been 
“acting” the part of the graduate student. I emphasized my professional identity by 
introducing myself as a researcher from Arizona State University, taking notes, and 
asking questions. I wore professional or semi-casual clothing depending on the occasion 
(on ten hour ride alongs I wear jeans and sneakers, as recommended by the officers). I 
also sometimes stressed my ignorance on policing-related topics, to emphasize that I am a 
“learner” in the setting and to glean as much information as I could (Lofland, 2005; 
Mastrofski et al., 1998). Spano (2007), however, notes this can produce showing off 
behavior on the part of officers, particularly when they are in the presence of female 
observers. I also found that I took special pains to establish myself as an unbiased 
researcher, hoping to assuage officers’ concerns that I might “jam them up” for 
something they do or say. My perception was that officers were concerned about 
researchers who may be unsympathetic to the officers’ situation and who may write 
something negative about them. Accordingly, I made an effort to explain to anyone with 
questions about the research purpose or how the data would be used. 
It is important to note that people do not have complete control over the identity 
ascribed to them by others. While a researcher may take pains to present herself in a 
certain light, research participants may “reject these presentations in favor of their own” 
(Mitchell, 1993, p. 12). For example, despite the fact that Snow and Anderson (1993) told 
their homeless research participants they were professional researchers, participants 
continued to convey surprise when the researchers told them they were not spending the 
night outside but in their own homes. Depending on the situation, participants’ own 
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attributions of the researcher’s identity may either facilitate or hinder access. An example 
from my own experiences illustrates how participants’ attributions helped facilitate my 
access. My professor and I attended a roll call briefing at the police department to meet 
the patrol teams and do ride alongs. While we had received approval to conduct our study 
from the administration, my professor knew from experience that it is difficult to study 
police officers without gaining their cooperation as well. We were escorted by a 
supervisor who would assign us to officers for our ride along. This process is informal, 
and usually involves someone asking the room if anyone wants a “rider.” In this case, my 
professor and I planned to ride with officers wearing body cameras and, at that time, 
there were only a few. Therefore, the supervisor approached a specific officer and asked 
if he had room for a rider. The officer looked at my (male) professor and said ‘No, I have 
a partner today,’ meaning there would be no room in the passenger seat because another 
officer would be sitting there. Understanding the officer’s underlying motive, the 
supervisor said ‘you’ll be with her,’ and pointed to me. The officer immediately said 
“okay,” openly revealing that he did not have a partner, rather that he simply preferred to 
have the female rider. The rest of the briefing room, understanding, laughed loudly at this 
exchange. 
 The supervisor had introduced my professor and I both as researchers. We both 
“looked the part” and we both spoke during a brief presentation on body worn cameras. 
However, the patrol officer prioritized our gender identities, not our professional 
identities, in forming his decision on whether he would agree to participate in a ride along 
that day. This attribution is certainly sexist. However, as noted previously, the goal of the 
research is to collect the data and my ability to gain access to do a ride along with a 
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camera wearing officer that day was facilitated by the officer’s attribution of me as a 
woman (and therefore for a straight male I was presumably more exciting or less 
mundane to have in the car). We have since told this story to a number of fellow 
researchers who study police departments, and have heard similar stories of professors 
having better “success” at gaining access to this male dominated research setting by 
employing female graduate students.  
On one hand, I want to be regarded by the police officers as a professional 
researcher. This is a particular motivator for me since I tend to look younger and may not 
always be taken seriously in this profession. However, at the same time I know we are in 
the business of asking for voluntary and sometimes uncompensated participation from 
participants. Researchers have for decades recruited participants without deeply 
analyzing the individuals’ underlying motives for their participation. Often it is money. 
For cops, who usually cannot be monetarily compensated for research, the reward might 
be 10 hours and 40 minutes in a car with someone they would rather be sitting next to. 
Certainly this is not always the case – I have met plenty of officers who are motivated to 
participate in research as a means of sharing their own perspective and to contribute to 
the collection of knowledge on evidence-based policing. Nevertheless, in my experience 
studying police officers my gender has often facilitated my access to this setting and data. 
Difficulty gaining access to police departments, or difficulty gaining full 
participation from officers, is a common issue in policing research. It is widely 
acknowledged that police officers distrust outsiders (Crank, 2004; Sherman, 1982; 
Skolnick, 2004; Van Maanen, 1974). This opposition stems from the perception that the 
public does not like them and will “screw them over” if given the chance, lending to the 
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adoption of a code of secrecy (Crank, 2004) and of a working personality in which they 
close themselves off from the general public (Skolnick, 2004). Officer distrust of 
civilians may be especially poignant for researchers because officers may perceive that 
researchers want to tell them how to do their jobs, and police culture dictates that no one 
can understand what police work is like unless he or she spends several years working 
patrol, especially on a more dangerous beat. There were days during this project when 
this issue caused me a great deal of stress and anxiety. One officer said he did not 
understand why someone would study policing just to study it some more – the only real 
reason someone would study policing is to become a cop. Another officer mockingly 
asked how one could possibly study the police profession without actually having been a 
police officer. A third asked me if I have ever held a “real” job before or do I just make a 
living by bothering others who work. Sometimes these statements left me feeling 
dejected about my work.  
Goffman (1959) famously argued that all people have a front stage and backstage 
area of their social lives. In the backstage, they shed their costumes and cease playing 
their social roles, at least to some extent. He notes that when audience members 
(outsiders) accidentally enter the backstage area and witness members without their 
masks, it can disrupt the social norms and create uncomfortable feelings, such as 
embarrassment. Many police officers work to foster a persona of impartial 
professionalism, or compassion and humanity when appropriate in front of civilians. The 
reserved persona is, in part, fostered because officers believe they will be ridiculed for 
acting “human,” telling jokes, or talking about non-work activities when they are on the 
job. This is especially true when they are at the scene of a traumatic incident, when some 
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officers profess they often need to discuss other things to distract them from the horrific 
scene in front of them. Out of fear they will be ridiculed or punished for expressing these 
human behaviors and emotions, officers do not act like their ‘normal’ selves, express 
concerns, share thoughts, or even feel comfortable in front of outsiders. Researchers who 
study the police know well that officers are almost always initially hesitant in their 
presence, until they can be sure that the outsider means to do them no harm. 
One problem I (and my team) faced in terms of access was that SPD suffered 
from recurring administrative turnover during our time conducting research with the 
agency. The department initially agreed to participate in research with us in November 
2014. In September 2015, just as I embarked on my dissertation data collection, Chief 
Straub was pressured to resign and replaced with an Interim Chief. My faculty advisor 
and I met with the Interim Chief in November 2015 to go over the previous agreement 
and ask for his approval, which was granted. However, in February 2016, the Interim 
Chief announced his resignation. This activated an 8-month search period during which 
the department had no Chief. At the same time, the civilian director who had been our 
direct contact in the agency quit his administrative position and entered the police 
academy as a recruit. During this time, I continued to collect data and reported to various 
people for questions and permissions. Though at times it was difficult to determine whom 
to report to, the staff were gracious and cooperative with both my dissertation research 
and the larger BWC project. In October 2016, a new chief was hired, and my research 
team and I met for a third time to brief the project and seek approval to continue the 
study. In this sense, I had to negotiate access to the setting on three separate occasions. 
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In summary, policing researchers face the task of gaining access to a highly 
privatized location. Once in, they must also develop trust with the officers themselves, 
before they can hope to collect meaningful data. Over the course of two years I 
maintained access largely because I had the backing of a very well-known and respected 
policing researcher, and a willing police department looking to collaborate with 
researchers in order to improve and foster better relationships with its citizenry.  
 
Human Research Subjects Protection 
The study was approved by the Arizona State University Institutional Review 
Board (IRB; STUDY00002197) in Spring 2015 to ensure the protection of all human 
research participants. The data collection for this project was included in a larger 
application entitled “Assessing the Impact and Consequences of Police Officer Body-
Worn Cameras: A Multi-Site Randomized Controlled Trial” (Principal Investigator: 
Michael D. White, Arizona State University School of Criminology and Criminal Justice 
and The Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety). The larger study 
focused on the impact and consequences of police officer body worn cameras. The 
current study was part of this larger study, with the purpose of studying de-escalation 
using body worn camera video footage as a novel data source. All participants who 
provided interviews, attended the focus group, and allowed me to ride along were read an 
approved consent form (see Appendices A and B). Participants in the focus group 
provided written consent, and all others provided verbal consent, according to university 
policy. In addition to obtaining participants’ consent, agency administrators approved all 
phases of the research.  
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Part 1: Qualitative Analysis 
Sampling 
Many scholars have argued that a best practice for studying good police work is to 
study highly skilled officers (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989; Kane & White, 2013; Klockars, 
1996; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; J. Q. Wilson, 1963). However, there is little consensus on 
what makes an officer highly skilled and how to identify these officers. It has been 
suggested that a good starting place is to ask their peers. 
Nobody who spends day after day in the tight and closed societies that are 
police work groups needs to measure “activity” to know who the good 
cops are. When this is done, the assessments obtained often have little or 
nothing to do with numbers…Good cops, according to street officers, are 
level-headed and never get their colleagues into “trouble.” Good cops 
always seem able to identify the causes of problems and to come up with 
the least troublesome ways of solving them. Good cops think ahead and 
always leave a way out of any tough situation. Good cops rarely have to 
resort to the law to solve minor order maintenance problems like drunks or 
noisy kids on the street. Good cops spend their time finding out about the 
people and places on their beats instead of lurking at speed traps or near 
badly marked street signs…As a consequence, the officers known to their 
colleagues as good cops may be virtually invisible beyond their immediate 
work groups. (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 127) 
 
Police would seem to be reliable observers of qualitative differences in 
street performance of other officers. They discriminate fairly accurately 
among colleagues on the basis of what they do. (Bayley & Garofalo, 1989) 
 
To my knowledge only one study has used peer nomination to identify and study 
highly skilled officers. Bayley and Garofalo (1989) asked all patrol officers from one 
police department to nominate peers who they felt were “particularly skilled at handling 
conflict situations.” They found that officers who received the most nominations were 
actually more active and used more force. They concluded that peers are able to identify 
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officers who police differently, but whether or not they were more highly skilled 
remained an unanswered question.  
This study used peer nomination to sample a small group of highly skilled de-
escalators. On September 21 and September 25, 2015, I attended all roll call briefings and 
one training, and asked officers and supervisors to complete a nomination sheet, which 
read: 
“Please write the first and last names of three of your colleagues, other 
than yourself, who you consider the most highly skilled at de-escalating 
difficult, potentially violent citizen encounters. Officers of all rank are 
eligible for nomination, but they must be currently employed by the 
Spokane PD. Your nominations will be kept strictly confidential and will be 
used for research purposes only. Completing this form is voluntary, and 
you will only be asked to fill out this sheet once.” (see Appendix C for the 
full document) 
An ascribed definition of de-escalation was deliberately left out, allowing officers 
to define the concept of a “good de-escalator” in their own way. One hundred and 
seventeen nomination sheets were distributed and 89 were returned with at least one 
legitimate8 nomination (242 total nominations; response rate = 76%). Based on the 
distribution, it was clear9 that eight officers had received the majority of the votes, and 
were selected for inclusion. A civilian director in the police department emailed the eight 
officers saying they had been nominated as the most highly skilled de-escalators, and that 
                                                 
8 Some sheets were filled out illegitimately or facetiously, such as those nominating employees from the 
Records department or others who had never worked patrol. If the sheet provided no sworn officers it was 
not included in the final count of submitted forms. 
 
9 The top three officers received 16, 13, and 11 nominations. Three officers received 8 nominations, one 7, 
and one 6. These numbers are consistent with those in Bayley and Garofalo’s (1989) study. In addition, four 
officers tied for 9th place with 5 votes each. These four officers were classified as a “back-up” sample, in 
case any of the top nominated officers declined to participate. Within one week of contacting participants, 
seven of the eight top nominated officers responded to my email requesting participation. One did not 
respond and was replaced with a randomly selected back-up officer. 
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I would be contacting them to request participation in a study. I then emailed the officers 
to set up a meeting or ride along to talk further and request their participation. 
 
Participants 
Table 3.1 presents sample characteristics for the peer nominated officers. To 
protect confidentiality, race, gender, age, and shift assignment are excluded from the 
table. One participant was female. Six identified as white, one Hawaiian, and one 
Hispanic. Two were not assigned to patrol. Two were assigned to the Day patrol shift 
(starting at 6am), two were assigned to the Power shift (starting at 4pm), and two were 
assigned to the Graves shift (starting at 8pm). Three held the rank of Patrol Officer and 
the rest were supervisors. The least experienced officer had 14 years of service, 
suggesting that officers are more likely to nominate peers who are more tenured, 
experienced, and perhaps well-known to others. The sample was assigned to a variety of 
specialty units in addition to their full time assignments, though one half of the sample 
was on the department’s Crisis Negotiation team. 
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics 
 
Data Collection 
Interviews. I conducted a one-on-one interview with each officer to discover his 
or her views on de-escalation. Interview data was collected only after each participant 
was read and verbally agreed to an approved verbal consent form (Appendix A). 
Interviews took place in Fall 2015 in a location of the participant’s choice – two at public 
coffee shops, one at the academy, two at a precinct, and three in a patrol car during a ride 
along. A semi-structured protocol was used as a guide (see Appendix D), covering 
officers’ demographic information and police experience, perceptions of de-escalation, 
and anecdotes from the field. Interviews lasted between one and two hours.10  
Focus group. In Part 1 I also conducted one focus group11 with seven12 of the 
eight participants, and myself as moderator. A focus group is a group interview in which 
                                                 
10 Interviews that took place during ride alongs lasted the longest, likely because the officer had less 
incentive to end the interview. That is, we were going to be together in the car for several hours either way. 
11 Participants worked across three patrol shifts that begin at 6am, 4pm, and 8pm. Further, two participants 
did not work patrol and worked a 9am-5pm shift. Accordingly, the officers worked, lived, and slept on very 
different schedules. For this reason, scheduling was difficult. To solve this problem, administration 
approved overtime pay for the focus group so each had an incentive to attend even on days off. Department 
administration also handled the scheduling of the focus group as they had direct access to each officer’s 
work schedule.  
 
Pseudonym Votesa 
Years 
of 
Serviceb 
Primary 
Assignment Special Unit Assignments 
Officer Marshall 16 19 Patrol 
Neighborhood Conditions, Dignitary 
Protection, Hostage Negotiation 
Officer Prince 13 25 Patrol Hostage Negotiation, Peer Support 
Corporal French 11 18 Patrol  - 
Sergeant Cross 8 21 Patrol Tactical Crowd Control 
Sergeant York 8 18 Patrol Community Outreach 
Sergeant Shaw 7 20 Internal Affairs Peer Support, Community Outreach 
Sergeant Hunter 6 22.5 Academy Hostage Negotiation 
Officer Stamper 5 14 Patrol Anti-Crime, SWAT 
98 
qualitative data is generated through communication among research participants, rather 
than between a researcher and participant (Kitzinger, 1995). The first purpose of the 
focus group was to generate a deeper discussion of the research topic through back and 
forth conversation among the participants. The second purpose was to facilitate a 
“sentinel event review” using body worn camera footage. This phase of the project 
replicated other studies (Fyfe, 1987; Toch, 1980; Toch & Grant, 1991; Toch et al., 1975) 
that have used focus groups to study violence reduction in police-citizen encounters. 
However, rather than using written police reports as Fyfe did in the Metro-Dade project, 
officers in the current study were asked to bring in their own body camera videos 
depicting scenarios in which de-escalation tactics were evident.13 To supplement these 
video data, I also selected additional videos recorded by other officers14 in the department 
that well represented the ideas discussed in the interviews.15 In total, six videos were 
shown in the focus group, three from sample officers and three from other officers (see 
Table 3.2). Two videos involved use of force, and were selected because they represented 
situations in which de-escalation tactics were not used or were unsuccessful. The 
remaining four videos did not involve force, depicting scenarios when de-escalation was 
successful in achieving the citizen’s compliance verbally. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
12 One officer had an emergency on the day of the focus group and could not attend. 
 
13 During the one-on-one interviews, I asked officers to think of body camera videos they had recorded 
which might illustrate the points we covered. 
 
14 Written permission was granted from administration and recording officers to use these videos in the 
focus group.  
 
15 I was granted temporary access to the department’s Evidence.com body camera video storage system. I 
asked numerous officers to recommend possible videos and reviewed each video before selecting three 
additional videos for the focus group. 
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Prior to the start of the focus group, all officers were read and asked to sign an 
approved consent form (see Appendix A). The focus group was guided by a semi-
structured protocol (see Appendix E). After an initial discussion of de-escalation, the 
group watched each video from start to finish on a large television screen. Following 
each video, I asked the group to discuss the nature of the call, the tactics used by officers 
to address the problem, and whether the tactics were effective. The focus group took 
place in the department’s main precinct and lasted one hour and 40 minutes. 
Research Questions and Analytic Strategy 
Part 1 asked the research question: What are highly skilled officers’ perceptions of de-
escalation? Interviews and the focus group were transcribed by Barrett Honors students 
from the Arizona State University School of Criminology and Criminal Justice16, and 
qualitatively coded by the author in QSR NVivo 11 for Mac (QSR International, 
Melbourne, Australia). Interviews were coded for the following themes –definitions of 
de-escalation, tactics, barriers to effective de-escalation, de-escalation training, 
characteristics of highly skilled de-escalators, and public perceptions of de-escalation. 
  
                                                 
16 Barrett Honors students receive course credit for participation in research. 
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Table 2. Focus Group Body Camera Video Descriptions 
 
Sequencea 
Sample 
Officer 
Video 
Call 
Descripti
on 
Force 
Used Scenario 
1 Yes Agency 
Assist 
No A man is approached by mental health professionals 
because he was making suicidal comments. They 
believe he is a threat to himself and want to admit 
him to the hospital. Police are called to assist. He is 
openly hostile about being contacted by 
professionals. He refuses to cooperate. The officer 
talks to the man for several minutes about his 
problem. The man visibly calms down and agrees to 
be admitted to the hospital. 
2 Yes Suspiciou
s Person 
No An officer approaches a man who is sitting at a park 
bench near a playground. He is eating lunch. She 
asks him how he is doing, then recognizes him as a 
man who is usually intoxicated. She commends him 
for being sober and getting something to eat and tells 
him to have a nice day. 
3 No Person 
with 
Weapon 
No A man is standing on the sidewalk with a gun and 
threatening to use the gun. The officer, standing 
behind his vehicle door, talks to the man for a few 
minutes. The man agrees to put down the weapon, 
puts his hands up, and walks slowly over to the 
officers. The officer talks to the man about his 
problem and the man apologizes for threatening the 
officers. 
4 Yes Domestic 
Violence 
No A man is suffering an emotional crisis in relation to a 
fight with his wife, and has been standing on a roof 
for several hours. The SWAT team, supervisors, and 
a number of patrol officers are on the scene. The 
officer spends several minutes borrowing a ladder 
from the neighbors, and a pack of cigarettes. The 
officer then spends 9 minutes talking to the man 
about his problem. He offers the man advice. The 
man thanks the officer for listening and "being real" 
with him. He agrees to climb down the ladder if he 
can have a cigarette. 
5 No Suicidal 
Person 
Yes Officers approach a teenage boy at a bus stop. His 
mother called to say he was making suicidal 
comments. The boy says he does not want to talk to 
police officers out on the open street, and requests a 
cigarette and to talk to his mother. The officers deny 
his requests. They attempt to handcuff the boy and 
he starts to fight. After a brief scuffle, the officers 
put the boy on the ground and handcuff him. 
6 No Person 
with 
Weapon 
Yes A man in a crowded downtown area is waving an 
axe. The officer instructs the man to put down the 
axe. The man begins to run away. Officers chase 
after him and one officer deploys a Taser, which 
connects and deploys a charge. The man falls to the 
ground and is handcuffed. 
aIn order viewed during the focus group.  
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Part 2: Quantitative Analysis 
For Part 2, data was collected using the Systematic Social Observation (SSO) 
method on 35 police ride alongs. The purpose was to analyze de-escalation in actual 
police-citizen interactions.  
 
Sampling 
Thirteen ride alongs were conducted with the expert sample officers: Marshall (3), 
Prince (3), French (2), Stamper (2), Hunter (1), Cross (1), and York (1). Shaw was not 
assigned to patrol and therefore could not provide a ride along. Hunter was temporarily 
assigned to patrol during the data collection period and was able to offer one ride along. I 
over-sampled ride alongs with Marshall, Prince, Stamper, and French because these 
officers were not sergeants and generated more citizen contacts. In total, I observed 45 
police-citizen encounters with the expert sample. 
To compare nominated officers to those who did not receive the most 
nominations, 22 ride alongs were conducted with 22 non-sample officers. A snowball 
sampling method17 was used. Administration facilitated this process by sending an email 
to patrol sergeants announcing that I would be doing ride alongs over the course of a few 
months. I then contacted sergeants and requested to accompany his or her patrol team for 
an entire work week, riding with a different officer each day. I also recruited additional 
participants by talking to officers while out on other ride alongs and asking them to 
                                                 
17 I initially planned to use a random sampling method to select officers who differed by rank, shift, 
demographics, and experience level. However, agency administrators requested that I levy my department 
contacts to sample officers on my own, so as to not use department resources. 
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connect me with others. In total, I observed 86 police-citizen interactions with the non-
expert sample, for a total sample of 131 interactions. 
 
Data Collection 
Ride alongs. Most police departments offer a civilian ride along program, though 
the existence of these programs and the rules governing them vary depending on policy. 
On a ride along, a civilian is granted permission to accompany a police officer or other 
worker for a few hours to observe the work first hand, ask questions directly proximate to 
specific situations, and (if approved) systematically record activities. In Spokane, the ride 
along policy restricts civilians to one ride along per year (SpokaneCity.org, 2016), but 
this rule was relaxed for the current study. 
Ride alongs are an established data collection technique with a long history in 
policing research. Ride alongs were the principal method for the seminal American Bar 
Foundation (ABF) Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the 1950s, which 
undertook the first systematic field observation study of day-to-day activities in 
America’s criminal justice agencies (Walker, 1992a; see also, Westley’s [1951] classic 
study of police culture). This study is considered a classic because it discovered the 
pervasive use of discretion by police. The ride along method was continually used in 
much of the research on the police through the 1960s, 70s, and 80s (Bayley, 1986; Bayley 
& Garofalo, 1989; Black & Reiss, 1970; Caldwell, 1978; Muir, 1977; Reiss, 1967, 1968; 
J. Q. Wilson & Kelling, 1982; Worden, 1989). 
Many experts believe observational data is superior to other forms of data 
depicting police officer behaviors. Compared to, for example, official use of force and 
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arrest data, observations can offer more detailed and nuanced information on police 
decisions and the specific processes by which ends are reached. Mastrofski and Parks 
(1990) argued that surveys generally tap into officers’ perceptions globally, but do not 
always match how officers behave on a case by case basis. Officers have an exceedingly 
wide range of options available to them when they are faced with a problem (Mastrofski 
& Parks, 1990) and field observation enables the researcher to gauge options as they are 
employed in the moment, rather than limiting to concrete options included in survey item 
responses. Perkins (2017) argued that even body worn camera videos do not replace the 
rich data gleaned by observational researchers who are fully immersed in the officer’s 
world while out on a ride along. Ride alongs allow researchers to observe actions and tap 
into officers’ perceptions as they problem solve in the moment. Observers can grow 
familiar with officers’ individual differences, and are also privy to the before and after 
commentary between officers about particular calls. They also may be better able to 
contextualize statistical findings by drawing on anecdotal evidence from their field 
observations. 
Systematic social observation. SSO was first employed as a technique for 
sociologists by Reiss (1968, 1975) and is commonly used for researching the police 
today. Mastrofski and colleagues (2010) define SSO as the study of human behaviors in 
their natural setting. Like many, Reiss (1968) believed observation is a key component of 
any scientific research, but for observation to be truly scientific there must be precise 
rules and protocols for recording and measuring so that it could be replicated by others. 
SSO is especially useful for research teams conducting observations because it requires 
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specific operationalized definitions and coding protocols, which reduce inter-rater 
variability in an otherwise subjective activity (Mastrofski et al., 1998). 
In practice, researchers code variables while observing in the field and later sit 
down to write up more detailed field notes (Mastrofski et al., 1998). Reiss (1968) 
recommended the best approach was to combine observation with survey methods – the 
researcher holds a survey during the ride along and “checks off” items to systematically 
guide coding and note taking. The SSO method has been used in policing research for 
decades, notably in the Project on Policing Neighborhoods (POPN; Parks, Mastrofski, 
Dejong, & Gray, 1999; Rydberg & Terrill, 2010; Sun & Payne, 2004; Terrill, 2001; 
Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002) and other classic and recent studies of the police (Bayley & 
Garofalo, 1989; Friedrich, 1980; Fyfe, 1987; Liederbach & Frank, 2003; B. W. Smith, 
Novak, & Frank, 2001; Terrill, Rossler, & Paoline, 2014; Worden, 1995). 
Procedures. In the current study SSO was guided by a predetermined set of rules 
and structured protocol (see Appendix F). Prior to collecting data, I spoke with one of my 
committee members (Terrill) on how to properly employ the SSO method. I brought my 
laptop on each ride along and coded variables directly into IBM SPSS Statistics Version 
23 for Mac. In the patrol briefing prior to each ride along, I coded variables related to the 
ride along, including the date, time, weather conditions, and whether the ride fell on a 
holiday or special event. Once in the patrol car, I read each officer an approved verbal 
consent form (see Appendix B) and collected the officer’s personal demographics, police 
experience, and variables related to work day, prior days off, subjective mood, and 
fatigue. Once the officer was out on the job responding to calls for service, I coded every 
interaction that generated an official police response or in which the officer contacted a 
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citizen for more than two minutes. When the officer interacted with multiple citizens at 
one call, I focused coding on the one citizen who could be best labeled as the “suspect” 
or who appeared to be the most escalated in behavior (examples of a suspect are if the 
citizen was observed committing a crime, or if he or she was the subject of the call for 
service). If no citizens fit these criteria, I coded the citizen with whom the officer had the 
longest interaction.  
For each encounter I coded 90 unique variables, including 10 qualitative 
descriptor variables. Ensuring that all of these codes were complete and accurate required 
effort. I tried to code variables immediately after observing each encounter. However, in 
many cases we jumped from one call to the next very quickly. In these cases I took notes 
to remember each encounter and finished coding when the officer took a break to 
complete paperwork or eat. If I did not have a good view or had been unable to listen to 
the officer’s conversation with the citizen I would review the body camera video on the 
officer’s phone during a moment of down time before coding. On night shifts I also 
sometimes waited until the next day to finish coding because I was tired and less 
comprehensive in my writing. If necessary I had access to all body camera videos 
recorded by the police department on Evidence.com and reviewed footage to refresh my 
memory to ensure that coding was as accurate as possible. 
Social reactivity. One limitation to observational research is the potential for 
reactivity – the theory that the presence of an observer may artificially influence the 
behaviors of those under study (Mastrofski & Parks, 1990). To avoid reactivity, observers 
are trained to minimize their participation in the activities they are observing, limit 
conversation, and attempt to “fit in” to the scenes as best as possible to minimize their 
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impact on the social situation (Caldwell, 1978; Mastrofski & Parks, 1990). It was 
sometimes unfeasible in the current study to limit conversation, because I captured 
variables that are not ascertainable to the eye (e.g. what the officer was thinking about the 
call, or why the officer decided to use particular tactics). For these unobservable 
variables, I had to ask the officer (Mastrofski et al., 2010). Eventually, most officers 
became accustomed to the information I was coding and some reported the information 
out loud as they worked. This would go something like:  
Okay, we received a call of a tripped alarm at 3:33pm, and we are 
officially on the call. Tripped alarm calls always carry a potential for 
danger because we don’t know whether it was an accident or whether the 
employees are in real danger. So, I’m driving there fairly quickly and there 
are two other officers en route with us (hypothetical quote).  
 
I made every effort to minimize my influence on officer behavior. During my first 
year in Spokane, I conducted 35 preliminary ride alongs during which I did not collect 
any data but simply got to know the officers and talked to them about the research. On 
the SSO ride alongs, I kept my questions about the codes short and general to avoid 
infusing bias. My general perception was that the officers knew me well, were familiar 
with what I was studying, and went about their business as usual. In fact, one officer was 
reprimanded for behavior he engaged in while I was present on a ride along (he yelled at 
an arrestee, which was later observed on his body camera video). Since the behavior was 
considered by many to be egregious, the body camera video was featured on the local 
news. It should also be noted that all but one officer in the data set wore a body camera 
and 93% (122 of 131) of the encounters in the data set were recorded. These officers 
were accustomed to having their behaviors and decisions recorded and scrutinized. It is 
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their “new normal,” and I was simply an additional observer, rather than a conspicuous 
one. 
Coding protocol and study variables. Similar to other recent projects employing 
SSO, the protocol was designed based on the POPN study (Liederbach & Frank, 2003; B. 
W. Smith et al., 2001; Terrill et al., 2014). This study elucidated a full range of factors 
important to the observational study of police behavior. The current protocol was 
condensed for a more focused study of de-escalation. In total, 41 variables were coded 
pertaining to the ride along, and 90 variables were coded for each interaction.18 Variables 
are categorized into characteristics of the ride along, officer, citizen, and situation. 
Situational variables are further categorized into Binder and Scharf’s (1980) four phases 
of police-citizen encounters. 
 
Research Questions and Analytic Strategy 
 This phase of the study answers two research questions: 1) What characteristics of 
officers, citizens, and situations are associated with officer use of de-escalation? and 2) 
What characteristics of officers, citizens, and situations are associated with effective de-
escalation?  
To measure use of de-escalation, officer tactics were first coded into five separate 
variables indicating whether or not the officer used one of five de-escalation tactics (an 
overview of these tactics is included in Chapter 4 Qualitative Results, and Chapter 5 
Quantitative Results). These five variables were recoded into a single binary variable 
                                                 
18 An analysis of every variable is outside the scope of the dissertation. A rationale for including each 
variable in analytic models is reported in the quantitative results section (Chapter 5). 
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“use” indicating whether the officer used any one of the five tactics. To measure effective 
de-escalation, a binary indicator “success” signifies whether the citizen was calm or 
agitated at the end of the  encounter. 
Officer-level independent variables indicate whether the officer was a peer 
nominated officer or a crisis negotiator, as well as the officer’s sex, age, years of service, 
and fatigue level. Variables also reflect whether the officers developed an entry plan or 
waited for back up before making entry, whether a citation was issued, and whether an 
arrest was made. Citizen-level independent variables reflect the person’s role in the 
incident, age, sex, income level, whether the person demonstrated signs of mental illness 
or substance abuse, whether he or she disobeyed police, and whether he or she vocalized 
anti-police attitudes. Situation level variables indicate the urgency of the call, whether it 
was a call for domestic violence or an investigative stop of a suspicious person, the 
number of responding officers, and whether the call was self-initiated.  
In Chapter 5: Quantitative Results, descriptive statistics first provide insight into 
the general nature the 131 observed police-citizen interactions. Binary logistic regression 
models are then estimated to answer the research questions, testing the impact of officer 
characteristics, citizen characteristics, and situation characteristics on the outcome 
variables. 
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CHAPTER 4: QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
This chapter reviews results from Part 1, a qualitative investigation of peer 
nominated officer perceptions of de-escalation. This chapter summarizes the following 
themes: 
1) Definitions of de-escalation; 
2) Traits of a skilled de-escalator; 
3) De-escalation tactics; 
4) Public perceptions of de-escalation;  
5) Situational barriers to effective de-escalation; and 
6) De-escalation training.  
 
Definitions of De-Escalation 
During each interview I asked sample officers to define de-escalation. A thematic 
analysis of responses to this question revealed that their definition had three components. 
Officers’ defined de-escalation as bringing a situation or citizen in crisis back to an 
objective or calm state. All eight officers included this component in their definition. 
Most also identified an outcome goal of de-escalation – to gain a citizen’s willing 
cooperation with officer’s instructions. Finally, they identified a process goal of de-
escalation, to use the least amount of force possible.  
An important point to note is that most of the sample officers had to think hard 
before offering a definition, and some struggled with the task. Many answers included a 
qualifier such as “to me, the definition of de-escalation is…” Sometimes when we were 
deeper into the middle interview, officers would suddenly think of a good definition, after 
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considerable deliberation and back and forth discussion about the topic. That they 
struggled with the task signals that de-escalation is not a concept engrained in officers 
during official training at this department or clarified in official policy. If asked about the 
definition of deadly force, the same officers would most certainly recite a definition 
conceptualized in their department policy. However, all officers arrived at similar 
definitions suggesting that they share similar ideas about the concept and discuss it 
amongst themselves. 
 
Calming a Crisis 
If a citizen is suffering an emotional or mental crisis, officers said they use de-
escalation to calm them back to an objective or rational mindset. The goal of de-
escalation in this case is to talk to the person in ways that calm them so they can think 
and communicate logically.  
De-escalation, to me, is taking a person that is extremely agitated, in 
crisis…getting them to get back to a part of their brain where they can be 
rational and think, and listen and respond, and…get them to a point of 
cooperation just using words. (Marshall) 
 
Taking a subject who is…maybe angry, volatile, intense, and bringing 
them to a resolution where they get to have a say in it…to where they 
actually become in control. And really, they come back to the frontal part 
of their brain…so instead of that “fight or flight” behavior, they come 
back to the logical part of their brain… (Prince) 
 
Bring them out of that crisis and engage them to where they’re making 
decisions based off fact, not off emotion. (Hunter) 
 
These assertions are consistent with Muir’s (1977) discussion of effective 
policing. He argued that officers are largely tasked with “extorting” compliance, and 
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often from individuals who may be temporarily irrational. The task is to use methods, and 
perhaps some innovation, to resolve the issue in the best way possible. 
Though the term de-escalation implies that there is a conflict ongoing, study 
officers said this strategy could also be used preventatively. When they suspect a citizen 
might become unwilling to cooperate, for example, officers said they can use verbal de-
escalation tactics to lay groundwork, build rapport, and avoid conflict. In the following 
examples, officers discuss using preventative de-escalation when they know they will be 
taking someone into custody or to a hospital. 
Shaw: At any minute we know, we all know, that can go bad. And it’s the 
difference between wrestling with them when the ambulance pulls around 
the corner and not… it’s preventing that…setting the groundwork for 
when he does [become escalated].  
Marshall: Setting the scene for when the ambulance shows up and then he 
starts potentially spiking like “I ain’t fucking going to the hospital!” 
 
We, as police officers, show up to situations and our ultimate goal is 
cooperation from the person that we’re either arresting or…de-escalation 
is getting someone to do something that they don’t want to do. Which is 
be placed in to custody and taken to jail and their freedom taken away 
from them, even if it’s for a short amount of time. So…getting cooperation 
from someone in a not-so-ideal situation is basically de-escalation…I 
think it’s just a safe conclusion to an incident that had the ability to 
become a violent confrontation. (Stamper) 
 
The idea that de-escalation tactics can be preventative has a long and storied 
tradition in classic policing scholarship. Both Muir (1977) and Bittner (1967) argued that 
professional police officers on skid row make a significant effort to gather information 
and develop a rapport with citizens in order to decrease the chances they will be hostile or 
confrontational during officer encounters with police. 
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Gaining Cooperation 
According to study officers, the outcome goal of de-escalation is persuading a 
person to cooperate with officers’ commands– “getting cooperation from someone in a 
not-so-ideal situation is basically de-escalation” (Stamper). In many situations, the 
problem may be solvable using an informal agreement or compromise between the 
officers and citizens. According to officers, a compromise is a feasible option when the 
citizen is being respectful and cooperative with officers, and when the problem involves 
minor or no criminal activity. When the situation does not involve a crime, officers said 
even walking away can be the best option to avoid aggravating the problem further. 
However, in police work the solution is sometimes proscribed by training or law. 
For example, if the person has an arrest warrant the officer is legally required to make an 
arrest. Another example is a person threatening to harm themselves or others with a 
weapon. In such cases, officers are responsible for ensuring that they follow the law 
and/or neutralize any threat before leaving the scene. There are no other solutions to the 
problem; there is no compromise available. The officer must get the person to cooperate 
with the one and only solution – to be arrested, or relinquish the weapon. To summarize, 
the interviews revealed that an indicator of successful de-escalation is a citizen willingly 
cooperates with police. However, officers said they must force the person’s compliance if 
they refuse to cooperate in certain situations. 
 
Using the Lowest Level of Force Possible 
The process goal of de-escalation is to solve the problem using the least amount 
of force possible. According to officers, the most typical forms of de-escalation tactics 
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involve communication, including verbal, eye contact, and body language. However, 
officers said that sometimes physical force is needed  -- “there are gonna be times where 
you have to use force and you’re never gonna get away from that” (Hunter). Many said 
use of force, when used properly and legitimately, can still be considered de-escalation 
because it brings the problem to a safe conclusion and avoids the need for more serious 
force.  
One was a young girl. She was sitting on the edge19, you know, hands like this as 
if she was gonna get ready to just jump off, you know. Feet dangling. [Another 
officer gets there], he’s on the Hostage Negotiation team, he talks with people, 
he’s good at talking with people… He starts talking with her. And so I stop 
talking. And I slowly climb over the sidewalk partition so that I’m right there and 
he had already been on the other side. He jumped over and was talking to her, just 
continued talking to her and then I just grabbed her and pulled her off the 
bridge… if you have that window to end the situation, sometimes it’s by rescuing 
the hostages… Sometimes it’s that window of opportunity where you have to 
shoot that bad guy. (Stamper) 
 
In summary, a second indicator of successful de-escalation is when the solution is 
achieved verbally. However, since sometimes police work proscribes the use of physical 
force, using the least amount of physical force possible to save the most people can still 
be considered de-escalation. Ultimately, de-escalation constitutes a “risk reduction” 
strategy, much like that described in Bittner’s (1967) study of policing on skid row. 
 
Traits of a Highly Skilled De-Escalator 
After defining de-escalation, each officer was asked why they thought their peers 
had nominated them as a highly skilled de-escalator. They were also asked to list 
                                                 
19 Spokane has a number of bridges that extend high over the Spokane River, which runs through the city. 
The department gets numerous calls to these bridges each week for suicidal persons. The department faced 
so many problems associated with these suicides that it now has video cameras recording each bridge at all 
times. 
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qualities that make an officer an especially effective de-escalator. They described a 
number of traits that improve de-escalation skills. Most common was being a good 
communicator or having the “gift of gab” as York put it. Officers said they voted for 
peers who they had seen talk in the field in ways that got through to citizens and 
produced positive results: “I thought about people that I had consistently seen calming 
situations down” (Stamper). Others voted for well-known crisis negotiators or academy 
instructors. By repeatedly demonstrating their skills to others, they earned reputations as 
de-escalators. Officers also listed being empathetic as a trait of a good de-escalator. 
When I’m dealing with a person either in crisis or a criminal issue, I try to 
put myself in their shoes…and say if this were me, or if this was 
somebody that was close to me, would I want them to be getting a fair 
deal? Would I want the person investigating it to try and understand where 
they’re coming from and realize why they got there and to treat them with 
some dignity and respect, still hold them accountable and try to find 
resolution? I would. (Marshall) 
 
We’re in this together. If you’re in crisis, you and I are in this together…I 
shouldn’t be demeaning or belittling. Which you’ll see [other officers do]. 
(Shaw). 
 
This ideal is directly parallel to Muir’s (1977) discussion of “perspective” as a 
trait of a professional police officer. Although officers may frequently encounter persons 
who are seemingly “offensive” or who may be directly disrespecting the officer’s 
authority or even their personal safety, the professional police officer must have 
perspective for their life circumstances and approach the problem with that perspective in 
mind. More generally, the professional police officer has respect for the humanity of all 
persons they are responsible for protecting or arresting. 
Officers also said one personality type is not always successful with everybody or 
in every situation, and there may not be a “rhyme or reason” to when you connect with 
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someone and when you don’t. For example, while having a dry sense of humor may help 
an officer connect with many, other times it might cause anger. In cases where an officer 
is not establishing a good connection with a citizen, officers said they would let another 
officer step in to see if they could change things around. 
Stamper: My personality might go great with someone to de-escalate 
them, and then the next day my personality's not the right one for the 
situation.  
Prince: Bingo.  
NT: And then what do you do when it's not working?  
Stamper: Switch. 
 
The conversation highlights a point made by Willis (2013) that officers tend to 
develop and hone their own strengths through years on the job. Officers are also aware of 
who among them is more highly skilled at a particular tactic or dealing with a particular 
problem. The best tactic to de-escalation in such a scenario is to have the best person for 
the job step forward. The sample also said someone who can maintain their calm and 
control their own emotions in the face of a crisis – someone who can “stay cool” – will be 
more effective at de-escalation.  
I think that I’m fairly calm on calls, especially patrol calls, different 
situations where it may be dangerous or…quickly evolving and I’ve 
luckily been able to…keep a calm demeanor and think through, whether 
it’s tactics or talking to people. (Stamper) 
 
I think a lot of my success is just being calm and…lack of affect 
sometimes…for me it’s a calm demeanor. (Shaw) 
 
Staying calm has the dual benefit of helping the officer think clearly about a plan 
of action and demonstrate they are capable of handling the problem. In summary, there 
may be traits held by officers to enhance their ability to connect with citizens and de-
escalate them in crisis. Research such as that conducted by Lawrence and colleagues 
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(2017), in which the authors connected personality traits and worldviews with more 
procedurally just policing, should be conducted to identify traits that enhance an officer’s 
ability to de-escalate. 
 
Verbal De-Escalation Tactics 
Officers were asked how de-escalation is performed. In general, they described 
communication tactics that prevented the need to use physical force. French said as a 
police officer “you can force someone all day long.” However, de-escalation requires 
special effort to achieve the same goal without going hands on. His statement reflects 
Bittner’s (1967) discussion of effective skid row officers, who often employed innovative 
methods of informal social control and enforcement of the law that did not always invoke 
the legal system. This section outlines five tactics for de-escalating a police-citizen 
encounter using innovative verbal methods, as opposed to physical methods. 
 
Tactic 1: Humanity 
One effective way to de-escalate is to emphasize one’s human qualities over one’s 
authority. Recall that Muir (1977) similarly described officers with “perspective” who 
respected the humanity of the persons from all life conditions and handled these calls 
with empathy and not heavy handedness. The humanity tactic also strongly resembles 
components of procedural justice including quality of treatment and respect for persons 
(Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Furthermore, Sykes and Clark 
(1975) argued that the traditional social norms and expectations of social interactions do 
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not apply in a police-citizen interaction since the dynamic is tainted by a power 
differential. Tension occurs because the citizen is expected to show a deference that is not 
expected to be returned by the officer. Using the humanity tactic, the officer attempts to 
reduce the power differential and emphasize the conversation is happening between two 
equals. 
The humanity tactic, according to sample officers, involves showing the citizen 
emotion, treating citizens with dignity and respect, minimizing authoritativeness, 
condescension, and “cop talk,” and talking to citizens “like people.” These tactics can 
temper the tone of the interaction.  
For me, if you can kinda talk to them like you’d be talking to a normal 
person, to try and take away the law enforcement portion of it, it seems to 
work. So many of these people – they’re very standoffish to police 
anyway. They don’t like the authority telling them what to do. So if you 
take that element out and just talk to them, sometimes that includes humor 
or a little empathy, I don’t know, it seems to work for me…It's just talking 
to them as a person. (Marshall) 
 
Marshall said the humanity tactic is particularly useful when handling low-level 
calls that are not emergencies or cases involving serious criminal activity. “Low stakes” 
calls can be thought of as opportunities for the officer to show compassion without 
compromising the goals of public safety. They can also be opportunities to build a 
foundation between the officer and the citizen, which will reduce the chances that future 
interactions will become volatile. 
I think if you can build a small bit of rapport with the guy, and a little bit 
of trust, and not make a mountain out of a molehill. For me a lot of times, 
it gets them to be compliant. Like the guy this morning…he knew he had a 
warrant, one for child support. He knew he was going to go to jail. Is it 
that really big of a deal to blow that small thing into a mountain? 
(Marshall) 
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Prince, a veteran negotiator, said a key part of this tactic is matching your emotion 
and body language to the citizen’s. “You have to show as much passion about the 
problem as they do. With the same intensity. So I try to…kinda go in deep, kinda grab 
their heart, trying to get them to tell me about it. Right away I try to grab that pain.” 
Stamper described how he had been video taped in verbal tactics training and watched the 
videos to practice matching his words to his body language.  
If I’m talking to somebody on the street and I’m saying everything’s 
gonna be okay. I wanna get through this. I wanna get through this so that 
nobody gets hurt. If my eyes aren’t conveying that and I’m looking at 
somebody with cop’s eyes… I’m not going to be believable. 
 
After watching a video in the focus group, Prince commended French for 
successfully de-escalating a situation by showing passion (Table 2, Video 4): “That's the 
piece that was gold was that you gave it the same intensity that he did. That was huge. 
You gave as much power to him as he had. You gave him all the juice. You were just as 
passionate as he was.” 
Finally, officers said humor establishes an overall positive tone in an interaction. 
Marshall said even something as simple as using a curse word can reduce the glare of 
authority and bring regularity in an otherwise official situation: “To administration that 
might be oh you can’t swear, you’re on body cam. But you know what? The guy might 
think that’s funnier than hell and it breaks the ice.” However, as previously noted, 
sometimes humor can backfire and further anger the person. Prince said a failed attempt 
at humor can be an opportunity to apologize and re-emphasize one’s humanity. 
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Tactic 2: Listen 
Most officers said listening to a person can go a long way towards de-escalating a 
heated conflict. The idea is similar to the officers in classic studies, who spent time 
gathering information about the people on their beat, making rounds, and asking 
questions. First, the listening tactic helps the officer find out the source of the problem. 
I think mainly for me it’s gaining control…and in order to do that I’m 
going to have to find what, what’s that one thing that they need…What do 
they need in order to become compliant? (Prince) 
 
Ask them questions that elicit an explanation or a reasoning why they're 
doing it, because you might get to the root problem of something that's not 
even why you're called there, and then you can really bring resolution to 
the problem. (Marshall) 
 
Listening also gives the officer ammunition for achieving calm and compliance 
by identifying the citizen’s interests. The officer can pay attention to details and work 
towards a topic of conversation that may calm the person down or change their mind. In 
the following Marshall describes how he grabbed onto a commonality to convince a 
suicidal man to step away from the ledge of a bridge. 
I found out, you know, this guy was Irish. I’m Irish. And I thought you 
know what? Hey I get where you’re coming from. We’re stubborn. We 
can’t help it. It’s our nature. Trying to use a little bit of humor mixed in 
with some sincerity. Like, I get it, man. You can’t psychoanalyze us. 
We’re Irish! We don’t want to be like that. We’re just that way. And it 
really started to bring him down. 
 
In the same way, French used one man’s veteran service to talk him out of fighting with 
the police. 
At one point he said that he was a veteran… So I asked him, ok so you 
don't think that anyone in your life cares about you or appreciates that? Do 
the kids in the neighborhood know you? And he said yeah they do. And I 
said ok you don’t think they know you as the Marine veteran…and to that 
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little kid who plays GI Joe, that's not important to him? I guarantee that 
you have somebody, don't you? And then he actually started listening. 
 
Finally, listening can help the officer “legitimize the person’s concerns” (Hunter). 
In the focus group, the officers commended French for using listening to his advantage in 
a crisis. In the video (Table 2, Video 4), French listened to a man’s problems and then 
paraphrased his concerns back to him to show he was giving them his full attention. He 
then listed the steps he would take to help the man if he agreed to come off the roof of his 
house. Other officers debriefed the video: 
Shaw: That was one of the great things that you did with him and I think it 
showed him the empathy is you bullet-pointed everything he said. You 
know, rather than occasionally going "So it's really hard for you”…You 
were like "This is how I'm gonna do it." Bam, bam, bam, bam, bam, bam, 
bam. And then, what'd he do? He came down [off the roof]… 
Marshall: When I heard you list off all those bullet points to him, in my 
mind it…gave him credibility that you were really interested in what he 
was going through. So then when you presented the two steps, "We're 
gonna do this, and then I'm gonna put the ladder up, let you come down, 
have a smoke, pat you down," I think that totally bought him credibility 
and trust in you because you had all that prior active listening and you 
knew- I mean you weren't bullshitting. You did listen to him. 
 
While simple, officers said listening to the person speak and legitimizing their feelings 
and problems can achieve multiple goals and ultimately provide the ammunition needed 
to achieve calm and compliance. 
 
Tactic 3: Compromise 
On the job, officers said they will compromise with a citizen and “reward good 
behavior” in situations where it is possible, legal, and does not risk safety or the goals of 
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law enforcement. In Bittner’s (1967) study, officers would similarly make small 
concessions and decision to not invoke the law, which assisted them in developing trust 
with residents and generally improving the safety on their beat. Interestingly, this idea is 
the direct opposite of recent propositions from Attorney General Jeff Sessions that the 
American criminal justice system return to a tough on crime approach and push for 
stricter sentences for low level crimes (Jarrett & Scott, 2017).  
According to study officers, often a small compromise can make the difference 
between a short conversation and a full-blown use of force. Below, the officers debrief 
Video 5 (Table 2), in which police contacted a boy who was making suicidal statements. 
The boy stated that he was stressed but if officers gave him a cigarette he would 
cooperate. The officers in the video declined the request and went in to handcuff the boy, 
who began to struggle. 
NT: If this was your call, what would you have tried? 
York: I would have smoked a cigarette with him. 
Stamper: Yeah, we can totally smoke a cigarette. I mean how, how hard is 
that? You know what, I’ll go buy us a pack. 
Cross: And he already told you that he’s gonna cooperate.  
York: Yeah, he said I’ll cooperate if I get a cigarette. So he already said 
the magic word and as a supervisor, that right there, I now just went from 
a quick write up there to a Blue Team and a bunch of other wordy reports, 
for… 
Prince: For a smoke. Five minutes.  
York: Yeah. What does it cost you? Five more minutes of your time. 
Marshall: Five minutes of your day, and you’re paying it forward, 
actually, because the next time he has contact with the police he’s 
hopefully gonna remember that. 
Stamper: Yeah, and your report is gonna be two pages… 
All: Shorter. 
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Officers said when using the “compromise” tactic, you must clearly outline what you will 
need in return for what you are offering. 
Prince: It comes down to…But here’s the deal, if I’m gonna do that, 
there’s some rules that you have to follow. You have to sit down, you have 
to be, you know, you have to be polite. You have to be respectful. 
Cross: Never just give him something. 
Prince: Yeah, yeah. You have to get something from him. He has to 
behave in a certain way. And they will…for a cigarette. 
 
For calls involving suicidal persons, Prince uses a very specific “compromise” tactic that 
has been successful in two decades of negotiating. 
Prince: For me on the bridge, something that I use a lot that has worked 
and it kinda gets me rolling… because it’s awkward walking 
up…especially on Monroe Street Bridge where you have very little time to 
capture someone’s attention before they jump. So for me, I say listen to 
me. Listen to me for five minutes, and if you don’t like anything that I 
have to say, then you can make a different decision based on that. But give 
me five minutes of your time. So, what that does is it buys me some time, 
and they think five minutes isn’t very long. So, so that’s one of my huge 
sales pitches. Trying to grab them. 
NT: And that works? 
Prince: All the time. Almost always. I’ve never had anyone jump off a 
bridge doing this. Every single time, it has worked for me. That’s why I 
keep using it.  
 
Hunter said he has compromised with countless citizens over his 23-year career. 
In the following example, a man was angry with police for sending his son back to jail 
because he believed the jail did not have the resources to properly care for his son’s 
mental illness. 
He was adamant that his son not go back to jail, when we can’t do that. 
But there was a little bit of wiggle room in the felony assault, because it 
wasn’t a domestic violence assault and he was a psychiatric patient... But 
he had a couple domestic violence arrest warrants so we had to arrest him 
and book him. So we kinda made a compromise with him that he would be 
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booked [only] on his…warrants... I thought that was a good balance 
because justice was still being served but, you know, we weren’t just 
summarily imposing our will on somebody… his last request was to give 
his son a hug and a kiss. And a lot of cops…are very hesitant to allow a 
family member to give a prisoner a hug and we thought it would be all 
right, and he did that, and he was very happy, shook my hand, called me 
by my first name. 
 
Hunter points out that by minimizing the charges, he is not compromising the goal of law 
enforcement – “justice was still being served” because the man was still going to be 
arrested, but not for all the offenses they could have charged him with. By throwing out 
the current offense, the officer was able to de-escalate the man’s father who had initially 
reacted with intense hostility towards the police officers. Eventually, the man left with a 
positive attitude towards the officer– “[he] called me by my first name” – because the 
officer had made a decision that would have a positive impact on the family’s situation. 
 
Tactic 4: Honesty 
According to officers, the value of being honest with a citizen cannot be 
overestimated in police work. By outlining the situation, the outcome goal, and the laws 
or policies governing officers’ decisions, an officer can build trust and ultimately gain the 
citizen’s cooperation. 
You have to be very clear in what your, your outcome or goal is...they 
may not like it, but you have to be able to articulate how this is the only 
thing that we have to do and, you know, we want your cooperation in 
doing it. (Hunter) 
 
If you said to the guy, you know, there’s some things I have to do… 
you’re going to go up [to jail]. It’s gonna be a very quick process because 
you’re being so cooperative. Lead him down that path. (Marshall) 
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French described how a domestic violence victim was upset and did not want him 
to take photographs of her injuries. He explains how “being straight” with the woman and 
clearly outlining the situation helped him gain her understanding and compliance. 
If I explain that...pictures are pictures. They don't have an opinion. They 
don't make things look worse or look better. They simply are what they 
are. You know, how big was the person who was taken to jail? Are they 
bigger than you? Yeah…it's my husband and he's way bigger than me. 
Could he kick the living shit out of you? Yeah he could. Did he? No he 
just hit me…Let's show that to a judge. So he could have done all this 
stuff? Let's take a picture that isn't going to do anything other than show 
that there's this little tiny mark, that's it. He could have beat the living piss 
out of you but he didn't. And then you end up getting them to go, oh ok 
yeah I guess that makes sense. (French) 
 
 
Tactic 5. Empower 
A fifth tactic for de-escalation is making the citizen feel that they are taking part 
in the decision making process, and giving them information and advice to avoid having 
the same problem in the future. The tactic reflects a key principle of procedural justice, 
which is to give a citizen “voice” in the decision-making process (see, e.g., Mazerolle, et 
al., 2013). Empowerment is particularly effective for people in crisis, who often feel out 
of control of things in their lives. As such, de-escalation involves “putting the power back 
on that person” to engage in the conversation, to ultimately to feel that they have some 
control over the final decision (Prince). 
Usually people that are escalated are in a state where they really feel like 
they don’t have any control. And in reality, when we are there, they – they 
are going to have very little control on the outcome. With de-escalation 
techniques I think you can kinda make it appear that they are making 
some…choices. And really they are… if they choose to calm down or, you 
know, do things that we’re asking them then…it’s going to be a different 
outcome. (Stamper) 
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If you get them to buy in at least a little bit of ownership into it, you know 
it may not be where they wanted to go to begin with… you’re helping 
them buy into it at least a little bit. Some facet of it. Some part of it. So 
they’re kind of grasping on to the idea not that you’re convincing them to 
just do it, but you’re also making it beneficial to them on some level or 
making them see the benefit in it. (French) 
 
Empowering citizens in the decision making process may also assist officers to assuage 
citizens’ concerns about unfair treatment and lack of identification with communities. 
Empowering can be accomplished in many ways. Officers described that they will 
engage the citizen in a discussion of possible solutions, explain in detail the benefits of 
complying with officers’ requests, and identify specifically how the solution will benefit 
them. Officers will also talk at length with the person about ways to improve their life 
situation. For example, on domestic dispute calls I often observed officers talk to one or 
both persons about whether or not to continue in the harmful relationship. Similarly, 
Officer Marshall carries (“waterproof, tear proof!”) pamphlets with him on duty to hand 
out to persons seeking mental health help, housing, food, or other services. 
 
Public Perceptions of Force and De-Escalation 
Officers said citizens and cops have vastly different ideas of what de-escalation is 
and, most importantly, how often it can be done. The disconnect occurs because citizens 
have a limited understanding of the types of situations and problems officers face on the 
job. Willis’ (2013) argument that research should take officers’ experience and 
perspective more fully into account, therefore, was widely echoed by officers in the 
current study. 
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Officers felt that many citizens think all situations can be de-escalated verbally, 
when in reality officers sometimes face danger that requires more than communication to 
resolve. Sometimes the police face real violence and need to respond with violence in 
order to protect the public’s safety. 
We’re not gonna be hugging, you know, or coming to an end that the 
citizens would expect. There might be times we’re gonna have to use force 
to resolve or to de-escalate this incident… I mean, it’s not like Leave It To 
Beaver you know, all nice, roses and everything’s gonna be hunky-dory 
and great family life. From our side it’s more reality.  (Cross) 
 
I’m not sure that the public has really seen what goes on every single day 
out in the field. I don’t think they really recognize an individual who’s in 
crisis and how volatile and dangerous they can become. And that fight or 
flight instinct. Sometimes when [a citizen’s behavior is] totally run by 
drugs, you may not be able to talk them out of that. (Prince) 
 
The moment that a researcher or a cop comes up with that Vulcan 
mind…that Jedi Mind Trick shit, then okay yeah, then we can go ahead 
and have a peaceful resolution to everything. But at the end of the day, 
someone could be going along right with what you want them to do. Right 
until the point that they don’t. The public don’t understand that we’re 
reactionary a lot of times to what someone is doing. And if someone is 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or mentally ill, and they’re going 
to put themselves in peril, or put somebody else, then we have to act, and 
the de-escalation might be physical de-escalation at this point, you know. 
We have to get them under control before we can do anything else. It’s not 
like engineering. It’s not like building a bridge. (Hunter) 
 
According to Muir (1977), the professional police officer does not resort to force 
as a first resort. However, it is equally important that police officers come to terms with 
the need to use force when it is necessary to solve a problem. Officers who fail to use 
force when needed (“avoiders”) can do serious damage to their communities by failing to 
address problems with crime and violence. These officers can also put their own safety in 
jeopardy. 
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Study officers further said the public sometimes thinks they enjoy using force. 
However, they said that they largely make an effort to use verbal communication and 
other de-escalation techniques that preclude the use of force on every call. The catch, 
however, is that they must first ensure the safety of themselves and others. In all other 
cases, officers said they try to avoid getting in a fight because, put simply, they do not 
enjoy it. Using force is dangerous, hurts people, makes their job more complicated, and 
requires a lot more paperwork and subsequent effort to resolve after the fact. The sample 
said that after all the years they have spent on the job, they have learned and adopted 
countless methods for avoiding physical confrontations because it produces the best 
possible outcomes for everyone involved. 
Additionally, officers said they get immense satisfaction from a successful de-
escalation, because helping people is the reason they signed up for the job. Marshall, who 
I observed save a child from committing suicide, described de-escalation as a contributor 
to his job satisfaction. 
It is kind of fun though, when a person is just out of control, screaming, to 
come in and catch them off guard and totally break that manic craziness 
they’re on. And if you can get it from there to halfway down to normal in 
one sentence or a couple words, it’s like – wow. It’s kinda cool. (Marshall) 
 
Generally, officers were concerned about the vast perceptual differences between 
their own ideas of de-escalation and the public’s. They are concerned because they know 
they are held to the public’s standard when it comes to the ways in which they handle a 
particular call. Further, they said the public fails to acknowledge the amount of times in a 
given work day that the police successfully handle a problem without using force, 
because they are only aware of the situations that go wrong. Although officers felt this 
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was unreasonable and unfair, they said it was a reality of the job. Below, the officers 
debrief Video 5 (see Table 3.2). They are animated when discussing that, even though the 
officers in the video were justified in using force, the public would view the same video 
with a vastly different lens.  
York: It looks… 
Prince: Terrible.  
York: Even though they’re within their grounds of doing it, you get all 
these passers driving by and all they say is “Fuckin’ SPD.”  
Shaw: “There’s a lot of people on top of that little kid.”  
York: Yeah and you got World Crossfit guy over there.  
Shaw: And you got a mom who doesn’t wanna call you again the next 
time he needs help.  
Marshall: And you hear this kid screaming “Mom! Mom!” Yeah, 
everybody hears that.  
Stamper: He is probably 25 years old, but [everyone else is] thinking he’s 
a juvenile that we’re beating on, you know.  
York: And all the media ever plays is that little 25 second clip so that 
mental clip that people get as they’re driving by. They see that. They don’t 
see everything that happened up to it, talking to him. All they see is three 
big, beefy dudes on top of Malachai and they’re putting the squish to him. 
 
When situations end in a deadly confrontation such as a police shooting, 
the public thinks that we should have done something different. We, we 
didn’t do everything that we, we could have to have prevented that death. 
The, the person who caused that is the person who is usually shot, not the 
police officer. Sometimes police are shot and killed, too, but that is also 
the action and decision made by that person who’s, who’s being violent, 
either to the community or to the police. We, we respond to situations. 
(Stamper) 
 
This section highlights the concerns officers have about the perceptual disconnect 
between their own experiences and citizens perceptions of police work. They believe that 
citizens view de-escalation as always possible, and that any use of force is considered a 
failure to de-escalate. They said, in reality, there are situations when use of force is a 
better option to protect the public and stay safe.  
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Barriers to Effective De-Escalation 
To illustrate the contrast between officer and citizen perceptions of de-escalation, 
officers said there are particular encounters they face on the job where de-escalation 
tactics are more difficult. They felt that the police are often criticized for failing to use 
tactics that were in reality unsafe or ineffective. 
I think the public forgets that people still have free will. That they’re still 
able to do what they wanna do. And we have a little bit of ability to try 
and manage that free will and get them to do what we want them to do, but 
at the end of the day, I don’t care how much talking, how much de-
escalation training, negotiation training. If someone is committed to doing 
something, you know, they’re gonna do it because they still have that free 
will...I think the public feels that we can control every outcome, which we 
can’t. (Hunter) 
 
Below, four types of situations are described. In these situations, officers said de-
escalation is less effective due to either the imminent priorities of the officer at the time 
or the mental state of the citizen with whom they are interacting. 
The Imminent Threat 
It was invariably argued that officers cannot always use verbal de-escalation 
because the first goal of police work is to protect life. As such, their priority when there is 
an immediate threat is to neutralize the threat by removing a person’s weapon and/or 
getting a physically combative or suicidal person contained. Officers said they are trained 
in the use of force tactics for exactly these scenarios. Hunter frequently qualified in his 
interview that the need to de-escalate should always come second: 
The only time that we don’t do verbal de-escalation – if our safety’s in 
jeopardy. If someone’s attacking us. But the moment that we stop 
whatever is going on that caused that, then we still treat people with 
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dignity and respect…Which is all part of verbal de-escalation…We’re 
always trying to do it, but at times it gets put on hold because we have 
different priorities. 
 
Virtually every other officer in the sample agreed that they are always first and foremost 
concerned with protecting lives, protecting themselves, and rendering first aid, and that 
they would use force if it was necessary. 
 
The Dynamic Situation 
 Officers said the amount of time they had to deal with a situation dictates how 
long they would spend trying to achieve voluntary cooperation through de-escalation. In 
a static or contained situation, officers are afforded more time to try different options. In 
dynamic situations where more factors are unknown, however, they would be concerned 
with assessing the problem and achieving stability. Below, the officers discuss Video 6 
(Table 2), in which police deployed a TASER to stop a man who was running downtown, 
waving an axe, and damaging car windows. 
NT: What elements of this call make de-escalation more challenging? 
York: Being in a heavily populated area with all the businesses at the 
downtown core. 
Prince: And the fact that he’s already done damage, at least to cars. That 
he’s showed a willingness to destroy property and… 
Prince: Propensity for violence. 
Stamper: Armed with a dangerous weapon and he’s not engaging with any 
kind of conversation at all. I mean…you can’t de-escalate a whole lot with 
someone who’s… 
Prince: Not talking.  
Stamper: Not communicating. Fighting, running. 
Stamper: It goes from, yeah, just fleeing, turning to fight, back to fleeing, 
armed the whole time. 
NT: So, [using a TASER is] exactly what you would have done in the 
same situation? 
Prince: Yeah. 
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Cross: Especially if you can’t get him contained. You gotta stop this right 
away. 
 
In this example, though the man had not yet physically harmed a person, the officers 
listed a number of reasons why they felt based on their experience the situation was 
potentially fatal. These reasons included the man’s unwillingness to even talk to officers, 
his willingness to cause damage, and the number of potential victims in the crowded 
downtown area. As such, all agreed that given the same situation they would have used 
less lethal force to contain the person immediately. 
 
Drugs, Alcohol, and Mental Illness 
As discussed, the first purpose of de-escalation is to calm the citizen to a more 
objective mind state, to the point where you can hold a conversation. Officers 
overwhelmingly argued that this goal is difficult with a person who is under the influence 
of drugs or alcohol, or suffering from a mental illness, because they are in a less rational 
state of mind and are less able to think or communicate rationally. Similarly, Muir (1977) 
said the “extortion” tactics officers use to induce compliance are significantly less 
effective when one’s “opponent” is irrational in their decision-making. 
When you’re under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol and both, your 
reality is changed. You’re operating solely on emotion. At that point, it’s 
very hard to lead your cognitive part of your brain. So, if they have 
something stuck in their head, it’s hard to get it out…the same goes with 
mental illness…and more often than not, you see people that are under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol and are mentally ill. So then you have the 
trifecta of fun…it’s very hard to communicate with them. I’m not saying 
you can’t, but that’s where you’re constantly weighing, you know, how 
long are we gonna talk? (Hunter) 
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A few participants told me that drunken citizens specifically were the most 
difficult people to de-escalate, the most confrontational, and least cooperative.  
I have had enormous difficulty with people that are really drunk. [To de-
escalate] you really have to get a hold of something that…It’s something 
that they latch on to. And then you’re able to break through and 
communicate. And with intoxicated people, I’ve noticed, it’s really easy to 
see if you’re not gonna be the one who’s gonna be able to talk to them. 
And sometimes it’s just…Hey man, turn around, you’re under arrest. I 
would rather try to communicate with someone having a mental episode 
than someone who’s extremely intoxicated. (Stamper) 
 
Prince likewise said, in her experience, the possibility of de-escalating persons under the 
influence of alcohol is about equal to chance. 
 
The “Committed” Person 
A common theme in many of the interviews was the difficulty in talking to the 
“committed” person. Officers told stories about people who, despite ample efforts to de-
escalate, still failed to comply with officers’ requests because they were already 
committed to a decision. This is also directed related to assertions from Muir (1977), who 
argued that certain persons who come into contact with police may be less attached or 
have less possessions and are therefore less persuaded by threats to loss of freedom or 
life. 
In the current study, the most common story was the “committed” suicidal person, 
who appeared to have already “made up their mind” about taking their own life. 
We got a call of a guy who… I don’t even remember how the call came, 
somebody thought he was acting strange on the bridge and so we show up. 
I’m the first one there, and he’s walking down the sidewalk and I see he’s 
got headphones in. And so now I’m speaking louder, he’s completely 
ignoring me, so on an escalation scale, this one’s much more 
intense…He’s on a mission…And so then I have maybe thirty seconds 
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where I say sir, hey please, step down from there and talk with me. I really 
want to. And then he just swan dives. Headfirst, arms out, into the river. 
He had headphones in, and I don’t think he heard a word I said. I think he 
was listening to his favorite music…and dove off the bridge. (Stamper) 
 
Cross: It was very tense because he came out screaming and had a 
handgun in his hand. We just tried but, you know, he just ended up 
shooting himself. 
NT: In hindsight is there anything else you could have tried? 
Cross: No, I think he was already committed to harming himself and I 
believe there’s nothing that we could have said or done that would have 
stopped him from shooting himself. 
 
Officers also talked of citizens who are “committed” to fighting with police or 
committing suicide by cop, despite efforts to talk them out of it. In many cases, the 
people in these stories held preexisting negative attitudes towards the police either 
because they adhere to the values of “street culture” or because they have had negative 
interactions with police in the past. 
After the [use of force], now he's handcuffed and it's roll him onto his 
side, get medics in here, and I'm going are you breathing? And he goes 
yeah. And I'm like man why did you not just listen? And he goes I don't 
know man! It turns out that he had told the wife before she left the house 
that when the police show up I'm going to fight them. So it was in his 
mind anyway. (French) 
 
His voice is raising. And he starts making statements that we killed his 
brother and in fact we had. His brother had tried to kill one of our 
officers…And so he harbored a lot of resentment to us. So, when it came 
time to tell him he was under arrest for – and it was just some 
misdemeanor stuff – he you know wouldn’t get out of the car, gripped the 
steering wheel, and when [my partner] went to grab him I can remember 
him saying don’t you fucking manhandle me. You killed my brother. And 
it just kinda deteriorated. (Hunter) 
 
In summary, while officers described several de-escalation tactics they found 
effective in their careers, they identified four scenarios in which these tactics are less 
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effective, or are unsafe given the safety threat. They said the public holds them 
accountable for using de-escalation in cases when it is not possible. 
 
De-Escalation Training 
Finally, I asked officers about the training they received over their careers that 
helped develop their de-escalation skills. I also asked whether they felt de-escalation and 
communication were covered adequately in their department, and for any suggestions for 
improving this training. All of the officers in the current study were veterans with over 15 
years of police service. The most common response was that verbal tactics and de-
escalation are covered much more commonly in police training these days, compared to 
when they first entered the profession.  
I don't think when I started 20 years ago that there was enough attention 
put on [communication], but I think now it definitely is. I mean, mental 
health is such a huge topic across the country and I think it's gotten 
worse…they've sent every member of our department through at least 
basic crisis intervention training, so to develop some exposure to a person 
in crisis – let's think of some ways to talk to them and give it that amount 
of time which is needed. Going back [to when I first became a cop] where 
like after five minutes – If this guy isn't outta that front door and in 
handcuffs, we're gonna do it for him. Especially now, I think we’re doing 
a better job of…making sure that all of our officers are trained in how to 
deal with – especially the mental health side of the equation. And you 
know, the number of calls that we get for suicidals and stuff nowadays, I 
mean [communicating is] very important. (Marshall) 
 
I'm sure it's changed since I went and I know the academy has gotten 
longer since I went. It used to be short and sweet and not a lot of it had to 
do with cultural diversity and communication. There wasn't a mental 
health aspect to the academy that I'm sure they have now. So it might be 
better covered since I went through. (French) 
 
As a craft described by Willis (2013), officers had to learn these skills on the 
street, because the alternative was a confrontation or fight: “I think for my generation of 
135 
police officers, it’s something that you learned on the job, because you learned how to 
talk to people so that you could get that compliance” (Hunter). Though officers said these 
skills may be more commonly taught in academies today, they still felt the majority of 
their communication “training” came from the streets. 
[In the classroom, officers] get a basis, but out on the streets they’re 
getting to watch other cops talk to people. Our newer cops out on the 
street, a lot of them have gone to college, [they] come straight from home. 
They have no experience being up at 2 and 3 o’clock in the morning 
dealing with people who have no business being out at that time…They’re 
really getting a lot of their experience from watching other cops. (Prince) 
 
Three officers said they worked in small, rural departments previously, before 
transferring to the larger city agency. Their experiences working in a smaller agency were 
effective at teaching them to de-escalate potential conflict, because they knew that back 
up was rarely available to come help them. As such, these officers frequently had an 
incentive to avoid getting into a fight because they were outnumbered. 
One thing about working for a smaller department is, there were lots of 
times when I would work a shift, a graveyard shift, and I would be the 
only officer on. We relied on the county…for backup, but they can be 30 
minutes away, they can be unavailable, and so I think at least speaking 
with people in a way to avoid physical confrontations became a habit…I 
think that that…affected how I communicate as a police officer. I was also 
by myself on calls where I had to physically fight people or I was attacked 
all by myself, and I think that most officers that are killed in the line of 
duty, I mean you see them, they’re on traffic stops all by themselves…so, 
even though I communicated in a way that I thought I’d be able to de-
escalate, I wasn’t always able to. (Stamper) 
 
These three officers also said, once they moved to a bigger city with more calls 
for service and more officers on duty, they began to work with officers who had not had 
the same experiences they had in a smaller agency. These officers were less skilled at and 
less motivated to use de-escalation because they always have back up support and do not 
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have as much of an incentive to de-escalate: “Some people were very short with people 
and more apt to communicate in a way that if you were by yourself, it’d be dangerous” 
(Stamper). These findings are exceedingly optimistic for scholars and practitioners 
hoping to design effective de-escalation training as they suggest the ability of police 
officers to affect the outcomes of encounters in ways that reduce violence. 
A couple officers described other training they received that improved their de-
escalation skills. French said he received training on cooperating with coworkers and 
effective leadership. He noted that this training not only helped him interact with other 
officers, it also helped with citizens because both scenarios involve engaging with 
someone in a way that achieves cooperation. Additionally, Stamper said he had been 
videotaped in tactical social interaction training. He felt it gave him insight on himself 
that he later put into practice. For example, he was able to see whether his facial 
expressions and body language were consistent with the words he was saying.  
On the other hand, while officers said they receive some training on 
communication – particularly in a mental health context more recently – they felt that no 
matter how innovative the training, it was not always 100% effective in practice. This is 
because the police deal with a human population in social situations; thus, no strategies 
work all of the time. 
I do think the enhanced crisis training was helpful. I don't think it is – well 
I don't think any of this stuff that the public thinks is a 100% cure-all – it 
doesn't work every time. But even if some of it works some of the time, 
that's a success… it doesn't work all the time and it's not the end-all be-all, 
but it was very helpful. (Marshall) 
 
I asked officers for their suggestions for de-escalation training. Some of them said 
that the drive to de-escalate was not completely engrained in them – when they receive a 
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call they do not always automatically run through de-escalation options in their head as 
they do with safety and use of force fundamentals. As such, a few officers said they 
would like to receive training that would get them in the habit of considering alternative 
force options before they even arrived on a scene. 
It would be a good thing to get in practice of, to have that reminder that 
before you get there, what can I do – what can I potentially do to 
deescalate it? It usually doesn’t happen until I get there, and then you can 
see the whole totality of what’s going on. (Marshall) 
 
The principles set forth by Binder and Scharf (1980), as well as the notion of the 
split second syndrome described by Fyfe (1986) would be helpful in the initial designing 
of such a training. These scholars argued that officers can take step at the beginning of a 
call, even before arriving on scene, to develop a plan of attack and get into the right 
mindset (e.g. staying calm) so they can effectively handle the call in ways that minimize 
conflict and the need to use force. 
Interestingly, virtually every officer in the current study said it was difficult for a 
police officer to remember the times when de-escalation efforts worked, because in 
successful cases they tend to leave and move onto the next scene. Only when something 
goes wrong is an officer forced to sit down, file a report, and seriously consider why the 
scenario unfolded the way it did.  
A shooting or a use of force; you remember the ones that didn’t work out 
because they didn’t and it ended up in a fight or some kind of violent 
encounter. The ones that do end up de-escalating, they kinda just are out 
of your mind and then you move on to the next call. I think that’s why the 
training is, it’s so important, because it also forces people to think about 
what they did in those situations and what worked. But when it does work, 
sometimes it’s just like oh, okay, I’m done. What’s the next thing I need to 
go do? Not everybody has self-awareness and looks back at how they’ve 
done the job. (Stamper)  
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 The implication here is that police training should incorporate reviews of 
scenarios in which de-escalation efforts were successful, in the same way that sentinel 
events involving a tragic outcome are reviewed. The body camera video footage from 
successful cases could be reviewed weekly at roll call briefings, and lessons learned from 
these cases could be compiled to inform training. It may also be worthwhile to have 
officers complete a “successful de-escalation report” that is similar to a use of force 
report, at least initially while they hone their skills to encourage them to process those 
cases in which they successfully calm down an escalated situation, and otherwise would 
forget the case and move on to the next one. 
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CHAPTER 5: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides descriptive statistics for 131 police-citizen encounters, 
observed during 35 ride alongs with 29 officers. Descriptive statistics are categorized into 
officer, citizen, and situation level variables. To paint a more detailed picture of the data 
set, more variables are included in this section than are presented in regression models. 
An average of 3.72 (SD=2.3) interactions were observed per ride along. 
 
Officer Level Descriptive Statistics 
Just over 32% (43) of cases involved one of the 8 peer nominated officers and 
21.4% (28) involved a crisis negotiator. 34.4% (45) of calls involved a swing shift 
officer, 32.1% (42) a day shift officer, 24.4% (32) a power shift officer, and 9.2% (12) a 
graveyard shift officer. In terms of rank, over 90% (118) of the interactions occurred with 
a Police Officer, 6.1% (8) involved a Corporal, and 3.8% (5) a Sergeant. Sample officers 
were a homogenous group in terms of demographics, mirroring the makeup of the 
department as a whole. 88.5% (116) of calls involved a male officer, and 90.8% (119) 
involved a white officer. The average age was 39.4 (SD=9.1), the average years of 
service was 13.3 (SD=7.5), and the average number of days an officer had been on duty 
prior to the ride along was 2.6 (SD=1.4). Officers did not largely report issues with 
fatigue. Most of the interactions involved an officer who reported little or no fatigue. In 
14.5% (19) of cases the officer reported moderate to high fatigue.  
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Citizen Level Descriptive Statistics 
Over half of citizens were offenders, while 12.2% (16) were persons needing 
assistance, and 12.2% (16) were victims. 8.4% (11) were complainants or witnesses, 
3.1% (4) were suspicious persons.. 83.2% (109) of citizens were white, and 9.9% (13) 
were black. 65.6% (86) were male. The average citizen age was 38.7 (SD=14.4). Most of 
the citizens in the sample were from low socioeconomic backgrounds.20 36.6% (48) 
showed evidence of chronic poverty or homelessness and 35.9% (47) showed evidence of 
being low income. 
 
Situation Level Descriptive Statistics 
Situation variables are categorized into Binder and Scharf’s (1980) four phases of 
police-citizen encounters – anticipation, entry, information gathering, and final decision. 
Table 5.1 lists descriptive statistics for situation variables, broken out into these four 
phases.  
Anticipation phase variables measure how the call was initially received and 
processed by the officer. In part, these variables gauge the potential for violence that 
would have been assessed by the officer on the way to the call. Numerous scholars have 
noted that the officer’s anticipation levels can affect how he or she responds upon arrival 
at the scene. 70.2% (92) of interactions were initiated by a call for service or citizen 
request, and 19.1% (25) were self-initiated by the officer. To assess the level of crime 
activity in the area, I asked the officer to estimate the number of calls for service the area 
                                                 
20 Variables that were more difficult to ascertain were coded based on an “evidence present” rule of thumb. 
If I observed or was informed about any single piece of evidence that indicated the presence of that variable 
(e.g. homelessness, mental illness, intoxication) then that variables was coded as “1.” 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics by Phase of the Encounter (N=131) 
Anticipation Phase Variables Frequency %(#)  
Information Gathering Phase 
Variables 
Frequency 
%(#) 
Rationale for Potential Violence    Officer used Authoritative Tone 13 (17) 
Violence in Progress 9.9 (13)  
Officer Used Any De-Escalation 
("use"=1) 88.6 (116) 
Person Threatening 
Violence 4.6 (6)  Humanity Tactic 78.6 (103) 
Person with History of 
Violence 4.6 (6)  Empower Tactic 29.8 (39) 
Officer Intuition 2.3 (3)  Compromise Tactic 28.2 (37) 
No Potential Violence 
Indicators 78.6 (103)  Honesty Tactic 63.4 (83) 
Call Initiation Method    Listening Tactic 47.3 (62) 
Call for Service 70.2 (92)  Officer thought Citizen Lied  30.5 (40) 
Officer Self-Initiated 19.1 (25)  Citizen was Intoxicated 22.9 (30) 
Other 10.7 (14)  Citizen was Hostile Towards Police 15.3 (20) 
Manner of Travel to Scene    Citizen Cried during Encounter 14.5 (19) 
Speed 9.9 (13) 
 
Citizen Signs of Mental Illness 22.9 (30) 
Speed, Lights, and Sirens 5.3 (7) 
 
Citizen Threatened Suicide 6.1 (8) 
No Urgency 84.7 (111)  Citizen Injured 9.2 (12) 
Weapon in Call Description 10.7 (14)  Citizen had Weapon in Possession 3.1 (4) 
Officer told Researcher to Wait 
in Car 9.2 (12)  Citizen fled from Police 3.8 (5) 
Neighborhood Crime Activity    Citizen disobeyed Police 9.2 (12) 
Police "often" called 55.0 (72)  Citizen made Anti-Police Statement 9.9 (13) 
Police "sometimes" called 28.2 (37)  
 
 
Police "rarely" called 14.5 (19)  Final Decision Phase Variables 
Frequency 
%(#) 
Police "never" called 2.3 (3)  Highest Level of Force   
   
Contact by Police 22.1 (29) 
Entry Phase Variables 
Frequency 
%(#)  Interrogate 46.6 (61) 
Officer Role during Interaction    Issue Verbal Commands 8.4 (11) 
Lead Decision Maker 67.9 (89)  Handcuff 22.9 (30) 
Back Up 22.1 (29) 
 
Citizen Arrested 18.3 (24) 
Supervisor 3.1 (4) 
 
Citizen Issued Citation 18.3 (24) 
Other 6.9 (9) 
 
Citizen Demeanor at End of Encounter   
Situation In Progress 59.5 (78)  
Calm and Compliant ("success" 
=1) 77.9 (102) 
Call Type    Agitated or In Crisis 22.1 (29) 
Domestic Violence 15.3 (20)  
 
 
Investigative Stop 5.3 (7)  
 
 
Traffic Stop 6.9 (9)  
 
 
Fight/Assault 6.9 (9)  
 
 
Other 65.7 (86)  
 
 
Officer Developed Entry Plan 12.2 (16)  
  Officer Forced Entry 1.5 (2)  
  Officer Waited for Back Up 16.8 (22) 
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 typically generated. Most often the officer said that police are “often” called to that area, 
indicating that police are often called back to the same areas.  As seen in the table, most 
cases did not start with obvious indicators that the call could become violent. There were 
indicators of potential violence about one fifth of the time. Digging deeper, we see that 
this is because 9.9% (13) of calls involved ongoing violence, 4.6% (6) involved a person 
threatening violence, 4.6% (6) involved a person with a history of violence. In three 
additional cases the officer believed the call could become violent based on their personal 
experience with similar calls. In 10.7% (14) of calls, a weapon was included in the call 
description.21 In 84.7% (111) of cases the officer traveled to the scene with no urgency, 
while in 9.9% (13) they traveled with speed, and in 5.3% (7) they turned on lights and 
sirens to get to the scene as quickly as possible. In 9.2% (12) of cases I was asked by the 
officer to remain in the car, indicating that they did not think it was safe for me to 
accompany them.  
The next set of variables capture the entry phase – or the manner in which the 
officer entered the scene, how he or she established contact with citizens, and the 
officer’s mindset during this phase of the encounter. Most often the officer was the lead 
decision maker or the back up officer. A majority of situations were in progress upon the 
officer’s arrival. In the remaining cases, the officer arrived on scene after it had been 
stabilized, to take a report, or to collect evidence after the fact. 15.3% (20) of calls 
involved a domestic disturbance or intimate partner violence, 6.9% (9) of calls involved a 
fight or assault that was not between domestic partners, 5.3% (7) of cases were 
                                                 
21 This variable was coded separately from the violence potential variables, because it reflects the 
complainant’s estimation of whether the call involved a weapon, and not the officer’s. Citizens may 
sometimes misperceive a weapon or may hint at the presence of a weapon to prompt quicker police 
response. Officers are often savvy to the difference. 
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investigative stops of suspicious persons, and 6.9% (9) of calls involved traffic stops. In 
16.8% (22) of cases officers waited for back up before making contact with citizens, and 
in 12.2% (16) they developed a strategy or game plan before making entry. 
The information gathering phase involves the interactions that occurred between 
the officer and citizen while police are on scene. Fridell and Binder (1992)’s study 
indicated that officers focus most on the events that occur during this phase when 
reflecting on why they used deadly force. Note that the behaviors of officers and citizens 
during this phase are not mutually exclusive. Officers in the current study used at least 
one de-escalation tactic in a majority (88.6%) of cases. It is evident that citizens in the 
sample often presented special problems to the police during this phase. The most 
common was drug or alcohol intoxication – 22.9% (30) of citizens appeared either drunk 
or chemically impaired. 15.3% (20) expressed hostility towards the officer during the 
encounter, 22.9% (30) exhibited signs of mental illness, 6.1% (8) threatened to commit 
suicide, 9.2% (12) were suffering from an injury when officers arrived, 3.1% (4) had a 
weapon in their possession when officers arrived, 3.8% (5) attempted to flee from police, 
9.2% (12) failed to comply with officers commands, and 9.9% (13) made an anti-police 
statement, including those who expressed general dislike towards the police and those 
who expressed a belief that they had been unfairly discriminated against. 
Several variables were collected to measure the final decision made by the officer. 
The highest level of force observed was handcuffing. Due to lack of variability, force was 
not included as an outcome variable to assess the impact of de-escalation on use of force, 
or the relationship between force and successful outcome. In 22.9% (30) of cases the 
citizen was placed in handcuffs. In 18.3% (24) the citizen was arrested and taken to jail. 
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In 18.3% (24) the citizen was issued a citation. In 76 cases, the citizen was in crisis or 
agitated at some time. In 35.9% (47) of cases an escalated citizen was successfully de-
escalated, while in 22.1% the agitated person was not successfully de-escalated. The 
remaining 42% (55) of the time the citizen never became agitated. For inferential 
statistics, this variable was recoded into a dummy variable22 “success” in which cases 
where de-escalation was successful or where the citizen never became agitated were 
coded as 1, because these cases had a desirable outcome. Cases where the citizen was still 
agitated or in crisis at the end were coded as 0. Descriptives for the outcome variable 
“success” are 102 (77.9%) successful incidents and 29 (22.1%) unsuccessful incidents.  
 
Correlates of Police Use of De-Escalation  
Sample officers stated that police use de-escalation frequently on the job, and 
significantly more often than is assumed by the general public. As such, the current study 
first sought to quantify how often officers in the sample used de-escalation and estimate 
correlates of de-escalation tactics. This analysis estimates statistical relationships between 
officer, citizen, and situation level variables, and officer use of de-escalation during the 
encounter. Table 5.2 shows coding descriptions for all study variables included in 
regression models. 
                                                 
22 Recoding this variable into a binary indicator is not ideal, since situations where citizens never become 
agitated are inherently different from those when a citizen is in crisis and officers are able to successfully 
de-escalate. Given the small sample size of interactions in the data set, it was determined that the best 
estimates would be generated through a simple binary logistic regression model compared to a multinomial 
logistic regression. This is a limitation of the current study and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 
Discussion. Moving forward beyond this dissertation, the author will conduct content and thematic analyses 
to examine each of these three categories of interactions as they relate to effective de-escalation. 
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Pearson’s correlation coefficients were estimated to assess the direction and 
strength of associations between all variables (not shown in tables). For sets of variables 
with high levels of collinearity (that exceeded r=0.80 or were less than r= -0.80) only one 
was included in the model. For example, potentially violent call, weapon call, and officer 
traveled to scene with urgency each had high Pearson’s correlation coefficients with each 
other, since each is a measure of situational risk. Traveling to scene with urgency was 
selected as the best measure of the officer’s assessment of risk. Among those variables 
included in the models, a few were closely correlated but did not exceed plus or minus 
r=0.8. Officer years of service was closely related to whether an officer was nominated as 
an expert de-escalator (r=0.71) and whether the officer was a crisis negotiator (r=0.62). 
Being a negotiator and a peer nominated expert were correlated at r=0.66. Issuing a 
citation was correlated with making an arrest (r=0.64), and developing an entry plan 
before making contact was correlated with waiting for back up (r=0.66). 
Three binary logistic regression models estimate correlates of officer use of de-
escalation tactics. Given the small sample size of the data set, inferential statistics models 
were estimated separately. Table 5.3 displays the results from the first set of regression 
models.  
Results indicate that few factors predict whether an officer uses de-escalation. The 
finding suggests that officers in this police department are not consistent in using de-
escalation when faced with particular problems, most likely because de-escalation tactics 
are not trained in the academy. Indeed, all eight study officers said they largely developed 
these skills on their own while out on the job. White officers were significantly more 
likely than nonwhite officers to use de-escalation (b=1.91; p<.05). Further, when officers   
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Table 4. Regression Variable Code Descriptions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable   
Use 1=officer used at least one of the five de-escalation tactics; 0=officer used no de-escalation tactics 
Success 1=citizen was not in crisis at end of incident; 0=citizen in crisis at end of incident 
Independent Variables   
Officer 
 Expert 1=peer nominated officer; 0=all other 
Negotiator 1=crisis negotiator; 0=all other 
Years of service Years worked as a sworn officer 
Gender 1=male; 0=female 
Race 1=white; 0=all other 
Fatigue 0=no fatigue; 1=some fatigue; 2=moderate to high fatigue 
Citizen 
 Role 1=offender; 0=all other 
Age Citizen's age in years 
Gender 1=male; 0=female 
Race 1=black; 0=all other 
Low SES 1=no evidence of poverty; 2=low income; 3=homelessness/chronic poverty 
Disobey 1=citizen disobeyed police during interaction; 0=all other 
Mental Health 1=citizen suffered mental health problems; 0=all other 
Suicidal 1=citizen made suicidal statements; 0=all other  
Anti-police 1=citizen made anti-police statements; 0=all other 
Situation 
 Urgent 1=officer traveled to scene with urgency; 0=all other 
Domestic violence 1=domestic violence call 0=all other 
Investigative stop 1= investigative stop of a suspicious person; 0=all other 
Number of officers Total number of responding officers on scene 
Initiated 1=call initiated by call for service; 2=officer self-initiated contact; 3=all other 
Tactics 
 Entry plan 1=officers developed entry plan before making contact; 0=all other 
Back up 1=officer waited for back up before making contact; 2=officer was back up; 0=all other 
Citation 1=officer issued citizen citation; 0=all other 
Arrest 1=officer arrests citizen; 0=all other 
Compromise 1=officer used compromise tactic; 0=all other 
Honesty 1=officer used honesty tactic; 0=all other 
Listen 1=officer used listening tactic; 0=all other 
Humanity 1=officer used humanity tactic; 0=all other 
Empower 1=officer used empower tactic; 0=all other 
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 developed an entry plan before making contact with a citizen they were less likely to use 
de-escalation (b= -1.20; p<.05). This finding makes intuitive sense. When officers take 
the time to develop a plan, they are more prepared to take a specific tactical action to 
solve the problem. Making an entry plan is also indicative that the situation is potentially 
violent, so officers are more likely to call in additional resources and talk through the 
situation. De-escalation, in this department, seems to be more defensive, used when 
officers make immediate entry and perhaps must then “talk themselves out” of the 
problem. 
 
Correlates of Effective De-Escalation 
Four binary logistic regression models were next estimated to examine factors 
related to the state of the citizen at the end of the encounter (a measure of successful de-
escalation). The models include officer level independent variables, citizen level 
independent variables, situation level independent variables, and officer tactics, 
respectively 
Table 5.4 displays results from the four regression models predicting de-
escalation effectiveness. The correlations indicate that the situation outcome is 
significantly related to officer, citizen, and situation level factors, as well as the de-
escalation tactics used by officers. For example, when an officer is a member of the crisis 
negotiations unit, the incident has a significantly lower likelihood of a successful 
outcome (b= -1.66; p<.05). It is doubtful this implies that negotiators are less skilled de-
escalators, but rather suggests a selection effect where negotiators respond more often to 
more difficult calls. At the citizen level, disobeying police orders (b= -1.63; p<.05) and  
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Table 5. Binary Logistic Regressions predicting Officer Use of De-escalation 
(N=131) 
 
aReference category is no fatigue. 
bReference category is no evidence of low 
income. 
cReference category is call for service. 
dReference category is officer did not wait for 
back up.  
eReference category is police contact only. 
*p<.05 
 
 
  
Independent Variable b (SE) 
Officer Characteristics 
 Expert -0.66 (0.82) 
Negotiator 1.00 (0.99) 
Years of service -0.08 (0.06) 
Male 0.14 (1.09) 
White 1.91 (0.94)* 
Fatiguea 
 Some fatigue 0.84 (0.81) 
Mod/high fatigue 0.35 (0.85) 
Citizen Characteristics 
 Offender 0.64 (0.65) 
Age 0.003 (0.02) 
Black 0.58 (1.17) 
Incomeb 
 Low income -0.05 (0.71) 
Homeless 0.11 (.84) 
Disobey 0.46 (1.14) 
Mental health -0.20 (0.79) 
Suicidal 0.20 (1.15) 
Anti-police -0.56 (0.95) 
Situation Characteristics 
 Citizen Agitated or In Crisis -0.80 (0.64) 
Urgent 1.28 (1.14) 
Domestic violence -0.66 (0.69) 
Number of officers -0.004 (0.18) 
Initiatec 
 Self-initiate 1.31 (1.09) 
Other -0.20 (0.86) 
Officer Tactics 
 Entry plan -1.20 (0.52)* 
Back upd 
 Officer waited for back up 0.47 (0.96) 
Officer was back up 0.93 (.10) 
Citation -0.77 (0.92) 
Arrest -0.66 (1.90) 
Use of Forcee 
 Interrogate -1.52 (0.95) 
Issue Verbal Commands -2.22 (1.24) 
Handcuff 0.73 (1.93) 
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making anti-police statements (b= -1.52; p<.05) were negatively associated with a 
successful outcome. The findings suggest that citizen disrespect for police is more 
influential in determining the outcome than citizen demographics. Domestic violence 
calls (b= -1.25; p<.05) and self-initiated contacts (b= -1.11; p<.05) were less likely to 
have successful outcomes.  
Finally, using the humanity tactic (b=1.23; p<.05) was significantly related to a 
successful outcome. The table also shows that some de-escalation tactics are negatively 
related to the outcome variable, though not significantly. The humanity tactic (which 
includes talking to the person with respect) may be the most simple and “go to” option 
for officers when they are faced with a potential conflict. Other tactics, including honesty, 
listening, and empowerment may be the second choice options officers use when the first 
tactic is unsuccessful. The negative correlations may reflect that officers dig deeper into 
their de-escalation toolkits when faced with more difficult citizens or situations. 
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Table 6. Correlates of Effective De-Escalation 
 
Independent Variable b (SE) 
Officer Characteristics 
 
Expert 
0.63 
(0.79) 
Negotiator 
-1.78 
(0.85)* 
Years of service 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
Male 
-1.28 
(0.90) 
White 
0.14 
(0.76) 
Fatiguea 
 
Some fatigue 
-0.51 
(0.58) 
Mod/high fatigue 
-0.10 
(0.77) 
Citizen Characteristics 
 
Offender 
-0.10 
(0.55) 
Age 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Black 
-0.91 
(0.74) 
Incomeb 
 
Low income 
-0.65 
(0.64) 
Homeless 
0.03 
(0.75) 
Disobey 
-1.81 
(0.75)* 
Mental health 
-0.49 
(0.63) 
Suicidal 
-0.01 
(0.95) 
Anti-police 
-1.54 
(0.72)* 
Situation Characteristics 
 
Urgent 
0.68 
(0.71) 
Domestic violence 
-1.26 
(0.57)* 
Investigative stop 
0.59 
(1.16) 
Number of officers 
-0.23 
(0.12) 
Initiatec 
 
Self-initiate 
-1.11 
(0.56)e 
Other 
2.19 
(0.46) 
Officer Tactics 
 
Entry plan 
0.43 
(0.42) 
Back upd 
 Officer waited for 
back up 
-0.67 
(0.66) 
Officer was back up 
-0.66 
(0.73) 
Citation 
0.24 
(0.77) 
Arrest 
-0.55 
(0.76) 
Compromise 
0.52 
(0.55) 
Honesty 
-0.51 
(0.56) 
Listen 
-0.25 
(0.51) 
Humanity 
1.23 
(0.54)* 
Empower 
-0.10 
(0.58) 
 
aReference category is no fatigue. 
bReference category is no evidence of 
low income. 
cReference category is call for service. 
dReference category is officer did not 
wait for back up.  
*p<.05; ep=.05.
151 
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
This chapter summarizes the study’s qualitative and quantitative findings and 
discusses how they contribute to police research, theory, and practice. Following this 
discussion, limitations and suggestions for future research are offered. The discussion 
chapter should be used to guide and inform future research on this highly relevant and 
understudied topic. 
 
Key Qualitative Findings 
Definitions of De-Escalation 
The first goal of the current study was to identify a definition of de-escalation and 
a description of its tactics from the police officer’s point of view. Thus far empirical 
research had not identified a universally accepted definition of this policing strategy and 
therefore could not operationalize it for empirical analysis. In this study, participating 
officers defined de-escalation as bringing a situation or person in crisis back to an 
objective/calm state. The outcome goal of the strategy is to gain the person’s willing 
cooperation, or at least non-violent compliance, and the process goal is to do so using 
primarily verbal tactics. If communication tactics are not feasible, officers said de-
escalation can involve using the least amount of force possible. In other words, 
sometimes less lethal force can be used in ways that avoid more serious forms of force or 
citizen violence. Further, officers said the intended purpose of de-escalation is to calm a 
citizen who is already escalated, but the strategy could be used preventatively – the same 
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tactics can be used to build a rapport with a citizen and prevent them from becoming 
escalated.  
De-Escalation Tactics 
To accomplish these goals, participants described five tactics that have effectively 
de-escalated situations or citizens in their own experiences on the job.  
• Humanity: Emphasize one’s humanity over one’s police authority. Using 
this tactic the officer avoids condescending to the citizen and instead 
emphasizes that the conversation is occurring between two equal persons. 
This tactic should reduce the tension that occurs as a result of the power 
differential in police-citizen encounters and ultimately foster mutual 
understanding between the officer and the citizen.  
 
• Listening: Listening to the citizen’s concerns and point of view legitimizes 
the citizen’s perspective and gives them voice in the decision-making 
process. Listening also helps the officer understand the root of the 
citizen’s problem and identify a solution.  
 
• Compromise: If possible, lessening the disciplinary actions taken against 
the citizen can significantly de-escalate an upset individual. This tactic is 
directly opposed to a “tough on crime” approach which directs the police 
to charge suspects with the most severe offense they can prove. In the 
current study, officers said they often drop a few of the charges, but keep 
others, to achieve the person’s compliance yet still ensure that justice is 
served. 
 
• Honesty: Using the honesty tactic, officers explain the legal and policy 
guidelines guiding the officer’s decision making to the person. The tactic 
helps the citizen understand where the officer is coming from and why the 
decisions they are making are necessary. Officers said often citizens are 
sometimes not aware of these constraints, and after receiving information 
they often become more empathetic to the officer’s constraints and 
subsequently are more cooperative. 
 
• Empower: The empower tactic engages the citizen in the decision making 
process. Officers in the study also said they will try to assist citizens with 
ways to avoid the same problem in the future. These tactics help the 
citizen to feel as though they are more in control of the situation, have a 
voice in the outcome, and have the ability to avoid getting into the same 
situation in the future.  
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Situational Contingencies 
Officers said they had much success in using these five de-escalation tactics over 
their careers. However, they emphatically qualified that the police face certain situations 
where de-escalation is less effective or unsafe. In life threatening situations, officers were 
adamant that the safety of officers and bystanders becomes the priority. Specifically, in 
situations that are evolving, or where there is an imminent threat, officers said they would 
be immediately concerned with achieving stability, understanding the problem, and 
neutralizing the threat.  
Officers said they also frequently interact with persons who are less receptive to 
verbal de-escalation tactics, such as persons who are under the influence or mentally ill. 
Here, the goal of gaining calm compliance is exponentially more challenging because 
citizens are more difficult to communicate and reason with. These challenges have been 
echoed by PERF (2012, p. iii): “Situations often are complicated when, because of their 
conditions, persons cannot communicate effectively with police officers. In some cases, 
they may appear to be threatening or uncooperative, when in fact they are unable to 
understand an officer’s questions or orders.”  
Finally and perhaps most complicated, officers in the current study said they 
experienced interactions with people who are simply so “committed” to disobeying 
police, harming themselves, or harming others that de-escalation techniques designed to 
persuade or rationalize with them are ineffective. These stories especially referenced 
persons who were committed to killing themselves and individuals who were determined 
to engage in a physical confrontation with police. 
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Some of these findings may seem disconcerting. Even after decades of work 
experience, participants still felt the likelihood of de-escalating an extremely intoxicated 
person to be equivalent to a 50-50 chance. What is more, officers felt there were 
situations in which they thought they could do nothing to convince a person against 
harming him/herself or others. In the case of a suicidal person, this means the loss of a 
human life – and a violent death that responding officers must traumatically witness 
firsthand. For example, in Chapter 4 Stamper revealed the story of the man who jumped 
off the bridge in front of his eyes despite his multiple attempts to initiate a conversation 
with the man. As another example, when responding to a combative individual who 
intentionally initiates a physical fight with police, a failure to de-escalate can mean a use 
of force, injuries to citizens and officers, and even death. As such, it is vitally important 
for researchers to analyze these types of situations in depth and identify ways to improve 
officer’s responses. 
 
Citizen Perceptions  
The purpose of the qualitative interviews was to understand officers’ perceptions 
of de-escalation. For the officers, much of these issues were complicated by broader 
social issues – specifically, how citizens perceive their work, use of force, and de-
escalation. During the interviews officers would often answer a question by offering their 
own perspective, and then contrasting that perspective with how a citizen might respond 
to the same question. This theme reflects the officers’ reactions to the increasingly critical 
atmosphere surrounding American policing today. They believed society increasingly 
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tends to judge police actions and decisions based on the citizen’s point of view, rather 
than based on the officer’s understanding of the realities of their work. 
 
Key Quantitative Findings 
Data Overview 
Binary logistic regressions estimated correlates of police use of de-escalation 
tactics and de-escalation effectiveness. Findings from first set of regression models 
(depicted in Table 5.3) indicate that few variables predict whether officers in Spokane use 
de-escalation tactics. This most certainly reflects the fact that officers in this agency do 
not receive systematic de-escalation training, and instead employ tactics they have honed 
themselves in an ad hoc fashion on the job. The first models indicate that officers who 
were white were more likely to use de-escalation tactics, while officers who took time to 
develop an entry plan before making citizen contact were less likely to use de-escalation. 
Perhaps in situations where officers develop entry plans, the situations are more serious 
and potentially violent. Officers on these calls may seek to make contact and employ the 
plan quickly without the use of verbal de-escalation tactics that take longer. Peer 
nominated officers and trained crisis negotiators did not appear to significantly use de-
escalation more often or more effectively. 
The findings from the second set of regression models (Table 5.4) highlight that 
identifiable factors of police-citizen interactions and citizens significantly predict whether 
de-escalation will be effective. When interacting with citizens who disobey police orders, 
and those who express anti-police attitudes, officers were less effective at de-escalating. 
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Domestic violence encounters were also less likely to end successfully. Officer use of the 
humanity tactic was significantly related to more successful de-escalation, while crisis 
negotiators were significantly less likely to de-escalate. I argue that the first finding 
suggests officers tend to use the humanity tactic most often compared to other tactics, 
especially in low level situations. The latter finding suggests crisis negotiators may be 
called to or sign on for more difficult situations involving citizens in crisis since they 
have specialized training for handling these calls. 
 
Empirical Contributions 
Operationalizing Variables for De-Escalation Research 
A first empirical contribution from the current study is that it operationalized de-
escalation. De-escalation has been widely suggested as a mechanism for reducing 
violence between officers and citizens, but the concept up until now had not been well 
defined. Many police, for example, believe the strategy is just a rose by any other name 
(Flosi, 2016). They say they have been learning to de-escalate on the street for their entire 
careers because to do otherwise would mean getting into a use of force incident on a daily 
basis. A majority of police officers, they said, do not enjoy getting into fights or using 
deadly force. Leading police research groups and the federal government have 
alternatively suggested that de-escalation is a crucial missing piece from police training 
and practices, a sentiment that many members of the general public share (President’s 
Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015; PERF, 2015). While there seems to be a 
consensus that de-escalating implies using less force, a specified definition of what de-
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escalation is, and an understanding of its purpose and a standardized set of tactics up until 
now did not exist.  
The qualitative portion of this study sought to fill this gap in the literature by 
asking officers for their perspective. This perspective is arguably the most important to 
take into account when building an evidence base on de-escalation, since police are the 
primary source for this information, the professionals with subject matter expertise 
(Willis, 2013). By identifying a concrete definition, as well as process and outcome goals 
of de-escalation tactics, the findings from the qualitative analysis offer clear guidance for 
future research seeking to test the nature and effectiveness of de-escalation. Researchers 
can use these findings to measure each of the five de-escalation tactics while observing 
either first hand in the field or second hand via body camera video footage. Researchers 
can also use these operationalized definitions to test whether the tactics lead to the 
identified outcome goals: reductions in use of force and calming of citizens in crisis. 
 
Guiding Future De-Escalation Research Using a Transactional Approach 
The second empirical contribution from the current study pertains to the 
transactional nature of police-citizen encounters. According to Fyfe (1986), police use of 
force is almost exclusively evaluated based on what the citizen was doing in the 
immediate moments prior to the use of force. Supporting his claim, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Graham v. Connor (490 U.S. 386 1989) held that police actions should 
be measured based on the facts of the situation as experienced by the officer in the 
moment they made the decision. Fyfe (1986) labeled this problem the “split second 
syndrome” and argued it gives rise to numerous negative consequences. Terrill (2016) 
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likewise argued this standard opens evaluations up to considerable subjectivity on the 
part of the viewer. Consequently, police behaviors are most often justified, because 
evaluators find it difficult to prove the officer did not perceive a threat in the final 
moments, as the standard requires. Additionally, the split second syndrome prevents 
researchers and practitioners from learning from mistakes and identifying methods for 
reducing unnecessary, yet legally justified, force (Fyfe, 1996).  
Some have alternatively argued that police-citizen encounters are transactional. 
They point to the ability of police officers to take initial steps at the beginning of the 
encounter to prevent or de-escalate a conflict (and ultimately a use of force). The split 
second syndrome dictates, however, that missed opportunities are not a quintessential 
component for evaluating a use of force.  
Officers in the current study showed symptoms of the split second syndrome. 
They were adamant that citizens’ actions dictate the direction of encounters, and that 
they, the police, are reactionary in critical situations to what the citizen does. This 
argument was contextualized specifically in use of force encounters. Officers said they 
only use force when the citizen’s actions absolutely necessitate a physical response. 
Reflecting on instances when they had used force, officers did not see their decisions as 
failures to de-escalate but as what was necessary in the moment when the citizen took the 
final action.  
On the other hand, officers’ discussions of de-escalation emphasized the ability of 
police to use communication tactics to redirect situations towards more positive 
outcomes. They acknowledged the decisions they make and the verbal tactics they use at 
the very beginning of an encounter can prevent a situation from escalating to a conflict. 
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Those three officers who had previously worked in smaller rural agencies also said they 
had been forced through situational contingencies to develop these de-escalation tactics 
because they did not want to get caught in a desolate area on their own in a violent 
situation. As a result, they found they were highly skilled at conversing with subjects in 
ways that reduced conflict. Many officers also felt the training they receive on de-
escalation could be improved or at least standardized. 
As noted by Fyfe (1996), it is exceedingly difficult to identify and hold officers 
accountable for unnecessary force, because these situations end in ways that justify the 
officer’s physical response. However, there are great opportunities for researchers to 
assist police in developing de-escalation tactics for handling future encounters. First, the 
findings clearly indicate a need for research to evaluate police-citizen encounters taking a 
transactional approach, particularly those that have a higher potential for violence. These 
studies should seek to identify those situations in which officers have opportunities to de-
escalate but tend to miss these opportunities and end up using unnecessary, but legally 
justified, force. It is vitally important for research to understand the nuanced and socially 
grounded reasons why these situations tend to end badly. Within these situations, scholars 
should evaluate the relative effectiveness of different police de-escalation tactics. 
Furthermore, the analysis should identify the specific phases of the encounter, using 
Binder and Scharf’s (1980) model, during which officers can employ various de-
escalation tactics most effectively. 
This study took a first step towards fulfilling this research agenda. Drawing on 
qualitative interviews the study identified four types of police-citizen encounters during 
which officers feel they are least effective using de-escalation. They said they might use 
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force more often when dealing with threatening suspects, in dynamic and complicated 
situations, with intoxicated or mentally ill individuals, and with persons who are 
committed to hurting themselves or responding police officers. These findings are 
reflective of Muir’s (1977) earlier study in which he identified citizens who tend to have 
an “upper hand” when dealing with the police. These include persons who have little to 
lose, those who are detached from their mortality and are less threatened by the prospect 
of deadly force, and individuals who are irrational and therefore less predictable. It is 
vitally important for researchers to study these types of police encounters so that we may 
assist officers in identifying solutions that reduce the need to use physical force.  
Scholars have long argued that these solutions may involve “up front” tactics 
employed by officers prior to arriving on scene and making contact with the persons 
involved. The officers in the current study did not identify any specific tactics that might 
assist them in dealing with a situation prior to arriving on scene. However, some did note 
that police training teaches them to consider the tactical dynamics of a situation on the 
way to the call. They argued this same practice might also be helpful for de-escalation. 
Officers could mentally run through different tactics they could use to calm the situation 
on the way to the call. Additionally, in their stories officers in the current study 
mentioned that having prior knowledge of a person helps to make better decisions when 
interacting with them in an official police situation. For example, Prince had previous 
knowledge of the citizen depicted in Video 2 (Table 3.2) because the man was well 
known for being frequently and severely intoxicated. The officer said a decision was 
made to leave the man alone because he was uncharacteristically sober and eating a 
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lunch. The officer did not want to engage with the man because it may cause more harm 
than good. 
Broadly, findings from the current study suggest there are tactics available, and 
which could be more systematically researched and trained, for reducing the use of 
unnecessary force in policing. It is important that researchers continue to investigate 
these possibilities and eventually assist with the creation of evidence-based de-escalation 
training for officers. 
 
Methodological Contributions 
Peer Nomination Sampling 
This dissertation provides important insight into a rarely used sampling procedure 
– peer nominations. While this method has been long proposed as a way to study good 
policing, Kane and White (2013) lamented that it is rarely used in practice. In one 
exception, Bayley and Garofalo (1989) used peer nominations to identify a small sample 
of officers who peers felt were the best at handling potentially violent calls. The authors 
found that peer nominated officers indeed patrolled differently – they were more active, 
but they also tended to use more force than average officers from the same department. 
The authors concluded that while the peer nominated officers were in practice different in 
their official police behaviors, using their methodology they could not assess with 
certainty whether these officers were more skilled officers.  
The current study sought to address this research gap using peer nominations to 
sample expert de-escalators. The sampling method produced a list of 12 officers in a 200-
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officer department who received the vast majority of the votes. This indicates that the 
agency as a whole collectively shared a common idea of the officers who excel at de-
escalating conflict. The top 8 officers were selected for closer study, based on Bayley and 
Garofalo’s (1989) example. Systematic social observations of these officers indicated 
that, using the current operationalized definitions of de-escalation, being a peer 
nominated officer was not significantly related to use of these tactics or achieving a 
successful outcome.  
Future research will need to further investigate this still open question using a 
larger, more representative data set that incorporates additional outcome measures, most 
importantly the use of force. It is possible that since de-escalation is not systematically 
trained, these highly skilled officers employ different tactics they have personally honed 
in the field. It is also possible that the data set masks any expertise these officers have in 
avoiding use of force, which was not captured in the current study. In addition to 
collecting further observational data, researchers should also conduct qualitative inquiries 
with police officers to gauge their reasons for nominating a peer officer as highly skilled. 
It may be that officers’ definitions of highly skilled peers are unique and not adequately 
captured using current definitions (Bittner, 1967; Hunt, 1985). Ultimately, research 
examining good policing is still in its infancy and more work needs to be done to refine 
and add to this body of literature. 
 
Officer Participation in Research During a Legitimacy Crisis 
A second methodological contribution pertains to gaining access to police 
research subjects in the current, highly critical social climate surrounding policing today. 
163 
Recent research studies suggest many police officers perceive there is a “war on cops” 
(Nix, Wolfe, & Campbell, in press) in the post-Ferguson era and officers may be 
engaging in less proactive policing as a result (Shjarback et al., in press). Shjarback and 
colleagues (in press) suggest this may be a protective response to the possibility that a 
police officer who makes a wrong move will be prosecuted for criminal behavior, 
subjected to agency backlash including termination of employment, or even injured or 
killed in the line of duty. 
In the current study, officers said citizens tend to believe de-escalation is always 
effective and that officers should learn to do this, or should be doing this more often. In 
cases of highly publicized uses of force that make the news, citizens often assume the 
officer failed to properly de-escalate the situation. As a result, many of the officers told 
me they were happy I was investigating the topic. Most importantly, they were pleased I 
was spending so much time riding in police cars because it showed I was dedicated to 
understanding the problem from the officer’s point of view and with a more 
comprehensive understanding of the complexities of the job. For these reasons they also 
said that they were happy to have ride alongs accompany them and were open to telling 
their stories. To often, they said people outside the profession are offering opinions and 
making judgments without taking the time to understand.  
This finding is optimistic. Negative public opinion of the police has historically 
caused officers to retreat defensively and foster an “us vs. them” mentality (Skolnick, 
1966). However, in the current climate, and in an era of pervasive social media and 
public criticism of the police, I found that officers are determined to share their sides of 
the story and get citizens to understand the full context behind those short, 
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unrepresentative videos they are accustomed to seeing online and in the news. My own 
experiences in collecting this data reveal that officers today may be more willing to 
participate in research than ever before. 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
The Role of the Police 
 One of the greatest challenges affecting police officers is that they serve an 
uncertain and sometimes conflicting role in society. Culture scholars have described in 
detail how this conflicting role identity fosters a tendency for police officers to emphasize 
one role – crime fighting – above all others (Paoline, 2003). The conflict stems from the 
fact that as officers emphasize their law enforcement function, they are requested on a 
daily basis to serve a wide range of additional functions. Saving lives, keeping peace, and 
maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the public have also been offered as central features 
of police duty. At the same time, Reiman’s (1985) social contract theorizes that the police 
were initially established as a means to increase overall public safety and ensure proper 
protections of property. While the current study cannot solve this debate, the findings are 
optimistic in reference to this role conflict. Namely, the qualitative data suggest that by 
placing a greater emphasis on de-escalation, police can pursue each of these roles 
simultaneously. Officers discussed how use of de-escalation can reduce physical violence 
between cops and citizens, which further the goals of the social contract and protecting 
human life. De-escalation skills also assist the police in enforcing the law and keeping the 
peace by gaining compliance more easily. 
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The data also spoke to the potential for de-escalation to increase police legitimacy 
in the eyes of the public. A key predecessor to legitimacy is procedural justice – if a 
citizen perceives that the processes by which police exercise their authority are fair, and 
that they were treated with respect, they are more likely to see the police as legitimate 
(Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Each of the de-escalation tactics articulated by study officers 
overlapped considerably with the components of procedural justice. For example, the 
notion that citizens want to be treated by police with dignity and respect is echoed in 
officers’ discussions of talking to citizens as people, while minimizing the use of 
authoritative voice and “cop talk” in the conversation. Officers said showing compassion 
and using humor can also establish a positive tone in the interaction that can serve to de-
escalate conflict. Dignity and respect for citizens and their rights can also be shown, 
when possible, through compromise. As Hunter noted in his interview, sometimes a small 
adjustment to charges can significantly improve a person’s situation while still achieving 
justice. Marshall likewise noted that he tries to avoid making “mountains out of 
molehills,” recognizing a low-level offense or misdemeanor warrant as something to not 
make a huge deal out of. The fairness and neutrality components of procedural justice can 
be achieved using the honesty tactic. By providing a clear legal explanation for the 
decisions being made, officers demonstrate to citizens that they are applying the law 
consistently and fairly. Finally, the listening and empowerment tactics legitimize citizens’ 
concerns and engage them as partners in the decision making process. These tactics 
achieve the procedural justice in decision-making by making citizens to feel they have a 
voice in the process and were able to fully explain their case to the police. If police 
departments publically encourage de-escalation through their department philosophies 
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and in official officer training, and when these tactics are employed more systematically 
on the street, they will publically demonstrate to citizens a dedication to improving 
legitimacy and protecting all human life. 
This study also offered the officer perspective on de-escalation, including their 
own experiences regarding when the strategy is and is not feasible. When de-escalation is 
unfeasible in a particular situation, officers felt it is important for members of the public 
to understand that officers retain not only the authority but the responsibility to keep 
citizens safe and to use force when it is necessary to do so. By articulating the types of 
encounters in which de-escalation is and is not feasible – both from the officers’ point of 
view and using systematic social observation and validated statistical methods – I have 
provided empirical evidence of the context within which many of the viral police use of 
force videos are situated. My hope is to publically report this information in ways that 
provide better, empirically grounded information to the general public so that they may 
understand the constraints within which officers operate and ultimately to increase their 
perceptions and trust in the police. On the other hand, when officers do engage in 
misconduct including excessive force or discrimination, citizens will be better informed 
and able to identify these cases as well.  
 
Good Policing 
Policing scholars have for decades argued that the best officers are the ones who 
use less force, and who find ways to steer potential conflict into more peaceful solutions. 
As the quote at the beginning of this dissertation reads, “Although force is the core of the 
police role, the skill of policing consists of finding ways to avoid its use” (Bittner, 1974, 
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p. 40; see also, Fyfe, 1996; Klockars, 1996). However, forty years after Bittner’s words 
were put to paper, still little attention has been paid to the comprehensive study of how 
good police officers do the job (Kane & White, 2013). While the police research 
literature has considerably advanced our knowledge of police misconduct, more is needed 
on the production of good police work (Fyfe, 1993). In identifying and better 
understanding de-escalation tactics for reducing the risk of force and violence in police 
work, the current study definitely took a step towards fulfilling this research mandate. 
Similar research should be conducted to supplement our existing theoretical 
understanding of good policing, to identify metrics for measuring and incentivizing these 
behaviors, and ultimately for producing good police work. 
 
Practical Contributions 
Police-Citizen Relations 
This study represents an unprecedented empirical exploration into an immediately 
pressing issue that is causing debate, tension, and in some cases violent rioting and 
backlash against police officers. Many citizen groups have adamantly expressed a belief 
that police abuse their authority to use force and often exert their authority in 
discriminatory ways that devalue the lives of minority citizens. Police in turn fear citizen 
backlash and may be less proactive in their policing as a result, a prospect that carries 
significant negative implications for crime and safety in U.S. cities. Officer believe that 
most police are genuine in their decisions to use force only when necessary to protect 
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public safety. In practical terms, studying the topic of de-escalation is vital for the future 
of police-citizen relations and for race relations in particular.  
The current study offers a systematic look at the officer’s perspective as it relates 
to these highly contentious social issues. The officers detailed stories of difficult and 
sometimes traumatic incidents when they tried to use de-escalation but were 
unsuccessful. Officers also talked about situations in which the police made every effort 
to solve a situation peacefully and yet were still ridiculed for using force or failing to save 
the life of the person. Many officers resent accusations of racial bias, particularly when 
they feel they dedicate their own lives to saving others. Documenting these stories takes a 
step towards bridging the gap between officer’s realities on the job and citizen’s 
perceptions of what police officer do and/or should do in difficult situations. 
 
De-escalation Training to Reduce Officer Use of Force and Police-Citizen Violence  
Officers’ perceptions of de-escalation suggest that continued improvements in the 
effective use of the strategy will lead to a reduction in violence between officers and 
citizens. By and large, officers agreed that the goal of de-escalation tactics and training is 
to avoid the need to use force by employing innovative communication tactics to gain 
compliance. To achieve these reductions, scholars should first seek to understand the 
skills used by highly skilled and experienced police de-escalators. Furthermore, research 
should investigate the reasons why certain calls for service, such as domestic violence 
calls, tend to end more often unsuccessfully. Finally, incidents during which officers 
successfully used de-escalation tactics should be studied comprehensively. These 
concepts should then be standardized and thoroughly trained to entire agencies. 
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Incorporating de-escalation as a central feature in police training could be mutually 
beneficial to both police, who will be best equipped to safely neutralize potentially 
violent situations, and the public, who have the collective right to expect that police 
authority is use legitimately, competently, and in good faith.  
The quantitative findings from the current study suggest there is currently “no 
rhyme or reason” to when officers in the study agency employ various tactics for de-
escalation. Additionally, officers struggled to identify a concrete definition of de-
escalation, and many could not remember incidents in which they had successfully de-
escalated a conflict. This is because officers are trained to reflect hard on the “bad” 
situations, or the ones in which they are forced to use force. As Stamper pointed out, 
when things go right, the officer must close the call and move on quickly to the next. This 
practice leaves little time for reflect and results in a police force that is trained in 
recapping the reasons why they used force but not trained in identifying methods for 
avoiding force. Training should therefore incorporate reviews of situations in which 
officers were successful at talking someone down from a suicide attempt or convincing a 
person to put down a weapon. 
Effective police training programs should also focus on skills for handling 
situations during which officers typically feel they have less influence over the outcome. 
For example, effective training will emphasize that officers’ actions from the very outset 
of the encounter carry consequences for the citizen’s behavior, and ultimately for the 
final outcome. Study officers noted that they often work to establish a rapport with a 
citizen early on in situations where there is a likelihood the citizen will not be willing to 
comply – for example, in situations where he or she will be cited, involuntarily admitted 
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to a hospital, or arrested and booked into jail. As such, training should not only teach 
officers to de-escalate ongoing conflict, but also to prepare for the possibility of a conflict 
and take early steps to avoid it. 
De-escalation training must also significantly consider officer safety. This is a 
primary and very real concern for officers. For example, Dr. Stephen Bishopp of the 
Dallas Police Department recently proposed to me the question of whether certain de-
escalation tactics, such as standing closer to someone or relaxing one’s hands, could 
actually put police officers at risk because they are antithetical to “smart tactics” 
(Personal Communications). Other reports suggest that agencies feel pressure to 
incorporate de-escalation into their official policies but are not adequately training 
officers in how to do this safely and effectively. (Griffith, 2016). Significant effort will 
need to be invested to consolidate the ideals of de-escalation with long standing notions 
of safe and smart police tactics to ensure the new principles of de-escalation do not put 
officers at higher risk of being injured or killed on the job. 
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
The current study has a number of limitations and findings should be considered 
in light of these limits. The qualitative portion of the study examined a small sample of 
interviews and one focus group. This design was deliberate however, because the author 
sought to understand the concept of de-escalation from highly skilled officers who were 
well regarded by peers as expert de-escalators. Certainly, a larger scale and more 
generalizable sample of officer perceptions of de-escalation is warranted. The topic 
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should be studied from the perspective of other stakeholders as well, including citizens, 
experts, and local workers who have frequent contact with officers in encounters. 
In the quantitative portion of the study, while the structure of the data (officers 
within interactions) required a hierarchical modeling technique, there were an insufficient 
number of observations to perform these analyses. The author attempted to use 
hierarchical modeling and the models failed to load in both SPSS and Stata. Regression 
findings should be interpreted as correlates rather than predictive coefficients. Larger data 
sets that incorporate a sufficient number of observations per officer to legitimate use of 
hierarchical modeling would be preferable to answer these important questions. 
The current study is also limited more generally by the small sample of 
observations (N=131) recorded on ride alongs, which captured no use of physical force 
beyond handcuffing. Obtaining a sufficient number of observed cases has historically 
been a problem for police researchers given the rarity of force and violence in policing 
relative to the number of face-to-face encounters officers have with citizens. Observation 
is a frequently used method for scholars of police behavior, and researchers often take on 
the task by assigning teams of graduate students to record these observations. A study 
similar to my own was undertaken by Bayley and Garofalo (1989), during which the 
authors trained and employed a group of 6 students who collectively coded 467 
systematic observations over 350 ride alongs – approximately 77 observations per 
observer. The authors concluded: “the rareness of violence in patrol encounters limits our 
ability to determine whether particular tactics used by patrol officers raise or lower the 
likelihood of physical conflict.” As another comparison, the Project on Policing 
Neighborhoods (POPN) project is the largest known study using social systematic 
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observation of police-citizen encounters and has uncovered much of what we know about 
police use of force (Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Terrill, 2003; Terrill, Paoline, & Manning, 
2003; Terrill & Reisig, 2003). About 20 research assistants collected 240 hours of 
observations in 24 beats across two cities, for a total of 2,472 observed encounters – 
about 123 observations per observer. The current study is limited in that I was ultimately 
unable to analyze the effect of de-escalation on use of force (which is the main 
hypothesis supporting use of the tactic) because I witnessed no instances of force across 
the 131 encounters. 
To answer this question moving forward, a larger sample of potentially violent 
cases and cases involving police force is needed. One option is to employ body worn 
cameras to sample and observe a larger number of incidents via video footage. The 
proliferation of body worn cameras among U.S. police agencies will significantly aid in 
research on police behavior and police-citizen interactions because researchers are no 
longer constrained to multi-million dollar projects that train and deploy large teams of 
observers (see, e.g., Willits & Makin, in press). Researchers can oversample videos 
depicting potentially violent encounters, as well as use of force and study those 
particularly complex scenarios in depth. However, as Perkins (2017) argued, data 
generated from body worn camera footage comes with its own set of limitations. While 
video footage offers part of the how, it does not give us all of how, and very little of the 
why. Numerous details pertaining to the social interaction, background including the 
officer’s previous knowledge of the citizen or the type of call, the officer’s fatigue levels 
and previous work shifts and stressors, as well as the aftermath of the interaction are 
173 
substantially clouded in a body camera video. Footage reveals the front stage, not the 
back stage, to use Goffman’s (1959) analogy.  
An example from my dataset illustrates the limitations of body camera video data. 
Prince and I arrived on scene to a suicide call where Marshall was already deep in 
conversation with a young boy who wanted to commit suicide. The call lasted several 
hours, and was so intense that the two crisis negotiators employed all five de-escalation 
tactics numerous times and switched back and forth among the two of them to ensure 
they did not lose steam. Both officers appeared desperate, and there was a palpable a fear 
that the boy would go through with his plan to kill himself. The situation was the most 
tense I had ever experienced in my life, as I viewed the scene from the ground three 
stories below where the boy was standing. Hundreds of grocery store shoppers watched 
from across the street as they entered and exited the nearby store. Family members, 
teachers, and friends cried and physically fought with officers nearby as they attempted to 
process the situation and get close enough to communicate with the boy. After several 
long and very traumatic hours and heroic efforts on the part of the officers, the boy 
finally stepped away from the ledge. I stood in my spot for several minutes after the rest 
of the scene cleared and cried. Officers offering consolation told me numerous stories of 
similar calls that had significantly affected them throughout their years on the job. This 
had been the first call of the day for both Prince and myself, though neither of us wanted 
to return to the patrol car and resume the workday. I went straight home, and the officer 
also called off for the rest of the shift. The body camera video footage recorded that day 
would definitely offer insight into the tactics used by the officers, the response from the 
boy (though from a distance), and some of the officers’ tone of voice and desperation. 
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However, little of the emotion or tension experienced by the officers, the impact of the 
surrounding environment and crowd of bystanders, nor the long lasting trauma of those 
involved would be captured on the video. In addition to body camera video, researchers 
may also partner with agencies for help in compiling sufficient data for understanding the 
impact of de-escalation in potentially violent encounters. Officers may be incentivized to 
write up narratives and submit body camera videos depicting calls in which de-escalation 
efforts were successful at avoiding force, which could subsequently be analyzed. 
A final limitation in the study is the predominantly white makeup of both the 
police department and city from which the data were drawn. The issue of race, and in 
particularly the racialized dynamics of police-citizen interactions, is one of the most 
critical in contemporary policing. Ultimately, the racialized implications of the findings 
cannot be inferred given the homogenous nature of the data set. Sample demographics 
also limit generalizability of the study’s findings to more diverse cities. Additional 
research is warranted to investigate the role of race and how it affects the effectiveness of 
de-escalation tactics. 
 
Conclusion 
The current study is the first to tackle the topic of police de-escalation and 
increases our understanding in numerous ways. Quantitative analyses of 131 police-
citizen encounters reveal that officers in the current study largely used ad hoc de-
escalation tactics in the field. They did not receive systematic training, but they have 
personally developed and honed tactics on their own. As such virtually no factors in the 
regression models consistently predicted whether officers in the agency used de-
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escalation. Furthermore, since they are not required to systematically analyze situations 
in which they are successful at de-escalation, officers tend to be more highly trained in 
evaluating those encounters in which things went badly (because they are required to 
complete an thorough use of force report). Since use of force reports are more likely to be 
used in a court scenario, it is likely that these exercises largely train officers to justify 
their use of force rather than to critique it. On the bright side, most often in the 131 
observed encounters the police were successful at calming the situation. Interviews also 
revealed that, while officers strongly believe there are situations in which de-escalation 
cannot be used, there are numerous opportunities for police to de-escalate. Most 
acknowledged that these tactics could be better trained and systematized in their agency. 
Ultimately, this dissertation should be viewed as a launching point for empirical research 
on de-escalation in police work. The findings should be taken optimistically that 
opportunities abound for police to hone their skills, improve their responses in ways that 
reduce violence, and address some of the long-standing criticisms directed at American 
policing. 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW AND FOCUS GROUP CONSENT FORM 
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You are receiving this form because you have been voted by your co-workers as one of 
the most highly skilled officers at de-escalating potentially violent interactions with 
citizens. This form describes my research study and requests your participation. 
 
Introduction: My name is Natalie Todak. I am a fourth year doctoral student in the 
Arizona State University School of Criminology and Criminal Justice. I am conducting 
this research for my dissertation. The faculty advisor on this project is Dr. Michael D. 
White, Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Arizona State University. 
 
Purpose: I am studying de-escalation in police-citizen encounters. There is virtually no 
research on this subject, so you will be among the first police officers to be surveyed on 
this topic, and your participation will dictate the direction of this area of research. The 
purpose of this study is to understand your perceptions about de-escalation and to observe 
your behaviors on the job, as exemplars of excellent policing. While there are no direct 
benefits to you, I believe this research has important implications for policing, especially 
in the context of the current national climate involving police-community relations and 
police use of force. 
 
Procedure and time limit: If you choose to participate, you will take part in three 
research activities. These activities will be spread out over the course of one year. I 
anticipate that 8 police officers will participate in this project. 
 
1) One focus group with other study participants. This focus group will last 
approximately one hour, and will involve watching body camera footage of 
incidents where force is used by police, and discussing it amongst the group. 
2) Two or three formal, audio-recorded interviews on the subject of de-escalation in 
police work. 
3) Three to five ride alongs, totaling approximately 25 hours. During these ride 
alongs, I will observe your work activity, ask questions, and take notes. 
 
In addition to these three activities, I will also ask about your background, training, and 
prior experiences on the job. As part of that I would like to explore your prior work 
history at the Spokane Police Department, which will include a review of your handling 
of potentially violent encounters. I will ask you to recall such incidents and describe how 
you handled them. I am also interested in encounters that resulted in use of force and 
citizen complaints against you, and I would like your permission to review that 
information from the department (past five years only). Since you have been identified as 
a top de-escalator, I am also interested in how you and other top de-escalators stand out 
from your peers. In order to investigate this question, I will compare your background, 
experiences, and work history with other officers. A review of this official data will help 
answer questions about the techniques you use to manage difficult, potentially violent 
encounters. Finally, I would like your permission to view your body camera video 
footage. 
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Your rights: Your participation is completely voluntary. You may withdraw at any time. 
You may refuse to answer any question in any phase of the study, and still move on to the 
next one. Deciding to participate or not will not affect your employment with the 
Spokane Police Department in any way, and I will not communicate to department 
supervisors about the nature of your participation, except to gain permission to conduct 
the study. My main priority is protecting the rights of the study participants. I intend only 
to produce findings to be used for research purposes only. You have a right to ask me any 
question and to have your questions answered. You may also request a copy of this form, 
or any other documents associated with the research findings, including my field notes. 
All participants will receive copies of all final reports. 
 
Identity protection: All answers you give me will be kept confidential. While I know 
your identity, this will not be shared with anybody else. You will receive (or choose) a 
fake name, by which you will be referred in all notes reports. Some of your direct 
quotations may be included in the final report, but this will not be connected to your 
identity. Some data will be audio recorded, but this will be saved on a secure computer, 
not on a public network. 
 
Risks: I do not foresee any physical or psychological harm that may result from your 
participation, other than what you experience as a police officer in everyday life. 
Remember, you may refuse to participate in any facet of the project, and may terminate 
your participation at any time. 
 
If you have questions or concerns, you may contact me at Natalie.Todak@asu.edu, or at 
(805) 908-1211. You may also speak with the Principal Investigator, Michael White, at 
Michael.D.White.1@asu.edu or by calling (602) 496-2351. 
 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Arizona State University Social 
Behavioral IRB. You may talk to them at (480) 965-6788 or by email at 
research.integrity@asu.edu if: 
• Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research 
team. 
• You cannot reach the research team. 
• You want to talk to someone besides the research team. 
• You have questions about your rights as a research participant. 
• You want to get information or provide input about this research. 
 
Your signature below indicates you have read the above information, have had all of your 
relevant questions answered, and agree to participate in the study.  
 
Name: ___________________________  Date: ____________________ 
 
Your signature below indicates your consent to be audio recorded. 
 
Name: ___________________________  Date: ____________________  
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RIDE ALONG CONSENT FORM 
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Introduction: My name is Natalie Todak, I am a Ph.D. candidate in the ASU CCJ 
department. The faculty advisor is Michael White, a professor at ASU. 
 
If you have questions or concerns, you may contact me at Natalie.Todak@asu.edu, or at 
(805) 908-1211. You may also speak with Michael White, and I can give you a copy of 
his contact information. This research has been reviewed and approved by the Social 
Behavioral IRB. You may talk to them at (480) 965-6788 or by email at 
research.integrity@asu.edu if: 
• Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team. 
• You cannot reach the research team. 
• You want to talk to someone besides the research team. 
• You have questions about your rights as a research participant. 
• You want to get information or provide input about this research. 
 
Purpose: I am conducting this research project for my dissertation. I am studying de-
escalation in policing. You were selected because you are a Spokane patrol officer. You 
are not receiving any benefits for participating in this ride along. 
 
Procedure and time limit: If you choose to participate, you will take part in one ride 
along with me. I will ask you questions throughout the ride along and I will typing your 
responses. I expect approximately 50 other officers to participate in the study. 
 
Your rights: Your participation is voluntary. You can decide you don’t want to participate 
and drop me off at any time. You may refuse to answer any question and still move on to 
the next one. Deciding to participate or not will not affect your standing at the Spokane 
Police Department in any way. You have a right to ask me any question related to the 
study and to have your question answered. You may also request a copy of this form, or 
any other documents associated with the study. 
 
Identity protection: All answers you give me will be kept confidential. While I know 
your identity, this will not be shared with anybody else. Data will be recorded, but this 
will be saved on a secure data storage system, not on a public network. 
 
Risks: I do not foresee any physical or psychological harm that may result from your 
participation, other than what you experience in everyday life as a police officer. 
 
With that being said, would you like to participate in this study? 
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Policing frequently involves dealing with citizens who are angry, emotional, and who 
often show no respect for your authority. Resolving encounters peacefully with such 
citizens can be very difficult, and in some cases, impossible. Given the focus nationally 
on violence between police and citizens, there is much interest in highlighting the work 
of officers who excel in de-escalating difficult, potentially violent encounters with 
citizens. 
We would like to identify a group of Spokane police officers who are especially skilled at 
de-escalation, or employing tactics that reduce the likelihood that citizens will act 
violently. Please write the first and last names of three of your colleagues, other than 
yourself, who you consider the most highly skilled at de-escalating difficult, potentially 
violent citizen encounters. Officers of all rank are eligible for nomination, but they must 
be currently employed by the Spokane PD. Your nominations will be kept strictly 
confidential and will be used for research purposes only. Completing this form is 
voluntary, and you will only be asked to fill out this sheet once. 
 
1. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
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1. What is your current position? How many years have you been a police officer? 
Have they all been at Spokane PD? Where else have you worked? 
 
2. What specialty units are you a member of? Do you think you were selected as a 
hostage negotiator because you have good communication skills, or vice versa? 
 
3. Why do you think your peers voted you as a top de-escalator? Do you think of 
yourself as a good de-escalator? 
 
4. What is de-escalation? Do you think your definition is different from the public’s 
definition? How does an officer de-escalate a situation? What are the most 
important skills an officer needs to do this? Does having backup help or hinder 
this process? 
 
5. What types of formal training have you had on communication or de-escalation? 
Do you think the ability to de-escalate difficult encounters is covered effectively 
in your department? How frequently do you use these skills in the field? Do you 
think this type of training is important in police work? 
 
6. Can you describe a call in which you sensed the situation might escalate and you 
were able to stop that from happening? Can you describe a call in which you 
employed tactics to de-escalate a situation, but they didn’t work? In hindsight, 
what else would you have done? 
 
7. Are there situations in which de-escalation is more difficult? What elements make 
de-escalation more difficult? 
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After watching each video: 
1. What was the call here?  
2. Once on scene, what was the problem?  
3. What other elements of this situation would you be concerned about? 
4. Is this the type of situation that you would walk into with the goal of de-
escalating? 
5. Why? 
6. What elements of this situation make de-escalation more challenging? 
7. How did the officer in the video try to de-escalate the situation?  
8. Did it work?  
9. Was there anything else the officer could have tried? 
10. Did the other officers in the video play a role in the efforts to de-escalate?   
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